5: Schwimmer E-4,5 (1966-1967) 1973
OJ23 Orokaiva OJ23
Mountain Orokaiva

648 their home country. American troops, by their equal treatment of Negro
177 soldiers, created the impression that racial barriers had no place in their society!
The troops' friendliness to the Papuans was tangibly expressed by gifts, not only
[439] of tobacco and other small luxuries, but also of discarded tools and equipment
still used in villages today. It is in these events that the Orokaiva saw the portent
of the coming of a new era.

731 *The Eruption of Mount Lamington.* In 1951, a Peléan eruption occurred on Mount Lamington. The *nuée ardente* produced by this eruption completely devastated a surrounding area of 68 sq. miles (Taylor 1958). Almost 4,000 people were killed and there were hardly any survivors of the numerous Sangara tribe. Those who did survive were provided with food, medicines and other comforts by the government and were for some time maintained in evacuation camps. The evacuees were not at once allowed to return to their villages as the authorities feared further explosions in the mountain. Some officials saw in this sequence of events a chance to create Papuan model communities with up-to-date socio-economic institutions. These plans for village reform, whatever their merits, were not realised at that time, partly because the danger of further explosions was soon greatly reduced, in the view of vulcanologists, so that the people were allowed to go back to their old village sites; partly also, because the reforms were not favoured by the Australian administration which assumed power after the defeat of the Labour Government in 1951.

648 *Intensification of Development Policy.* Large scale, expertly planned social,
657 economic and political development did not start in Papua until around 1960
(Parker 1966:189). In the economic sphere the first major development success
was the building up of a coffee industry based on the production of indigenous
[464] growers using their own village land. While by far the largest quantity of this
coffee is grown in the Highlands, the yield in the Northern District was enough
[434] to assure to any Orokaiva who entered the scheme an income of something like
$60–100, in the year 1966–67. During that year all the villages I visited, both
on the foothills and in the plains, were producing coffee. It was an activity in
which any able-bodied man resident in a village would normally engage to a
greater or lesser extent. Several factors aided the development of this industry.

[242] Agricultural extension work to train the population of the Northern District in coffee growing began immediately after the eruption. A training school was set up in Popondetta. Papuan agricultural assistants were trained to give basic instruction and to distribute seed. These assistants spread knowledge not only while they were employed by the government, but even more when they went back to their villages and grew their own coffee.

648 Title improvement work is also beginning to contribute to agricultural
657 development. Until 1956, the government kept entirely aloof from indigenous
423 tenure problems and passed no ordinances enabling it to adjudicate in land
disputes. By that time, however, it had become obvious that commercial
arboriculture could be developed only to a limited extent unless a land registry
was introduced and the traditional Orokaiva principle of maintaining residual
rights in land was adandoned. Though the first attempts to change the land
tenure system were unsuccessful, in 1967 it looked as though a very satisfactory
procedure had been worked out. (See Ch. V.)

648 Road improvement was another necessary preliminary to significant village
657
491

TABLE II/8

ENROLMENT IN PRIMARY SCHOOLS OF THE 871
ANGLICAN MISSION IN THE NORTHERN 797
DISTRICT 872
(*Source*: Department of Education, Popondetta)

	1966	*1967 (Est.)*
Preparatory Classes	1,775	1,845
Standard 1	1,290	1,307
Standard 2	1,563	1,581
Standard 3	1,278	1,298
Standard 4	1,275	1,310
Standard 5	693	708
Standard 6	488	498
Total	8,362	8,547

Note: Some schools offered classes up to Standard 2, some up to Standard 3, some up to Standard 4, while only a few schools offered classes beyond that level. Children unable to obtain transfers to schools offering classes at a higher level might stay at school for a year or more after finishing the highest available grade. This explains the unusual statistical pattern.

development. By 1967 two important moves had been made: the arterial road 648
between Buna and Kokoda was being rebuilt and linked to the main 657
coffee-producing villages by a system of access roads, built with the assistance of 491
taxes raised in villages.

The educational services have not, so far, been very closely integrated with 871
economic development goals. Many of the schools in the Northern District 872
are conducted by the Mission. While the objectives of many of the Mission 797
schools are still primarily religious, and the teaching staff has only rudimentary training, some of them do prepare students for further education at the secondary level, and provide recruits for skilled occupations. The Sasembata school attended by Sivepe children falls within that category. Chances of passing a qualifying examination for secondary schooling are good and from that point adequate financial assistance is usually available to students. Villages such as Hohorita and Inonda, lacking such opportunities, and having access to only two or three years of elementary schooling, cannot hope to have any but the brightest students advance to secondary education. As the language of [191]
instruction is English in all schools, those who do not advance beyond elementary grades do not become acquainted with concepts relevant to development objectives.[12]

Local Government Council. The Higaturu Local Government Council, 657
formed in 1956, serves about 15,000 Orokaiva, comprising the Popondetta, Sohe-Popondetta and Saiho census divisions. In 1966 the main activities of the

TABLE II/9

657 REVISED ESTIMATES OF HIGATURU LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL FOR JULY 1966–JUNE 1967 (*abridged*)

Revenues		*Expenditures*	
Tax: 2000 males	$16,000	*A. Personal Emolument*	
1000 females	1,000	Council President	$ 156
Truck Hire	13,000	Council Vice-President	108
		Councillors	1,560
		Exec., Fin. Ctee	108
Aid Post Orderlies Subsidy	1,250	Council Clerk	1,170
Water Supply Subsidy	3,320	Messenger	390
Aid Post Subsidy	240	Landrover Driver	500
		Truck Drivers	1,450
		Agric. Fieldworker	234
Adult Education Subsidy	780	Market Manager	260
Miscellaneous	2,900	Aid Post Orderlies	2,500
Total	$38,490	*Total*	$ 8,692
		B. Revenue Expenditure	
		Council Administration	$ 1,000
		Transport	5,000
		Drugs	720
		Adult Education	780
		Other Items	1,686
		Total	$ 9,186
		C. Capital Expenditure	
		Drivers' houses (2)	$ 2,200
		Council Staff House	800
		Council House Furniture	500
		Market Building	1,500
		Staff, House, Health, Personnel	800
		Water Supplies (16 villages)	6,565
		Clinics (3 villages)	900
		Roading (3 projects)	6,070
		Other Items	2,099
		Total	$21,434
		Grand Total	$39,212

Council were road building, improvement of water supplies, building medical aid posts, maintaining produce markets at Popondetta and Saiho and the operation [651] of trucks to provide extra revenue. Most revenue was derived from a head tax of $8 per annum for every adult male and $2 per annum for every adult female. The central government paid a 50 per cent subsidy on certain Council projects. [474] Between 1959 and 1962, the Council also ran the coffee processing factory [245] operated for Orokaiva producers, but this was transferred to the control of an

Orokaiva Coffee-Grower Society, a producers' co-operative formed for the 657
purpose. 245

The Council is made up of twenty-six Orokaiva members who are paid a 474
monthly stipend. However, in practice a government adviser attached to the Council appears to determine policy. Indigenous attitudes to the Council are analysed in detail in Schwimmer 1967. Together with the Coffee Society, it has offered the Orokaiva some political participation and the importance of this new departure is vividly recognised by the people.

The New Age. Since the Second Wo[illegible]War, a great many ideas from the 177
outside world have been communicated to the Orokaiva. I have already 797
mentioned economic, and some political ideas; in addition, the Anglican mission began to attract many converts, especially after the Mount Lamington disaster. By 1964, the great majority of Orokaiva were baptised.

The establishment of the House of Assembly in Port Moresby, giving limited 641
powers of political decision to Papuan representatives elected by universal 666
suffrage, has introduced new patterns in village life: meetings with the local member, with other candidates, and with organisers acting for these candidates and presenting political argument. The personnel of the local government council tends to be deeply committed in national politics and to talk about political affairs when visiting villages.

During such discussions, the Orokaiva are beginning to learn that an end to 648
Australian rule is conceivable and that they will have some voice in decisions relating to the independence of their own country. They fully recognise that this makes an immediate difference to the balance of power between themselves and

TABLE II/10

EDUCATION AND OCCUPATIONAL EXPERIENCE OF THE JEGASE AND SEHO CLANS OF SIVEPE COMPARED – ADULT MALES ONLY 464 871

Approximate Period	*Education*		*Occupational Experience*	
	Seho	*Jegase*	*Seho*	*Jegase*
Nil	6	6	4	5
1 year	–	1	1	2
2 years	–	2	1	–
3 years	–	1	–	–
4 years	–	2	–	2
5 years	–	–	–	1
6 years	–	1	–	–
7 years			–	–
8 years			–	–
Over 8 years			–	4
Data vague	2	1	2	–
Total	8	14	8	14

222 4 Orokaiva: *tauga*; botanical: *cycas media*; Orokaiva: *puga*; botanical: *terminalia okaria*. There are two varieties of breadfruit, called *oga* and *eumba*. They are both somewhat unusual but I failed, in spite of sending samples, to obtain indentifications.

241 5 Details of garden production are given in Table II/3. Rainfall at Sivepe and Inonda is shown in Rimoldi 1966:109; Crocombe and Hogbin 1963:100.

342 6 A plan of a contemporary Orokaiva house is shown in Fig. 3. Recent changes in house design, house construction and domestic amenities are summarised in Table II/4.

462 7 See Tables II/5 and II/6. Williams' data are taken from an unpublished manuscript and appeared first in Schwimmer 1969:226. I have discussed the Orokaiva division of labour in more detail in Schwimmer 1969: 145–50 and explained the apparent discrepancies between Williams' table and Waddell's and Krinks' statistics.

439 8 Crocombe and Hogbin (1963) provide a list of prices prevailing in this
437 trade. They report that there is still some trade in shell ornaments from the coast and in feathers for head dresses from the mountains. Informants at Eroro, on the coast near Buna, gave me details of their traditional trade with Managalasi of the nearby mountains. A Sivepe man who has hunting rights to land near Ajoro goes there to hunt birds and sell the feathers. His chances of finding any of the more valuable birds near Sivepe are remote. The difference in Sivepe and Inonda patterns (i.e. the foothills and the alluvial plains) appears from the data in Table II/7. It will be seen that Sivepe stock is to a far greater extent inherited, whereas Inonda stock is to a far greater extent acquired through brideprice (value $13), barter (value $21.60) and other exchanges (value $13.70).

439 9 Dr. Waddell has provided a detailed statistical table of the geographical
438 distribution of subsistence produce (Waddell and Krinks 1968:218). This table provides clear and detailed information on the geographical range of the Sivepe
437 exchange network. A full descriptive account may be found in Schwimmer 1969: 41–69.

648 10 An interesting picture of this period of Orokaiva history is drawn in Beaver, 1916.

795 11 Full information on these cults will be found in Chinnery and Haddon (1917) and Williams (1928). If has escaped previous commentators that Bia, who started the taro cult, was employed for some years by Monckton, and participated in various punitive enterprises with an alacrity most pleasing to his master. He was described in Monckton's books in rather revealing detail (e.g. 1921: 185, 268, 269, 295, 308; 1922: 10, 13, 65, 136, 172, 214, 216). For the present relationship between the Orokaiva and the missions, see Schwimmer 1969; 123–33.

871 12 The general subject of Orokaiva economic development since 1951 is
very fully covered in numerous bulletins published by the New Guinea Research
872 Unit from 1963 to the present, and also in Schwimmer 1969. A general
797 indication of the investments in socio-economic development is given by a table
of public expenditure in the territory of Papua for the years ended 30 June 1961
657 to 1965 (Commonwealth of Australia: *Annual Report of the Territory of Papua*
648 *for the period 1 July 1964 to 30 June 1965*, 179). The growing emphasis on educational services is perhaps the most notable aspect. Table II/8 indicates the pattern of school attendance. Table II/9 summarises the activities of the Higaturu Local Government Council; roads, water supplies and clinics are perhaps the projects most relevant to development.

101 13 The three villages have been sketched in figures 4, 5 and 6. Education and occupational experience at Sivepe and Hohorita are analysed in Tables II/10 and II/11.

CHAPTER IV

THE EXCHANGE SYSTEM AND THE NEW AGE

1. *Cultural Changes*

177 Many significant changes have occurred in Orokaiva society since European
[241] contact. The introduction of cash cropping has made the Orokaiva, to some
[437] extent, into a peasantry, depending to a limited degree on monetised marketing.
Furthermore, there has been a large amount of labour migration, mostly by male
[167] workers whose families stay behind in villages. Even in the villages, technological
[433] innovations have been influential in raising productivity and improving standards
of living, while sharply reducing the game population. People have become
[657] accustomed to the existence of a specialised political authority, wielded by
Australians but supported and assisted by Papuan functionaries. Inter-village and
[797] inter-tribal warfare has been effectively suppressed. The Orokaiva give at least
nominal allegiance to Christianity, and thus to the principle of obedience to an
omnipotent god.

829 These changes have profound implications for Orokaiva political philosophy.
177 As we have seen, the Orokaiva recognised the importance of Hobbes' question:
how can a man avoid a perpetual war between all and all? The answer, briefly, was
657 that social order can be created by a system of exchange partnerships. But this was not Hobbes' own answer nor that of the Australians who now rule New Guinea. If the changes pursued by the colonial government are wholly successful, it is clear that exchange partnerships, as the basic source of social order, must become subordinate to legitimate central political authority and the modern market economy. In other words, there is what Gluckman calls a 'contradiction' (1965: 109) between Australian policy and the exchange-oriented Orokaiva social philosophy. It is possible, but cannot be predicted, that this 'contradiction' will eventually lead the Orokaiva to abandon their traditional exchange ideology. In the meantime, however, it is already clear to the Orokaiva that their world view is being seriously challenged by white wealth and power.

436 The effect of pressure on the exchange system is evident in many spheres. In
the economic sphere, the Orokaiva still carry on most of their non-monetary
437 transactions by the traditional system, using gift exchange between consanguines,
431 affines and bond friends. Furthermore, gifts of money are being made along traditional lines, money being used either as a substitute for *hambo* and other valuables, or as gifts from urban migrants to country kin. On the other hand, store-bought goods are, by a general convention, excluded from the full operation of the exchange system, only a minority being distributed as gifts. The

tendency is to use money income to purchase goods needed for daily life but 436
obtainable in the subsistence sector of the economy (Waddell and Krinks 1968: 437
192). Only a small minority of the goods used by Orokaiva fall into this
category, but if the tendency to exclude most store-bought goods from the gift 431
exchange system continues, we may expect that system gradually to decline in
importance as the monetary sector of the economy increases.

In the political sphere, the traditional system of control is still generally in 621
operation at the village level. Under this system some men may exert great
influence over a community, but they cannot enforce compliance by physical 622
sanctions. While the Orokaiva generally maintain this system, an exception is 657
made for councillors and committee men acting under delegated power from the
government. These men may lay complaints with Australian authority and in
practice do not always disdain to do so. Among the New Zealand Maori, any [171]
leader who so much as threatens to invoke European authority risks being
nicknamed 'Mr. Government' and losing all influence. Not so among the
Orokaiva; the argument is that it is better for such powers to be used by an
Orokaiva official than by the government itself. Nonetheless, use of authority 181
outside the extended family goes against the Orokaiva ethos and undermines the
exchange system in a minor way, because an official, by invoking his *authority*, 177
can obtain something from Alter without becoming indebted to Alter. A [622]
traditional leader, under the same circumstances, might have incurred a debt or
drawn on a kind of credit balance. Here again, the departure from the traditional
exchange system does not greatly intrude in everyday affairs, but is symptomatic
of the type of changes social development would bring. There has thus been a
growing inconsistency between the norms of the traditional exchange system
and the facts of labour migration, cash cropping, adherence to the Christian
Church, attendance at meetings called by councillors, school education, use of
medical services, changes in house architecture, participation in women's clubs,
savings and loan societies, rubber co-operatives and the like. How, if at all, did
Orokaiva thought cope with these basic inconsistencies?

I have explained how traditional institutions are accounted for. When I 773
inquired why it is that mankind wears clothing, makes fires, contracts marriages,
I would be told myths about the *dema* responsible for these institutions. I would also be told that after the *dema* had shown men how to act in these matters there had never been any change. There was primordial time during which men lived, one might say, in the state of nature. In spite of the absence of strife and death that era was not invariably represented as a happy one. Women were desolate because they had no men to marry, no fire to cook with, no houses to live in. In spite of most obstinate and desperate efforts, graphically described in the myths, mankind failed to get the things it needed. The *dema* thus brought release from suffering when they introduced cultural goods, techniques and rules of behaviour. But after the *dema* died, nothing ever changed again.

While such beliefs belie any suggestions that the Orokaiva are without 173
history,[1] it remains true that the Orokaiva repertoire of historical explanations is 773
very small. The actions of the *dema*, the scission of lineages comparable to the
branches of a tree, the settlement of villages by men sleeping under a *barevo* tree – this completes the set of traditional historical explanations of which I have knowledge. How could the Orokaiva, confined to this set of concepts, find

dismissed by a seeker of ancient lore, but contained some myths of obviously 177
recent vintage which helped me to understand contemporary Orokaiva thought. 773
I was told that before the Europeans came, the Orokaiva used to make only very
small gardens. They were in constant danger of starvation and depended greatly
on wild fruit. I copied the names of these, but was told that many of them were
never eaten nowadays. (Many are inedible.) In those days, people did not
make feasts as they did not grow enough food. The large gardens people have at [412]
the present time were introduced only when the Europeans brought steel axes
and knives.

In other villages I was told similar stories about a primordial state of wretchedness when people cultivated no taro but ate wild fruit now considered inedible. But this period ended when the *dema* introduced the elements of traditional Orokaiva culture. In Hohorita, culture history had become foreshortened. Other Orokaiva distinguished the traditional *dema* stories which occurred in the dim past from the stories concerning the arrival of the Europeans; they recognised in fact *two* periods of fundamental change: one ancient and complete, the other recent and incomplete. In Hohorita tradition, these two periods have to some extent become fused. The premature death of men born between, say, 1890 and 1910 deprived the men of today of any factual knowledge of the coming of the European: it has already been turned into myth and placed, so to speak, *in illo tempore*. But this unusual development only emphasises how closely the gifts of European culture are identified with those of traditional *dema*.

The chairman of the Higaturu Local Government Council, who also happened 623
to live at Hohorita, had long conversations with me about the constitution and 657
activities of the council. On one occasion I wished to discover to what extent the
council had been set up in response to popular aspirations and to what extent 177
the councillors (as opposed to the Australian adviser) made decisions on basic [115]
policy. Answer: because the government had a council at Rabaul, it decided to
have one in the Northern District as well. Did the people want the council? They had been given schools; they had been given coffee to market. They therefore thought the council would also be good. Would it not be better for the people to decide for themselves how their problems should be solved instead of leaving all decision-making to the government? The council did not come from ourselves but from the administration. We do not know about the council. It belongs to the administration and it was given to the village people.

The Department of District Administration had recommended this informant
to me as being the most knowledgeable in the district on the subject of the
council. I found his knowledge of the facts to be most accurate, and at council
meetings he was the only man who dared to argue with the advisory officer. But [829]
when I questioned him on the level of social philosophy, he fell back on the
standard Orokaiva explanation: power and strength come to us not from things we have invented or made ourselves, but from things that have been given to us by our exchange partners. This is precisely what Councillor Ase said: if the Orokaiva of today desires to have an *ivo* equal to that of his ancestors, he has to follow the instructions of the council, i.e. to build a new village, grow coffee, individualise land titles. This, at the present time, is his best available source of power and strength. In other words, it is not a matter of villagers independently

623 working out a development policy, but rather of obeying a sacred formula that
657 came to the Australian authorities from a *dema*-like source and was then passed
on as a gift to the Orokaiva.
177
Are all these gifts derived ultimately, in Orokaiva estimation, from Jesus
829 Christ, or are there other *dema* figures as well to whom these gifts are ascribed?
[123] Who would they be? This is a hard subject for a white anthropologist to inquire
into. Informants answer: 'We do not know. Nobody has told us.' The
anthropologist feels uneasily that if anyone knows the source of Western wealth
and power, it ought to be himself rather than his informants.

3. *New Exchange Cycles*

121 The image of post-contact history reconstructed here from statements by
Orokaiva informants seems unduly dreamlike and idealised. This is because they are statements about the metaphysical starting mechanisms making social relations possible. Turning to the relationships themselves, I find that they are often marred by a severe conflict of interests and values. For the purpose of a brief overview, we shall consider relationships with representatives of three types of European-introduced institutions: church, commerce, and government. Following our theoretical scheme, we shall be especially interested in the objects that are exchanged in these relationships and in the mediating elements that make possible social exchange.

An employer of Papuan labour is interested chiefly in obtaining the
461 compliance of his workers by the payment of money. Usually he is not at all
466 interested in social exchange, but in a contract whereby he acquires the total
work output of the worker for the period he is on the job. The Orokaiva,
829 however, regards all the work he does as part of a social relationship with the
437 person for whom he works. First of all, he expects that person to feed him while
he is working. This is because he has been prevented by the person he is helping
177 from going to his own garden. The employer in New Guinea usually does feed
his workers, subtracting the cost of the food from the wages he pays. But secondly, the Orokaiva, lacking a long tradition of wage labour, regards his work as a long series of gifts to his employer enabling him to claim return gifts. He does not think of his wages as being a total discharge of his employer's obligations. They were promised at the beginning, but since then many unpredictable things have happened: he has loyally looked after his employer's interests in a series of small crises; he finds he has additional urgent needs he did not envisage when he agreed to come to the job; he believes his labour has yielded his employer vast profits. As the Orokaiva understand a social partnership, events of this kind all create a claim upon the person who has received help. Thus, the worker keeps on pressing his employer most persuasively for extra gifts of various sorts, in addition to his wages. This pattern is found throughout New Guinea and is known as the *baksheesh* system. Employers often give in to the demands, hand out various extras, and allow for these costs in plantation budgets.[3]

466 The basic significance of the *baksheesh* has already been pointed out by
437 Mauss (1966: 250–5, 229–32); '*La chose ainsi transmise est, en effet, chargée de l'individualité du donateur*.' It rests on a notion that both worker and
177

employer give something in excess of their contractual obligation. These services 466
and gifts over and above the formal contract are a form of social exchange. Both 437
parties seem to be expressing affection and solicitude for the other. The worker
does this by special care for his employer's interests; the employer does it by 177
'baksheesh'. The latter are never just extra handouts or cast-offs, though these may also be given. They are usually responses to appeals by the worker who describes an emergency that has arisen for which he requires some object of usually quite limited value: old batteries, a little kerosene, etc. It is the employer's solicitude in response to a claim which gives these objects their special value (though, of course, they have some monetary value as well). This social exchange can be expressed in the following diagram:

MODEL 6



This model represents the ideal norm of the relationship, as seen by the Orokaiva. He is well aware that the reality often falls far short of the ideal norm: not all employers show affection and solicitude. It is, however, a more serious flaw of the model that the white employer would totally reject it; his ideal norm of the employer-employee relationship is a very different one that does not involve social exchange (or baksheesh) at all. There is, in fact, a conflict of ideal norms between employer and employee. The actual arrangements on the plantations, which I have briefly sketched, are a sort of compromise or accommodation between the two conflicting concepts of employment: the employee accepts the fact that baksheesh is usually rather unwillingly and rudely handed over, as being a regrettable white man's custom; and the employer somehow makes room for a minimum of baksheesh on his balance sheet.

The fact that the conflict of values remains unresolved in this relationship 177
does not vitally threaten plantation development, but similar conflicts are not so easily sidestepped in the Orokaiva's relationship with government and the mission. Neither community development nor religious conversion will be successful without some ideological commitment on the part of the receivers of the message. Obvious though this statement is, it is worth while to spell out its implications here, as it applies to the implementation of government policy.

Policy is formulated in Port Moresby and promulgated by the Administrator 657
in the form of ordinances and regulations. Instructions on the enforcement of 177
these are prepared by the Department of District Administration in Port Moresby and interpreted, in the light of local conditions, by the Department's officers in Popondetta, the administrative centre of the Northern District. But how can these ordinances and regulations be enforced in the jungle by a very limited number of patrol officers? Until 1956, a rather simple procedure was used. The patrol officers appointed a large number of suitable Orokaiva as village [625]

657 177 625 constables, instructed them to report any trouble, visited the villages, looked for evidence of non-compliance with instructions, punished delinquents, left further instructions with the village constable and threatened further punishment. The trouble with this procedure was that the changes it could produce were of rather limited scope. All the Orokaiva needed to do to keep the patrol officer satisfied was to attend to things that could be seen on a visit (the state of the roads, houses, latrines, the grass in the villages, the quota of obligatory rubber trees, etc.) and to avoid the kind of trouble the village constable could not help reporting (murders, serious dissensions).

657 177 623 Social and economic development, however, depends on the communication of ideas, on encouraging regular schooling, use of medical facilities, cash-cropping, the development of markets, participation in local government, preparing the young for careers outside the district, encouraging capital formation and entrepreneurship, improvement of agricultural techniques, land titles, and so on. In the 1950s, when the government became deeply interested in these objectives, it created local government councils, abolished village constables, and rather forcefully changed its emphasis from the enforcement of compliance to the inducement of collaboration. Some of the Australian officers told me they found this shift rather frightening: if there was no jail for non-compliance, how could one be sure that the Orokaiva would take any notice? On the other hand, Orokaiva conservatives found the shift in policy frightening for the opposite reason: as they told me, the village constables left Orokaiva social life virtually intact, except that occasionally someone would be sent to jail for a while – a mere ripple on the surface of community affairs. But since the government councils were established, and the councillors came round regularly making long speeches, and since the new institutions listed above had actually been demonstrated to be useful, the foundations of the old way of life were beginning to be undermined.

With the help of the councillors, the government's ideas were certainly being communicated, but hardly ever by the government's own officers.[4] The only white officers who regularly visit villagers are young, inexperienced patrol officers, dependent on interpreters. Speech-making is only a minor part of their role and not the most successful. All the councillors I have heard, however, are master propagandists. As the government's aim is clearly the communication of ideas, it would be hard to find a more efficient method than the present one, where the government communicates to the councillors and leaves the latter to do the rest.

An interesting and somewhat unusual exchange cycle results from these transactions. The exchange partners are the government and groups of Orokaiva villagers. The objects of exchange are information (emanating from the government) and respectful attention (on the part of the villagers). I use this term 'respectful attention' as the nearest translation of Orokaiva *ingari* which means 'to hear', 'to understand', 'to follow advice' – and comes closer than any other word in the Orokaiva vocabulary to the notion of obedience and compliance. The exchange cycle may be expressed in the following diagram:

MODEL 7



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The elements of mediation are entirely indispensable in this relationship. Unless there is development activity, the government will feel that the relationship has broken down. Unless the councillors intervene, the government's information cannot be communicated.

Both the villagers and the government find this exchange cycle highly 657
precarious. It is precarious for the villagers because social exchange, for the 177
Orokaiva, implies a state of competition between the partners. It is unprofitable to engage in social exchange with a partner unless one can hope to equal him (and even better him) in wealth and power. This desire to equal (and defeat) the Europeans competitively is an ambition of which informants spoke to me occasionally when I came to know them well. It was quite clear to the Orokaiva that they could never achieve this objective by growing coffee on small village plots. Hence, they could not regard the activity advocated by the government as being worth engaging in for its own sake. The question facing them was: will this activity serve our ultimate end of achieving equivalence or victory? The term 'development activity', as used in model 7 implies that it is thought to serve this ultimate end.

I demonstrated in the previous chapter that all elements of mediation are 657
essentially magical. The Orokaiva similarly regard development activity as 177
magical. In response to this notion, government officers sometimes evolve rules
of behaviour that look remarkably like magical formulae. One officer in the 241
Northern District invented a regular weekly calendar which he thought the Orokaiva 789
should follow. Certain days of the week should be set aside for coffee growing, others for growing and marketing extra garden crops, others for cleaning and improving the village, and so on. I heard the officer proclaim this calendar; later, I heard a councillor proclaim it in Sivepe village. It was listened to with respectful attention, but afterwards ridiculed by the village men. The formula was rejected because it was thought to be useless. There was, of course, a plethora of such formulae circulating as many officers thought up their own, and most officers were rapidly transferred from one job to another. It was natural, therefore, for the Orokaiva to become selective in the formulae they adopted. Also, experience showed them that the formulae did not always work.

The difference between this modern magic and the traditional varieties lies in 177
the greater uncertainty of the prescription. The Orokaiva habitually use an
experimental approach to magic: if one medicine does not work, then try 657
another. But all traditional medicine has at least an impeccable source: it was 789
given by the ancestors. The magic of 'development' (money, Western technology, Western power) was, in Orokaiva belief, ultimately derived from Jesus

177 Christ and perhaps other supreme sources of which they have no knowledge, but
657 these ultimate sources mostly seem inaccessible to the Orokaiva; the people
[789] know their information to be poor and unreliable. Nonetheless, as the councillor
from Hohorita remarked, it has been found by experience that the gifts deriving from the government have often been good ones. The relationship is therefore worth maintaining as it may produce further valuable gifts in the future. (This widely held opinion, incidently, is the bane of Papuan progressives, who are pressing for immediate independence of the Territory from Australian rule).

Although, in an attempt to make my meaning clear, I have spoken of the magic of 'development', it is important to point out that the term 'development' has not been borrowed, to my knowledge, in Orokaiva speech. The Orokaiva term is *iji eha* (the new day), a phrase occurring, for instance, in the passage quoted from Councillor Ase's address. The *iji eha* has come about, as we have seen, as the result of the gifts of a new *dema*, Jesus Christ. One of these gifts was a permanent peace, to replace the permanent state of *isoro* of earlier days. But this gift was accompanied by new commandments. Councillor Ase emphasised the casual connection between the gift and the commandments: 'As a new day has now arrived (*oroho evi iji eha avo eto*,), I tell you to be united.' Like *isoro*, so the *iji eha* requires unity, but for the sake of struggles of a different kind: the building of a new village, the growing of coffee and rubber, the support of school education. The commandments of the *iji eha* are in effect community development.

177 It may thus be said without hyperbole that community development among
657 the Orokaiva has a mythological charter – namely, the Christian religion as the
Orokaiva understand it. It acts as a mediating element between the Orokaiva and
797 the European power-bearers: it is the magic whereby a relation of social exchange may be established between the former and the latter and whereby the Orokaiva may eventually become the equals of the white man in wealth and power.

177 But the second mediating element in this relationship is the councillors,
through whom the government's information must pass to reach the people.
657 They do not play the role of leaders but of mediators in a rather limited sense.
623 In their contact with the government (mainly confined to contact with the advisory officer to the council), they receive information and hear council decisions in the formulation of which they generally have no part. The flow of information tends to be from the government to the councillors rather than in the reverse direction. This one-sidedness suits both parties, but especially the councillors, who gain little but may lose much by adding to the government's knowledge. At the village level, the councillor tends to become the chief mouthpiece of the *iji eha*. He is expected to report faithfully, and in detail, what he has heard from the government. His advice will be asked on matters related to council activities, but most of the time it is the councillor himself who takes the initiative and harangues the villagers. He does not expect all his advice to be accepted; he may even have private doubts about some of what he is
[191] transmitting. A Sivepe ex-councillor even had the habit of reporting on all council matters in Motu, a *lingua franca* used at council meetings because the advisory officer does not know Orokaiva. Most Sivepe people understand some
[554] Motu. By speaking in Motu to his fellow-villagers, the councillor built up his own

status while at the same time establishing some distance between his official 177
performance and his private self. Even when a councillor does not resort to so 657
extreme a device, his role is a highly formalised one, as the values underlying his
message are very strange to him. The *iji eha*, as communicated at the council 623
meeting, is almost outside his mental grasp. He has heard the details but cannot 191
see the pattern. (The council meetings are not suited to the communication of 554
the complex patterns of Western civilisation.) Fortunately his audience is usually warm and sympathetic to his message and shares with him the mood, the 'feeling' of the *iji eha*, if little else.

4. *The New Day, the Mission and Divine Retribution*

Relationships with the mission in the Northern District have usually been of two 797
main types. When a mission station was first established, exchange relations
between Orokaiva and the station began immediately. The mission offered 177
schooling, medical services and largesse of various sorts. The Orokaiva offered land and labour. These were direct exchanges requiring no mediating elements. The mission was usually in no great hurry to begin baptising converts, preferring to let interested persons rise gradually from the status of hearer to catechist and conferring baptism some years later. Although coastal stations were established around the turn of the century, it was only after the Second World War, when a considerable number of stations and outstations were established inland, that the majority of Orokaiva came within reach of mission influence. The Sasembata station[5] serving Sivepe was not opened until 1945 and had no baptisms until 1953. The bulk of the population of that village was converted between 1953 and 1964.

It was then that the second, and more complex, phase of the relationship started. In the first phase there had been a great deal of contact between people and mission station, especially because of the educational services that were offered, but it was only in the second phase that these contacts became religiously significant. We may express the emerging relationship in the following diagram:

MODEL 8



Although this exchange cycle seems, on the surface, to represent more or less the relationship between any Christian and his Church, it seems arbitrary to select from the complex set of mediating elements enriching the fullness of such a relationship as commonly understood just these two sacraments, important as they are. It is only in the light of the Orokaiva understanding of the Church that

Origins of the System (1894 - 1918)

From the beginning of British administration in Papua 657
in 1888, it was policy to encourage Papuans to engage in cash 241
cropping. MacGregor, the first Lieutenant-Governor, advocated
cash cropping to those villagers he met in his tours of the
country, but such incidental advice by an intinerant official was
probably not very influential. The first legislative provision [46C]
to promote cash cropping was a Native Regulation, introduced
by MacGregor in 1894, which provided that magistrates could [245]
compel indigenous people to plant coconuts on penalty of a
fine.(1) This was extended in 1903 by a regulation which pro-
vided for compulsory planting of other economic trees. Native [177]
agriculture was not, however, the main plank of agricultural
policy for although government staff were trained to "treat
natives justly" they were directed "above all to prepare the
country for development by Europeans. There is not, and
there has not been, any other policy".(2)

Planting under the regulations took place slowly, and
only in areas which were under the close supervision of magis-
trates.. It appears that there was little planting of cash crops [433]
by Papuans other than under the compulsion of the regulation
and at this stage it does not seem to have been a matter of con-
cern to the Administration whether the people planted in-
dividually or in groups. It has not been possible to determine
which pattern was most frequently followed in practice, though
the examples noted in the literature mostly involved planting by
village or clan groups rather than by individuals. Coconuts
were the main crop planted under the regulations, but rice,
rubber, kapok, peanuts and fruit trees were tried in smaller

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(1) Native Regulation No. 2, 1894. Miles (1956: 318) regards MacGregor's technique for promoting native agriculture as unusually enlightened, but in fact it seems to have been almost universal in the Pacific at that period, and MacGregor had become familiar with it while serving under Sir Arthur Gordon in Fiji. Similar regulations were introduced by Germany to Samoa and New Guinea, by the United Kingdom to Fiji and the Gilbert Islands, by New Zealand to the Cook Islands and by Holland to Indonesia.

(2) MacGregor to Lamington 4.10.1898 (quoted in Healy 1962 : 84).

657
quantities in some areas.(1) 241

After the turn of the century less emphasis was given 657
to the policy of expanding indigenous plantings of cash crops and 464
instead Papuans were persuaded to work as labour on European
plantations. In 1906 the Lieutenant-Governor stated that not 177
only was staff inadequate to enforce the 1894 regulation, but [433]
that where it was enforced the resultant income attracted
traders whom he felt to be a bad influence on the Papuan people.
Employment on European plantations, on the other hand, was
considered to be beneficial.(2) This policy remained until after
the first world war, though some Resident Magistrates also
applied the regulations in order to extend native plantings.

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(1) For a more detailed study of the application of these regulations see Miles 1956 : 319-23.

(2) Territory of Papua Annual Report (hereafter abbreviated to P.A.R.) 1905-6 : 9.

Native plantations as the mainstay of agricultural policy (1918 - 40)

657 179 After the 1914-18 war, a shortage of labour, low produce prices and high shipping costs made it very difficult to attract European settlers to Papua. The emphasis of agricultural policy was therefore shifted and indigenous agriculture was seen as the only hope for the future. "If we cannot attract capital to develop the Territory", the Lieutenant-Governor wrote, "we must develop it without capital - that is, by native agriculture" (P.A.R. 1921-2 : 6). He saw two particular advantages in native agriculture over European; it did not require hired labour and it did not require large amounts of capital. It was clear the country would not be developed by the few European plantations then in operation (with a planted area of about 61,000 acres in 1923) and for the next decade at least Murray gave great emphasis to the development of "native plantations".

245 249 657 [466] In the Northern District(1) there had been little planting under the regulations since the turn of the century, but with the outbreak of the first world war the Resident Magistrate gave priority to expanding output by the compulsory planting of coconut, rubber and citrus trees, and 10,000 coconut and other economic trees were planted in 1914-15 under the direct supervision of patrol officers (P.A.R. 1914-15 : 49). By 1921 there were 46,404 coconut trees in the Orokaiva area but over half (25,642) had been planted within the previous five years. Almost all the rubber trees had been planted in the previous five years (P.A.R. 1920-1 : 48-50).

657 241 Although the regulations did not prescribe that planting was to be either by individuals or groups, in all the post-1914 instances we are aware of in the Orokaiva area, each village or cluster of villages was in fact directed to plant as a

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[131] (1) The Orokaiva area was included in the Buna and Kokoda Districts of the Northern Division until 1909, then in the Kumusi Division until 1920, and in the Northern Division (later termed the Northern District) since 1920.

group.(1) Group planting seems to have been the general 657 pattern in other parts of the Territory too. In the Western District in particular, the Resident Magistrate initiated schemes 241 for cash crop plantations being owned and operated by each [423] village as a whole. Profits were to be used for projects which would be of benefit to the village community (P.A.R. 1913-14:12). [434] About fifty such plantations were established under the scheme.

During this post-war drive (and probably in 1920) a 657 government officer assembled the people of the nine villages(2) of the northern branch of the Asigi tribe and instructed them to 245 choose a site and plant an area of coconuts for the nine villages as a whole.(3)

A central site was chosen near Ongoho on land belonging to the Akute'undi sub-clan (most of the members of 245 which lived in Ongoho village), and about 500 coconuts were planted as a community project by the men of the nine villages.(4) They were to be used exclusively for copra making (there were ample coconut trees in the villages for domestic use) and work and profits were to be shared equally among the able-bodied men. Small plots of rubber and citrus trees had [249] been established at Ongoho under the same scheme a year or two earlier. The citrus was intended to be used primarily as a latex coagulant for the rubber, and only secondarily as a cash [433] crop.

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(1) In some instances in the coastal villages of the Northern District each individual planted his own trees, but all villagers planted in one "village" block on the land of one man or of one descent group.

(2) Ongoho, Hongorata, Ivisusu, Sowai, Weki, Ondahari, Oere, Girigirita and [361] Heherita. Sowai and Weki were later abandoned and today their populations live together at a new village named Sotokoiari. Likewise Girigirita and Heherita have [103] amalgamated and moved to a new site. The new village is called Girigirita.

(3) Data in this section of the report was collected by interview only in the villages [124] concerned during April-May 1963.

(4) The annual reports show that in 1921 there were 518 coconut trees over five years [101] old and 1,287 under five years old in the Asigi area. The nine villages listed above comprise about half of the total Asigi population. The 518 mature trees were probably those planted in the villages. Trees in the community block which did not survive were not replaced, and as the ground has not been cleared since the second world war, many have died. There were 198 trees still standing in 1963.

The Native Plantations Ordinance

In addition to the post-1918 drive for increased planting under the regulations a new policy was introduced with the dual aim of increasing village production and government revenue. (1) The old regulations had provided for compulsory planting only, but the new ordinance provided for continuous supervision and compulsory maintenance and harvesting of gardens, as well as processing and marketing facilities. Under the heading "Compulsory labour in the natives own interest", Sir Hubert Murray claimed that "the most obvious, and possibly the only solution is to encourage, or if necessary to compel, the native to work for his own benefit" (P.A.R. 1921-2 : 16). 657 466

The new policy was embodied in the Native Plantations Ordinance 1918 (and amendments)(2) which provided for the establishment of community plantations in which both the government and the villagers would participate. Profits were to be shared equally between the government and producers. (3) The Lieutenant-Governor was empowered to direct that any Crown land could be set aside as a Native Reserve for the purpose of establishing a plantation. Alternatively, with the consent of the land owners "whose property the land remains", plantations could be established on native land. 423 657 [434]

The earlier Native Regulations which provided for compulsory planting of cash crops were not repealed, but they seem to have been used much less after the new Ordinance became operative in the 1920's. 657 241

The available sources give little indication of the reasons for emphasis being placed on group plantations rather than individual plots, though Miles (1956 : 323) hazards the view that it facilitated control and inspection, and that the indigenous

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(1) For a discussion of the emphasis on raising government revenue see Mair 1948 : 88.

(2) The Ordinance of 1918 was subsequently superceded by the Native Plantations Ordinance 1925-52, extracts from which are contained in Appendix E.

(3) The Ordinance prescribed that "half or any other proportion" of the crop was to belong to the villagers. In practice villagers were paid half the takings.

241 657 people probably preferred it anyway. He gives no evidence for the latter assertion. It seems equally possible that officials of the day considered the Papuan people to be "naturally" adapted to communal patterns of work.

The first action to implement the ordinance in the Northern District was taken in 1921 and 1922 when inspections were made by officials "with a view to plantations being established of such economic plants as will suit the soil and promise a profitable return" (P. A. R. 1921-2 : 23). Similar action was taken in parts of the Central, Milne Bay and Gulf Districts at the same time.

Acquisition of land

657 423 In 1921 the Crown began to purchase lands under the Lands Ordinance 1911-22 and to declare them under the Native Plantations Ordinance, as Native Reserves set aside for the purpose of Native Plantations. Between 1921 and 1925, 38 such plantations were declared in Papua (33 of them in 1922-3). Each plantation was to be farmed by a group of neighbouring villages. By 1932, however, 18 of the Orders in Council by which the plantations had been established had been cancelled (there were no cancellations thereafter). Of the remaining 20, 14 were located in the Northern District and the other 6 in other parts of Papua. With the exception of small extensions to several plantations, no further land was bought by the Crown for this purpose after 1925. The plantations established on Crown land in the Northern District are listed in Appendix A.[A]

In 1925 the policy changed to the extent that plantations were only established under the ordinance if people could be persuaded to set aside native land for the purpose. The Crown did not buy the land, and residual ownership was not challenged, but for such time as the land was proclaimed under the ordinance it could only be used as a native plantation for a particular group of villages. We have been unable to ascertain the reasons for this change of policy. Between 1923 and 1936, 75 plantations were proclaimed in Papua under this section of the ordinance. By 1934, 36 of the Orders in Council setting up the plantations had been cancelled. Of the remaining 39, 12 were located in the Northern District. They are detailed in Appendix B.[B] No further communal plantations were ever established.

A, [See Category 423, pp. 37-40--Analyst B, [See Category 423, pp. 41-42--Analyst]

425 The purchase documents list the names of the vendors, who were described as "sole owners" of the land concerned.(1) There was an average of five "owners" per block, with a range from one to eleven. All of them were men. From the sample checked it appears that not all members (nor even all male members) of the owning sub-clans were included, but rather the heads of the owning sub-clan and of component lineages. Moreover, some heads of neighbouring sub-clans which participated in the project, but were not members of the owning sub-clans, were included. This suggests that the people may have viewed the negotiation as a decision by the signatories and their descent groups to set the land aside for a particular purpose (with the consent of the occupying sub-clan), rather than outright sale by the occupying sub-clan.

Legally the blocks which were purchased belonged to the Crown, but the Orokaiva people do not admit either the sale or any other Crown rights. In the course of field work in 1963 we asked villagers at each of 12 blocks, to whom the land on which the coffee was planted belonged. Invariably we were told that it belonged to one or other of the local sub-clans. In three instances we suggested that it may have belonged to the Crown, but the people reacted so strongly that we did not press the point, (though the strength of their assertion may well have reflected their uncertainty about precise rights to the land).

423 At the time of purchase the officers concerned no doubt pointed out to the owners that the land would not be taken for use by the government, but would be set aside for the collective use of the villages concerned. The plantations were in fact established and it is understandable that the people consider that the landowners were merely granting joint usufruct to members of neighbouring sub-clans. The government has never asserted its legal rights to the abandoned plantations, and it seems unlikely that it will ever do so.

Planting under the ordinance

●657
241
[212]

Whereas the Native Regulations had been implemented by the Resident Magistrates, provision was made in the

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(1) The vendors were illiterate and signed the documents by the putting of marks.

ordinance for the appointment of officers as "controllers of 657
native plantations". The first of these, Mr. G.H. Murray, 241
was appointed in 1920 to serve the whole Territory (P.A.R.
1920-1 : 28). It was not until 1923 that a permanent officer,
Mr. A.T. Dawson, was posted to the Northern District. Neither
officer had been trained in agriculture.

The people of the Northern District were reported to be receptive to the idea of having their own plantations and "practically no compulsion" was applied in getting initial agreement to the principle (P.A.R. 1923-4 : 16).

Planting began in 1923 and by 1925 fourteen of the 248
plantations had been planted. Owing to a delay in obtaining
cocoa seedlings from Java, 30 acres of cotton were planted in
1925 (P.A.R. 1924-5 : 27). The cotton experiment was a
failure and was not repeated. By 1926 there were only 50 acres 245
of cocoa, 10 acres of coffee and 6 acres of oil palm in the dis- [249]
trict.(1) Eleven of the plantations were of cocoa, one of coffee
and two of oil palm. A little rice was also tried. The cocoa, [243]
oil palm and rice were soon abandoned by both government and
the people owing to a drop in prices, and only the coffee was
persevered with.

In 1926 or 1927, a further 116 acres of land were 245
cleared for coffee under government instructions, but the rate
of expansion declined markedly thereafter. By 1936 there were
18 plantations totalling 242 acres under coffee in the Orokaiva
area. 189 acres were then in bearing and the rest were expected to begin bearing by 1938. Plantings ranged in area from
4 to 30 acres.

Every able-bodied man between the ages of 16 and 36 245
years who lived within five miles of a plantation (except those 466
employed by government, missions or European plantations)
was required, by regulations under the ordinance, to work 60 [651]

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(1) This figure included some private plantings in addition to those under the ordinance - P.A.R. 1926-7 : 10. Coffee seed was supplied from the government station at Higaturu.

466 days per year on the plantation of his village.[1] Those who worked 60 days or over were thereby exempted from head tax
245 (then ten shillings per year). Those who did not were liable not
651 only to head tax but also to a fine of £2 or imprisonment with hard labour for a period of three months.

Evidence is inconclusive as to how much work was
245 required in practice. Despite the reference to sixty days' work
466 per year, crops like coffee needed constant attention and if only sixty days per year were to be performed by each man, either work days would need to be staggered or workers rostered. At first government officers required 120 half-days, but in most villages once the crops were in bearing all men were required to attend every morning from Monday to Friday throughout the year.[2] None of the foremen had watches and it is impossible to know how long men worked in fact, but informants in widely separated parts of the area claim that they were required to work until noon in the coffee gardens. In addition, men took turns to carry the produce on foot to the government base at Higaturu every Saturday. This involved a walk of about fifteen miles in each direction from the Ongoho (Asigi) community block.

Women took no part in cash cropping, but they did
462 most of the gardening. Men sometimes helped in the food gardens in the afternoons.

657 Reports of the period contain many references to the peoples' lack of enthusiasm for the scheme and heavy sanctions
245 were applied by government officers to have their programme
466 enforced. In 1925 the Resident Magistrate tried to extend the

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(1) Men who had been away as indentured labourers were exempt from this requirement for three months after their return to the village.

(2) At several places near Higaturu people claimed that they were required to work afternoons also during busy periods. After such periods they would be allowed a week or more off with no plantation work. It seems likely that this was done in the villages close to Higaturu which were under closer supervision by the officer in charge of the plantations. In the more distant areas the officer seems not to have delegated any authority to vary the regular pattern. Humphries (1944 : 3) notes that the specified period of 60 days (he says three months) was not observed in practice and that "in fact men were called upon to work whenever circumstances required them".

657 scheme to Ioma and other areas. At Ioma "it was only when
245 faced with the alternative of going to gaol for failure to pay tax
that they were induced to work on the plantation .... In other
466 districts the natives elected to pay their taxes in money"
(P.A.R. 1925-6 : 52). The scheme survived, according to
Captain Humphries (1944 : 2) who was at one stage responsible
for it, "only because of the gaol that loomed in the background."

697 The standard penalty for failure to work was three
months' imprisonment which was served by working on the
[687] government coconut plantations at Buna or Ioma, or on the government rubber plantation at Kokoda. These plantations were
worked entirely by prison labour (apart from supervisory and
specialist staff) and many of the older men we spoke to had
served sentences for breaches of this ordinance. In fact, as
Mair (1945 : 83) notes, the existence of government plantations
which had no provision for paid labour acted as an incentive to
prosecute for breaches of this and other laws.

245 Daily work on the community coffee gardens was
supervised by the village constables who were thus in a position
625 of considerable authority. Nevertheless, this role may not
have been particularly congenial for the constable was as likely
as anyone to be punished for failure to keep the work up to
standard. There was not a constable for each village, and the
constable at Ongoho, for example, was responsible for the nine
245 Asigi villages which worked the Ongoho block.[1] The constables in turn were supervised by Papuan foremen known as
"coffee bosses", each of whom was responsible for a number of
[657] communal gardens. The "coffee bosses" in turn were responsible to the European Controller of Native Plantations who was
based at Higaturu.

245 Such was the difficulty of getting labour to carry the
produce from the factory at Higaturu to the port of Sanananda
466 (near Buna) that a special regulation was passed requiring all
465 able-bodied men to carry produce whenever instructed to do so.[2]

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(1) For supervision of the plantation and normal police services he was paid ten shillings per year.

(2) Native Plantations (Northern Division Carrying) Regulations 1928.

651 proceeds to be retained by the government was paid into the [241] Native Taxation Account (which was composed of revenue from head tax and native plantations). Average annual government revenue from the plantations was £1,082 and from head tax £14,003. After costs of collection had been met the balance remaining in the Native Taxation Account was transferred to two funds which were entitled, somewhat inaccurately, the Native Education Fund and the Native Benefits Fund.

657 Hulling, marketing and administrative costs incurred in running the plantations scheme were paid from the Native 241 Education Fund. The same fund provided a coffee pulping [871] machine for each of the plantations which was more than about two hours walk from Higaturu, the produce of the closer gardens being pulped at Higaturu Station. In fact no money was spent directly on native education in the Northern District, though some small subsidies were granted to mission schools. The Native Benefits Fund provided for the salary of a Government Anthropologist, medical services, bonuses to large families and other miscellaneous expenses. Only about a quarter of the money in the two funds was spent on education (all in the form of subsidies) and much was simply left to accumulate. When [651] the war broke out there was an unspent balance of £26,199 in the Native Education Fund. The whole plantations scheme (including Native Education and Native Benefits) was administered by the Director of Native Taxation.

465 The producer's half of the income from the coffee was paid, not on delivery, but at the end of each year. The [211] official in charge of the scheme visited each village to make the payments. The ordinance required that payment was to be made in proportion to days worked and, as the village constable who was in charge of the plantation was almost invariably illiterate, some of them kept an "attendance stick" for each man. A notch was cut in the stick for each day of absence other than that caused by illness or the death of a close relative. When the government officer visited the village to make the [212] payments the constable produced the attendance stick of each man as he came up for payment. Some constables relied on memory to inform government officers of absentees, but the few literate ones (e.g. at Sombo) were provided with attendance books.

Post-war community plantations (1945 - 62)

177 Shortly after the outbreak of war with Japan, government services were reduced to a minimum, coffee buying ceased 657 and the community cash crop gardens were soon abandoned. [241] The Orokaiva area became the scene of intense fighting between Japanese and Australian-American Forces during 1942 and 1943 and civilian government was not restored until 1945. No further Commissioners for Native Plantations were ever appointed but towards the end of 1944 an Agriculture Officer (Mr. F. Shaw) was posted to Higaturu. One of his tasks was to [461] get the pre-war plantations into production again. Most informants today say they had no wish to resume work on the plantations owing to the low payments made pre-war, which they assumed would continue. Their association with Amercian forces had led them to consider their labour to be worth con- [466] siderably more than pre-war rates. However the military administration (A.N.G.A.U.) was then still in charge of the Territory, and they were instructed to recommence work on the plantations.

245 The pre-war system whereby every man worked on the coffee each morning from Monday to Friday was resumed, 466 though supervision was transferred from the village constable to a "coffee boss", one of whom was appointed by the government to oversee each plantation.

Penal sanctions were less severe than pre-war, the usual punishment for failure to attend work being one month's imprisonment instead of three, but before long the sanctions 465 were relaxed and few people were convicted. Income was [434] higher, for whereas before the war the villagers were paid only half of the proceeds of the crop, after the war they were paid the full price.(1) Ongoho people inform us that annual payouts after the war were £6 to £9 per man per year, and in addition

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(1) The Native Plantations (Papua) Ordinance of 1952 provided for the total value of the crop to be paid in cash to the producers. In practice, the policy had been followed for several years before that.

After 1958 most of the coffee produced by indigenous 245
growers in the Northern District came from plots which were 423
planted by individuals (largely as a result of agricultural extension services) and registered under the Higaturu Local Government Council land registration scheme. The communal project was formally abandoned in 1960 with the repeal of the Native Plantations Ordinance.(1) Crown lands reverted to the Crown and native lands to their owners. The Government has treated the Crown lands as reserves for the local people and has not taken any action to restrict their use as communal plantations. Today, however, only 9 of the 16 pre-war plantations 433
which we visited are producing at all, and they at only a fraction of their potential output.

We traced the history of the Ongoho community block 578
in detail in a series of separate interviews at each of the
villages which had participated in the project.(2) The collapse [124]
of the project there was caused by disagreement over land
rights, apportionment of work and distribution of income. The [614]
disputing parties were the various sub-clans which had participated in the project. The sub-clans may be roughly equated with villages.(3)

Before the war, strict control by the Administration 657
precluded the emergence of these particular problems: the land 245
had been demarcated and the trees planted under close supervision, fixed patterns of work were imposed, and the money was paid to each man by a government official. By the late 1940's however, the sanctions for failure to work were not in fact being exercised, and attendance was irregular. The Ongoho "coffee 245
boss" who had been responsible for local supervision from about 1945 found the dissension too much to control and resigned in 1948. Little work was being done and the govern-

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(1) The Native Plantations (Papua) Repeal Ordinance 1960.

(2) This was necessary because the issue is still very contentious and feelings about the disputes over the community gardens are still strong.

(3) In fact each village is regarded as being that of a particular sub-clan, despite the [621]
existence of smaller enclaves of other sub-clans in most of them. Marriage is usually
(but not exclusively) between sub-clans and almost invariably within the Asigi tribal [582]
group.

474 foodstuffs and for ceremonial exchanges and some urged the people to deposit their compensation money in a central fund for use by the community as a whole. Many leaders took this advice and collected large sums for the co-operatives. Some of the money was kept in the villages, but some was contributed to central funds which were held on a tribal or sub-tribal basis.

Few of the leaders had the technical knowledge to know how to handle the funds or to apply them to productive projects, and much of the money was dissipated in unproductive
[657] activities. About 1950 government Co-operative Officers were sent to assist the establishment of formal co-operatives and to save the many existing informal co-operatives from disintegration with consequent public loss of faith. The officers were able to make headway in some instances, but in other cases the funds were already exhausted and the people disillusioned. In cases where the funds remained, the government insisted on their being handed back to the original contributors before any official co-operative was formed (Belshaw, 1951 : 250).

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241 Efforts to increase indigenous participation in commercial agriculture in the Northern District in the post-war decade had met with little success and in 1954 the Department of Native Affairs resumed pre-war patterns of promoting commercial agriculture. Additional police were stationed in the area, particularly on the inland side of the Kumusi River but to
[466] a lesser extent among the Orokaiva also. One policeman was based at each of a number of villages and each village was required to clear a community garden for cocoa planting.

The Department of Agriculture staff did not favour any extension of community planting and put its emphasis on individual cash crop gardens but, in the early stages at least, this action was strongly opposed by both the mission and the
[717] patrol staff. Missionaries who were involved feared that individual cash cropping would lead to abandonment of the villages as each individual would probably want to live near his own cash crop garden. They felt that this would result in a reduction of religious and educational activity and may lead to a resurgence of non-Christian practices. Patrol staff too opposed individual plantings at that time, in some instances it seems because of an erroneous notion that traditional agriculture was

a communal task.(1)

Most of the communal cocoa gardens in this area were later abandoned. Some (such as Hojavasusu) were divided into individual lots and continue to produce. A few others are still functioning to a limited degree, but none are now operated on a communal basis.

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(1) By about 1[illegible]56 the new patrol staff had come to favour individual plantings and this policy has been followed by both departments since then.

likely to emerge. Problems of work organization and income 241
distribution may nevertheless arise.(1) 614

Problems of work organization: The communal plantations almost all involved several unrelated descent groups
which traditionally recognized no single leader. The Orokaiva [726]
did occasionally form larger ad hoc groups for warfare and
sometimes for forest clearing, but these were temporary associations directed to the achievement of a short term goal. This of itself does not preclude the formation of new and larger groupings with unitary leadership provided there is either a strong desire for group action (and the necessary institutions to direct it), or strong external sanctions to enforce it.

The earliest communal plantings of coconuts and 245
rubber by the Orokaiva were carried out under instructions 249
from officials and sufficient pressure was exerted to ensure
compliance. The pressure was not, however, maintained and 657
the coconut and rubber trees were little cared for after planting. 466
Nor was harvesting for market enforced. Prices were low; the coconuts were seldom made into copra and the rubber was never tapped until the time of the war.(2)

The working of the coffee planted under the Native 245
Plantations Ordinance was strictly supervised. A village constable was in charge of each local group, the European officer 657
in charge patrolled the area regularly, and defaulters were 466
severely punished. The communities regarded the whole [626]
operation as one of oppression by the government. During the
period that government sanctions were reduced and finally withdrawn, coffee prices were high (more than ten times higher
than immediately pre-war). Many people therefore wished to [461]
continue working the coffee gardens, but the community was not
traditionally equipped with adequate sanctions to ensure that [626]
individuals did their share of work, and the law specifically forbade the exercise of sanctions by any indigenous individual or group.

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(1) Since writing this we have been informed of a small (3 acre) communal tobacco-growing project which began at Soroputa in 1948 on the land of a single descent group. [249]
It was reported to have functioned efficiently until it was destroyed by the Mt. Lamington eruption in 1951. [731]

(2) For details of the war-time rubber-tapping scheme see Rimoldi, 1964.

241 As Mair (1948 : 85) has noted, the fact that officials
657] could fall back on compulsion gave them no encouragement to
[466] considering any alternative approach. The European officer's
link with the people was through the village constable, and from
[625] what the Orokaiva tell us this line of communication operated in
[177] one direction only, for most constables felt that it was improper
to query instructions given by Europeans, or to make suggestions to them. Not only was no attempt made to create local institutions which could have carried responsibility for community projects, but the imposed organizational structure did not provide the people with an acceptable model on which to fashion any new local institution. The vesting of all powers of sanction in the central government, moreover, forestalled the possibility of their spontaneous emergence.

465 Problems of income distribution: While the Admin-
istration paid each individual separately, no overt problem
212 arose, but when government ceased buying and the coffee was sold to a trading company a lump sum was given to the person or persons who brought it in, usually the local coffee boss. Relatively few Orokaiva were literate (among the Asigi there were none) though it may have been possible to have made equal payments to all persons. However, as the community was unable to enforce equal work this was not feasible. Had there been a sufficient standard of literacy it may have been possible to operate on co-operative rather than communal lines (i.e. making payment in terms of work contributed) but in fact few people had the necessary degree of literacy and almost none had any knowledge of book-keeping.

461 Problems of motivation: The Orokaiva were never willing participants in any of the communal schemes (with the
[466] exception of rice growing in 1949). Some of them may have
begun some of the projects willingly, but continued operation
[433] was only achieved by force. The money incentive was quite
inadequate: most of the schemes produced no income at all, and those that did gave less (in cash and kind) than employment elsewhere. As already noted in the section on work organization, there was no social incentive to continued production.

241 It has been suggested that the pre-war community projects were merited in that they introduced the people to the

Appendix D

Native Regulation No. 121(1)

(Providing for compulsory planting of economic trees)

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Coconuts and other useful trees and plants

(1) It is a good thing to plant coconuts and other useful fruits and trees, and all coconuts and trees planted under this regulation shall belong to the person that plants them and to his heirs, and every able-bodied man shall from time to time plant coconuts and other useful trees and plants. The Magistrate shall fix the number of trees or the area of land as the case may be that the able-bodied men of each district or village shall plant. and coconuts shall be properly planted at a distance not less than five fathoms from tree to tree.

(2) All men will not have to plant the same number of coconuts and other useful trees, on the same area of land because some men have little land and some have much and some places are not good for planting trees.

(3) It shall be the duty of the village constable to see that this regulation is obeyed in such villages as the Magistrate directs, and if he fails or neglects to do so he shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding Two shillings and sixpence or in default of payment to imprisonment for any period not exceeding Seven days, or to imprisonment in the first instance for any period not exceeding Seven days.

(4) The Magistrate shall also, where deemed desirable, order the people to plant and cultivate useful food trees along the village road so that they may all enjoy the shade and eat of the fruit.

(5) The Government may provide the people from time to time with young trees or seeds to plant, and the Magistrate will direct the people where to plant them.

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(1) Native Regulation Ordinance 1908-30.

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(6) If any native who has been ordered to plant and cultivate a certain number of trees or a certain area of land by the Magistrate wilfully neglects or refuses to do so he shall on conviction for a first offence be liable to a fine not exceeding Five shillings or in default of payment to imprisonment for any period not exceeding Six weeks, or to such imprisonment in the first instance; or, for a second or any subsequent offence to imprisonment in the first instance for any period not exceeding Three months.

Sub-clauses (7) to (9) cover minor points of detail and have been omitted.

This regulation was amended in 1946 such that planting could be forced thereafter only in the event of serious food shortages.

Appendix E

Extracts from Native Plantations Ordinance 1925-52 and subsidiary enactments

"4. (1) The Lieutenant-Governor may ... direct that any land acquired or resumed under the provisions of the Land Ordinance 1911-24 ... shall be a native plantation 423 657

(2) The Lieutenant-Governor with the consent of the native owners may ... direct that any land shall be a native plantation ... and shall remain so until the Lieutenant-Governor otherwise orders but the land shall remain the property of the native owners.

4. (A) The Lieutenant-Governor may appoint officers to carry out the provisions of this ordinance. Such officers shall be known as controllers of native plantations ....

5. (1) Statutory workers[1] shall work for such number of days each year as may be prescribed .... 466 [651]

(2) For cultivation work ... the Lieutenant-Governor may ... remit tax.[2]

8. (1) Of the total annual produce of each native plantation one half or such other proportion as the Lieutenant-Governor may order[3] ... 241 657

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[1] Defined as "every able-bodied male villager" aged between 16 and 36 years excepting government or mission employees and indentured workers.

[2] Order in Council of 2.7.1924 ruled that no tax would be payable by any villager who worked for two months per year on the plantation.

[3] No proportion was ever gazetted but it is understood that one half was invariably taken.

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(a) may be distributed in kind by the Government among the villagers ...

(b) may be sold by the Government on account of the villagers ...

(c) may be purchased by the Government from the villagers ...

423 9. The remainder of the annual produce of each native plantation ... shall be the property of the Crown".

466 Native Plantations Regulations 1926, made under the above ordinance, prescribed that statutory workers had to work sixty days per year on their plantation. It also provided that "supervision and regulating native plantations and the cultivation thereof" was vested in the Director of Native Taxation.

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Order in Council of 20.9.1926 made the following provisions for the distribution of the villagers' share of income derived from native plantations:

> "1. That each one-half or other proportion of each year's produce which is the property of native villagers ... shall be divided among the statutory workers and voluntary workers in the proportions that the number of days which each of them respectively has worked during the year bears to the aggregate number of days which all of them have worked on the native plantation in the cultivation thereof ....
>
> Provided that where any statutory worker (who has by death or age ceased to be such) or where any voluntary worker (who has ceased to be such or has died) has previously worked on a native plantation for any time during any year during which the prescribed plant cultivated thereon has not come into bearing or is unproductive then he (or, in case of his death, his widow, or in case of her death, his child or children whilst under the age or apparent age of sixteen years) shall be entitled to receive

> during the first productive year of the native
> plantation such part of the produce thereof as 465
> is the property of the villagers as the proportion
> which the number of hours he worked (in 466
> his first year of work) whilst the native plantation 434
> was unproductive bears towards the total number of hours which all statutory workers and voluntary workers worked in that year and so on yearly mutatis mutandis until he (or his widow or children as the case may be) has received such part of the produce in respect of each unproductive year he worked on such native plantation.
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> 2. That instead of allotting the proportion of the 241
> annual produce of a native plantation in the
> manner set out in the proviso to Paragraph 1 657
> hereof the nearest Resident Magistrate ... may be required by the Director of Native Taxation to confer with the villagers in their village and ascertain what other scheme of allotment of such annual produce they themselves consider to be preferable .... The Magistrate shall report the result of such conference to the Director who shall forward it with any observations he desires to make to the Lieutenant-Governor who may approve the scheme preferred by the villagers with or without modification whereupon that scheme of allotment as approved shall be followed in relation to such annual produce instead of the scheme ordered in the said proviso.
>
> Officers to be instructed to adopt 2 when practicable."

Native Plantations (Papua) Ordinance 1952 provided 657
that the villagers would own the whole of the produce of the
plantation instead of half as formerly. This ordinance also did [423]
away with the earlier requirement that villagers work 60 days [466]
per year on the plantation, and cancelled the provision whereby
persons who worked on plantations for two months were exempt [651]
from tax.

177 648 time the process of readjustment and restoration was still a major question demanding attention. A few years later the third misfortune occurred.

731 The eruption of Mt Lamington, which caused catastrophic loss of life and dispossessed many people of their land,[1] left deep impressions on the minds of the survivors, particularly an acute sense of guilt which has been widely remarked upon. They felt that God had punished them for not helping the Allies enough during the war, and for not heeding the wishes of the mission and the administration. Some observers ascribed both the marked spirit of co-operation noticeable in evacuation camps and the avowed intentions of many to obey government directions in the [161] future, to these negative feelings (Belshaw 1951:3-6; Keesing 1951:5). By this time 'population trends indicate that with the present percentage of children, there are likely to be considerable [464] increases in the future' (Plant 1951:4). The area was closed for recruiting but this did not solve the problem of the [797] supply of labour for reconstruction because men were drawn back to their casual jobs on local rubber plantations and the mission asked each village to work a day a week rebuilding mission stations (Belshaw 1951:8).

657 [731] After the war, compensation was paid for property of the villagers which had been damaged or destroyed, and following the eruption a programme of resettlement and rehabilitation was instituted.

121 127 For our investigations, Sivepe was chosen from the villages in the Saiho Census Division mainly because it had been one of the sample villages in the Survey of Indigenous Agriculture conducted by government departments of the Territory and of Australia on behalf of the Food and Agriculture Organization's World Survey of Subsistence Agriculture. Information from the survey has provided quantitative material which, though summary, is directly comparable with results of our short survey of subsistence cultivation. The F.A.O. survey's sample was chosen by statistical methods.[2]

121 125 The interest which governed our own selection of a sample of manageable size from among Sivepe villagers - and comparable with

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[1] Several thousand of the Orokaiva on the slopes of the volcano were killed by the clouds of hot dust emitted at about 200 m.p.h. and 200°C. Sivepe was just beyond the limits of the area destroyed. The villagers spent about a year's enforced absence in evacuation camps (see p.76), but some neighbouring people who survived were absent from their land for far longer periods.

[2] Walters 1963:4.

128 Besides data collected on a standard series of topics investigated in the related series mentioned above, our report also includes discussion of the relationships between land tenure and land use on the one hand and residential and local organization on the other - questions which have been raised by anthropologists and administrators writing on this Orokaiva area.

731 178 [623] The population displaced and resettled after the eruption were almost all mountain Orokaiva; one legacy of these events was the protracted complication of land tenure, which some of the people later found an obstruction when they were caught up in a general increase in enthusiasm for cash-cropping. This coincided with the formation of the Higaturu Council whose membership consisted in large part of the mountain Orokaiva.

● 657 178 Community development plans made after the eruption[1] were never successfully launched, but the tenure situation in the council territory and specific areas of acute land-consciousness are the problems which patrol staff felt made it essential to regularize the tenure of cash crops at this time.

241 178 [361] In 1951 Keesing expected that the marked trend towards larger settlements witnessed after the eruption would, as a matter of course, be reversed as circumstances permitted villagers to revert to their normal horticulture involving frequent rotation of cultivated areas; paradoxically, it was in view of the spreading enthusiasm of the Orokaiva for a more intensive, commercial agriculture about 5 years later, that some mission staff anticipated similar fragmentation of the same large villages.

361 178 [121] Considerable topical interest is given to the question of the connections between settlement patterns, agricultural systems and title to land by current changes in the Orokaiva area which have implications of further radical adjustments in residential patterns. In a recent development a few local government councillors had initial success in advocating the consolidation of villages apparently as a means of establishing an economic base for the provision of local services or amenities. Members of Sivepe and other villages decided to rebuild together on land near Sasembata (E. Waddell: personal communication). Staff of the mission have [657] for many years favoured this type of settlement among its Orokaiva parishioners.[2] Although, with consistent effort, patrol staff of the Department of District Administration achieved the periodic amalgamation of pre-eruption villages, the department did not endorse the recent move and pointed out that councillors acted independently of any decision of the council or advice of its executive.

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[1] Mentioned by Belshaw 1951. [2] See Crocombe 1964:31.

361 Moreover, the Yega cocoa project[1] has had a remarkable demonstration effect throughout the Orokaiva area; land development along
similar lines as at Ombisusu is nearly everywhere under serious
● [657] consideration and, whenever undertaken, may be assumed to involve
some degree of resettlement on individual blocks. It is now
government policy in the district to foster this spread of smallholder projects as a matter of high priority.[2]

121 We have attempted some comparative discussion by introducing material on another area of closely settled populations, Chimbu.[3] Firstly, this provides contrasts in patterns of residence and mobility, the intensity of subsistence cultivation and in the results of changes in land use. The Chimbu example is an appropriate test case regarding arguments for certain necessary connections between local systems of agriculture, the stability of settlement and the potential for schemes for land development among these Orokaiva. The settlement pattern eventually formed after the eruption affords data for instructive but not conclusive comparison with the pre-eruption situation. Secondly, a consideration of Chimbu land tenure and local organization throws some light on our Orokaiva data.

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[1] This is fully discussed by Dakeyne 1965.

[2] In late 1964 the many individuals interested in these schemes showed considerable interest in the new Land Tenure (Conversion) Ordinance, 1964 (Edric Eupu: personal communication).

[3] See p.72 ff.

423 [224] [226] The only local hunting land held by Sivepe people is that held by individuals as gardening land. A villager may hunt or fish on the land held by members of any group in the village and in fact often strays further afield than this 'village land' without attracting the attention of other groups. A man may, without consulting others, invite a kinsman from another village to hunt or join in a fish drive with him but no hunting parties involve the assembly or co-operation of larger groups. A man wishing to hunt on the land of one of his kinsmen in another village would consult his kinsman first.

235 d. Livestock

[231] Apart from the game available to the hunter, there are only 2 sources of fresh meat available, the domestic pig and fowl. Six householders own a total of 15 fowls which were either bred or bought by their owner. They are valued mainly as an asset for times of feasting and only to a limited extent for egg production. They are allowed to run loose in the village during the day but are enclosed in shelters at night for protection against dogs.

231 Like fowls, pigs are fed by women mainly on scraps but they find much of their food by roaming in the bush and grazing in old gardens. They have complete freedom of movement within or outside [241] the village during the day and in some instances only are they housed in pens during the night. As a result, they are a constant threat to gardens which are not thoroughly fenced; their movements are a frequent source of dispute and require the gardener to exercise care in siting his garden and sometimes to devote considerable time waiting there to attack a pig which has been frequenting the area.

[431] [426] Of the 24 pigs or piglets claimed by 7 of the 12 householders, 15 were bred by them and the rest received in gift exchanges; none was inherited. The only longstanding debts admitted or claimed by members of the sample were in terms of pigs.

[146] There is little animal protein in the villagers' diet; some fresh meat and smoked meat or fish is purchased at Saiho market or from vendors travelling to the market - this source of meat seems to be quickly becoming reasonably accessible (E. Waddell: personal communication), but wild pigs - a very important source in many other Orokaiva areas - are rare and the area for hunting restricted. It would be feasible to take steps to modify any lack of animal protein by increasing stock numbers and improving their quality, but this would involve the introduction of new strains and, to maintain any increase or improvements, husbandry techniques would need to be refined.[1] At present parasites take

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[657] [1] About 50 Berkshire boars were distributed to Village Constables among the groups affected by the Mt Lamington eruption.

177 464 625 in Papua (Territory of Papua 1908-9:19). In 1904, 4 village constables had been appointed from the peoples along the new road. By 1908 members of the various tribes were peaceably trading with the carriers along the road (Territory of Papua 1907-8:22).

166 361 177 In about 50 years preceding the establishment of their present village the groups now represented in Sivepe had between them been involved in shifts of residence between a series of 14 village sites within an area of about 2 square miles adjoining the Sohu River. Informants claimed that they or their ancestors moved from 11 of these under instructions from government officers to amalgamate into larger units. During this period members of several other descent groups have either accompanied them or established independent villages and worked land of their own in [621] the same area. Intermarriage among contemporary villages there was common and individuals frequently moved from one to join kin in another.

166 361 613 The 4 Jegase lineages can trace the history of their groups back to a point of common origin in the first decade of the century in the village of Simbehata and its 'satellite' Totogata, both on what is now Jegase land hardly a mile from the present site of Sivepe.[1]

(1) Migration 1900-50. The Bebehupa moved from Simbehata to Korogombata[2] and were joined by some members of Usohu living nearby.[3] Except for 3 families which moved out to form Kisisita, Aurija and Andakahambo villages, they remained there until about 1937 when they were asked by the Administration to reunite with these 3 to establish Korinasusu. One of the 2 major pre-war tracks from the coast to Kokoda lay nearby and when Japanese and Australian troops moved along this in 1942 the people abandoned the village and moved into isolated garden huts. Most villagers returned to Korinasusu after the war but 1 group founded Nahihita nearby.

[657] In 1950 the Administration instructed the Bebehupa of Korinasusu and Nahihita to join the Usohu people living in Gogovosusu and Binduta to form one large village. Up to that time the villages had been confined to Jegase land but because

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[1] For place names mentioned in this section see Map.2.A

[2] Mentioned as a 'Jegase village' by Williams in 1923 (W.83), as are Sivepe, Pusahambo and Hanimkumbari (see pp.34-7). He also lists them as Awala villages.

[3] A number of the older Jegase men claimed that the Usohu people formerly regarded themselves as members of Jegase clan.

A,[See Category 102, p. 40--Analyst]

166 361 613 Neither the man nor his son has every cultivated his patrimonial land at Hamburata although they hunt and fish there. The man makes these periodic visits to affirm his rights as he claims that constant surveillance is necessary to forestall encroachment on his land. His father's brother controls the land in his absence.

By 1950 the members of the Berekipa households who numbered 12 had thus acquired only 5 parcels of land (totalling 9 acres) near Sivepe since the lineage returned from Hamburata 30 years before, and had to rely on other lineages for access to adequate land. [657] After the war the Berekipa were asked by the Administration to move from Pusahambo to a village called Pamba where Arehu lineage was living. They seem to have been largely dependent on the Arehu and on affines elsewhere for planting rights since then.

The Arehu people had founded Totogata next to Simbehata and remained there after the other Jegase people had moved on to Euru and Korogombata. Some members of Bebehupa lineage, in refusing to recognize Arehu as a genuine Jegase lineage, explain that it is an immigrant group descended from a Togahau man of Arehu clan[1] who was adopted as a child after a Jegase raid on the Togahau. The land the group now holds is centred on Simbehata and the Bebehupa, although they take little interest in it, allege that it was acquired when the Jegase man from Simbehata was killed at Divinikovari. The Arehu have retained and strengthened their rights over the years and to all effects have become absorbed into the local branch of the clan, extending their effective ties there by intermarrying with other lineages. When pressed, the only resident male (d4J) even answers questions about the position ascribed to him as one of the agnates in the local group by [578] stressing that he and his father married Jegase women, as if no more need be said. The grandson of the alleged original landholder has disputed the rights of the Arehu man to the parcel of land on which the old village Simbehata was situated.

[657] Several years after the ancestors of the Bebehupa left Simbehata the Arehu were told by a government officer to amalgamate with other Jegase people and with the members of Timumu and Seho clans from Euru and Asina. The village formed on Seho land was old Sivepe with its satellite, Pamba; most of the people stayed there until they fled the Mt Lamington eruption in January 1951.

The Pekuma and Hajejopa lineages of Timumu clan had both joined the Jegase and Seho people in founding old Sivepe. The fathers

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[1] This clan today is represented in Sirembi village in Togahau Census Division and possibly in other villages there. In 1923 Williams (0.1) noted that they were also present in the villages of Porori and Ohamba.

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 45]

62 facilitated the type of local movements that we noted occurred in
[361] the neighbourhood of Sivepe. However at times[1] the density 'on
the ground' of villages of the standard size found in the other
[721] Orokaiva tribes may be misconstrued as a state of advanced fragmentation of settlement.

It should be noted that the limited amount of relevant detail on the areas where Williams worked[2] fails to indicate a significant difference in size between the Aiga village averaging 26 people at that time, and the Wasida village, with about 6 houses and a single-boys' house.

166 The Sivepe people have moved only singly or in small groups
[657] except when villages have been directed to amalgamate by the
Administration. The villagers say that, except when they were
evacuated to Ilimo refugee camp, they have never been forced to
[614] move from the area which had been held by their ancestors, or to
rely on outside groups for access to land. Our evidence indicates
that, except for limited expansion into unoccupied land early in the century, all the major shifts of residence of the sample clan branches have been confined to their own territory.

[425] People who have moved to take up rights in other land have done
so by exploiting personal ties of kinship or affinity. We found
[614] no instances of overlapping land claims at the clan or local
branch level such as are found in other areas of Orokaiva territory where enough land was available for whole clans to move the location of their settlement some distance to unused land of a friendly group.

621 Belshaw (1951:3) observed that in the years preceding the Mt Lamington eruption

> there was much feeling among Government officers that the relatively poor houses of the district, and the small hamlets, should give way to new villages built on the 'Kokoda' pattern, that is a line of substantial houses built around a grassy village square.

[178] The people tended to resist this change, but they had made some
[166] moves to amalgamate 'hamlets' (see p.34). He noted also that
there was much movement between villages, and that it usually involved a man's leaving his father's land to live on that of his mother or his wife.

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[1] For instance, when the densely populated area stretching from Isivita to Isoge and Awala villages struck the writer of one generally observant report as 'literally a mass of small hamlets' some of them with no more than 20 members.

[2] See Williams 1930:7; W.1.

249 planting was still being encouraged. The trees planted in the district were for long the only Papuan-owned rubber plots.

249 657 These trees had been planted under Native Regulation No.121, first passed in 1903 but not enforced in this division until the first world war. The legislation states that 'it is a good thing to plant coconuts and other useful fruits and trees.... The Magistrate shall fix the number of trees or the area of land, as the case may be, that the able-bodied men of each district shall plant' (Native Regulation Ordinance 1908-30).

466 249 657 [245] We could not determine how much compulsion was involved in establishing each of these 'plantations' but in 1921 the Assistant Resident Magistrate reported that planting in the district needed more supervision than one officer could provide and in 1922 the Lieutenant-Governor said that the threat of force was necessary to ensure the success of the policy of agricultural expansion under the regulation (Territory of Papua 1921-2). A particular reason for resistance in this district may have been the official priority given to rubber whereas it was reported ' the natives prefer coconuts due to their food value' (Territory of Papua 1920-1). A person who refused to plant was liable to a fine of 5 shillings or 6 weeks' imprisonment or to 3 months' imprisonment for a second offence.

249 The people of 3 villages, Pusahambo, Euru and Asina, were directed to co-operate in the planting of one of the stands near Sivepe. After the people of Asina had declined to provide land it was agreed that the plantation should be established on a parcel already partly cleared near Pusahambo. Part of this land belongs to Timumu people and part to Jegase; and although 1 Timumu lineage sometimes assert that they also hold residual rights in the Jegase section of the land, they appear never to have questioned the rights of the members of Jegase and Seho clan branches to the trees.

The only other plantation to which any member of the sample has rights is Korinasusu. This also is on land divided between members of 2 different clans, Jegase (Bebehupa lineage) and Usohu, who disputed the exact boundary when we enquired about it, but have generally been able to agree on the rights to tap the trees.

249 657 It seems that the rubber project in the district was designed so that, from the start, the owners of the rubber should themselves handle much of the production and processing. They were encouraged to plant lime trees 'so that they can coagulate latex with lime-juice and smoke a fair sheet of rubber for market' (Territory of Papua 1920-1). However, no facilities for the manufacture or processing of latex or rubber were introduced. The people claim that after the planting regulation had been enforced, the trees

249 ●657 stood untouched for about 20 years. In 1944 Humphries (1944:4) reported that 'the trees grew to maturity with very litte attention from the natives and today they are being tapped for the first time'.

[434] In 1941 an agreement under the Transactions with Natives Ordinance (1893-1935) was made between a European planter recently arrived in the area and the villages with rubber stands, whereby he obtained exclusive rights to tap, collect and dispose of the produce of all the trees, while from 6 per cent to 12 per cent (according to ruling market prices) of the gross sum obtained by the lessee was to be paid to the owners every 6 months; in general this meant that the owners received 1 penny to 3 pence per pound. The contract was to extend for 5 years and the lessee was to have the option of renewing it for a further period of 5 years.

The arrangement became effective in 1941 but was interrupted by the Japanese invasion of the Northern District. In 1943 A.N.G.A.U.[1] authorized the lessee to return to restart production from the trees. Man (1954:35) says that

> [433] during 1944, under the supervision of the rubber division of the Production Control Board, tapping of some 250 acres of those smallholdings was organised. During 1945 production was over one hundred thousand pounds dry rubber, indicating average yields of about four hundred pounds per acre.

249 433 311 Various estimates have been made over the last 20 years as to the size and number of the rubber stands in the area. Mann's figure of 250 acres contrasts with the lessee's estimate of 110 acres,[2] and with Humphries' assessment of about 80 acres. There were 95 stands with a total of 7,721 trees listed in the 1941 agreement but during 1943-5 a further 42 stands were added so that most of the available stands were then included in the scheme.[3] In 1951 Belshaw claimed that there were roughly 6,000 rubber trees in the 'Periho' tribal area within what was formerly the Kokoda District and another estimate about the same time put the number of trees in this wider area at 10,000. The annual report of 1959 stated that 26,000 trees 'in the Awala area' were tappable. A

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[1] The Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit.

[2] Assuming this estimate and the figure of over 100,000 pounds for 1945 production to be accurate, we must conclude that the average yields were more than twice those given by Mann.

[3] It was reported by patrol staff that 'nearly all' the rubber stands were being worked from Awala in August-September 1943.

249 433 311 recent agricultural census listed 55 stands with 13,700 trees in the Saiho Census Division (which coincides roughly with the 'Periho' area) and another 3,700 trees in the Sangara Census Division. However, according to the 1964 census there were 14 Saiho villages with stands, carrying 10,000 rubber trees altogether, 4,500 of them less than 6 years old and another 3,500 less than 10 years old.[1] There were also 46 individually-held plots recorded with 8,000 trees, all less than 10 years old. The total number of rubber trees on village-stands in the Saiho, Sangara, and Togahau Census Division was put at almost 26,000.

249 657 [434] The agreement between the lessee and the villagers was modified in 2 ways after the war. When the scheme was resumed in 1943 the Administration decided that in order to facilitate the handling of money, the royalty to be paid to the owners should be changed from a percentage basis to a flat rate of a shilling twice a year per tree tapped;[2] and the royalties set aside every 12 months by the lessee were sometimes withheld by the District Office so that the people did not receive payment for more than 18 months, although the contract provided for half-yearly payments.

249 [464] Until 1946 local villagers were employed by the lessee to tap their stands. A tapper would work in his own area but his task necessarily included some stands belonging to nearby villages other than his own. This caused some misunderstanding at first but the owner's suspicions were eventually allayed.

[625] [623] The Village Constables had been responsible for seeing that the magistrate's instructions were obeyed when the plantations were established but apparently the Village Councillor in some cases assumed control over the distribution of the income among the 'owners', who were listed in 1 schedule of the agreement, although the money was shared under the supervision of a government official. One man recalled that 1 delayed payment of £114 was made for rubber from a number of stands owned by members of his village; he claims that the money was shared by more men than those named in the agreement drawn up several years before.

The lessee believes that the stage at which contract arrangements were conducted to the best effect and greatest satisfaction of the villagers was the period 1943-6 when he arranged to employ some of them as paid tappers.[3]

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[1] These would include self-sown trees.

[2] There is no evidence to support Belshaw's assertion (1951:13) that the owners were at one time receiving a royalty of only 6 pence per tree.

[3] In September 1943 government officers reported that there was a good daily yield as the trees were in good condition.

423 procedures for determining and recording titles were amenable to local regulation and adjustment by the institution conducting the registration. This does not mean that more than one type of right need be guaranteed or that security of title is unimportant.

657 A registration scheme would function best as a mechanism for
resolving uncertainties over landrights in other areas where it
423 could enhance the productivity of large blocks of land by rationalizing the overlapping claims of members of 2 or more clans. Due
to the extensive fragmentation and subdivision of group territories
around Sivepe and the restrictions which have been imposed on the
scale and range of the past movements of groups, there were no
[578] apparent conflicts in the locality over rights at the clan branch
level. The current incidence of interpersonal disputes affected
only a few small parcels and did not seem to be a persistent
obstacle to productivity.

[425] The question is now of reduced significance as the Higaturu Council scheme has been superseded by more comprehensive provisions for land tenure conversion. Nevertheless, registration of permanent individual rights, whether on a person's own land or another's, is desirable in order to preclude disputes which might otherwise arise once the value of the land is increased by the introduction of permanent improvements in the form of cash crops.

121 We contend that it is legitimate to extrapolate our local information by assuming extensive social and cultural uniformity
[171] among the mountain Orokaiva. Analysis of tenure practices and
territorial organization of Sivepe groups shows that in important
respects the landholding systems resemble those characteristic of
certain closely-settled unilineal communities of which Chimbu
might be considered the type. We therefore maintain that modern
mountain Orokaiva land tenure and local organization differ considerably from the model introduced in outline by Williams in his
original monographs (1925, 1928, 1930).

179 Finally, we wish to indicate the general significance of the
type of council scheme for land registration discussed here, and
423 this is best done by quoting at length from the report of the
Mission from the International Bank. It claimed (1964:33) that
solutions to land tenure problems in Papua-New Guinea would be
found more readily if greater responsibility were placed 'on the
native people, including the local Government Councils, to work
out their own solution adapted to varying circumstances'.

This would not mean the recording of title under standard European procedures and would 'require comparative flexibility on the part of the credit organization designed to assist and stimulate native production. On this approach there could be much delegation of responsibility' among government staff and 'much

179 423 more active collaboration with local groups and leaders' (ibid:172). The report discusses the Land Tenure (Conversion) Ordinance, which became law in 1964, noting (ibid:171) that the legislation requires that the Administration satisfy the preliminary conditions of 'complete inquiry about customary rights and agreement of all the holders of customary rights' before it can conduct the surveys and convert these rights to individual registered title free from any customary limitations.

The experience of the Native Lands Commission in surveying land and recording customary rights 'indicates that progress in the application of this legislation will almost certainly be slow' - too slow, the mission believes, for much progress to be made in implementing its recommendations for economic development (ibid.).

It recommends 'a more flexible approach' to the obstacles to change, posed by the traditional social matrix of land customs. The Administration could well 'encourage native groups to work out their own solution to obtaining individual ownership or control of the land within native customs. The local government councils could make a useful contribution to this difficult problem.'

c. Economic incentives

433 Mann (1954) concluded his report on the area by stating that the agricultural possibilities of rubber were very good but that

> it seems little short of a tragedy that the well-intentioned efforts to introduce it as a native culture in this area have come so close to complete failure, whilst the trees remain as a source of discouragement to further development of what may prove to be a worthwhile venture for the landowners of the district.

657 433 The policy of establishing rubber stands under the Native Regulation was well-intentioned but, as Humphries points out (1944:4), it was implemented by a single overworked man. The people of the district may well have questioned the point of having 'useful trees' when the initial forced plantings were not followed up with the provision of extension, processing or marketing facilities. Although they eventually received a small income for little effort when a local planter put this idle capital to some use, there have never been facilities designed specifically for local needs.

Belshaw maintained that even while receiving this income the people were unhappy with the scheme, not simply because they judged the price they received unjust, but because they felt it was 'wrong that somebody else should be able to exploit their own resources' (1951:14). Moreover, they resented the withholding of payments and this has left lasting impressions.

657 433 From the villagers' viewpoint Europeans who participated in establishing and exploiting their rubber, and other external agencies, have alternately assumed complete control of the enterprise - if it could legitimately be regarded as a continuous attempt to realize their assets' potential - or have adopted a laissez-faire attitude towards village production.

To help meet current demand A.N.G.A.U. encouraged resumption of the project after the war but the planter claims that 'in spite of repeated representations Administration has given no support, moral or otherwise', to the various schemes; although he sought to determine the villagers' preferences where alternatives offered themselves, it was inevitable, as things stood, that the people generally had very few opportunities to decide what form the scheme should take. They could merely be invited to express their preferences on random points about the implementation of a policy determined by others; they could also decide whether to participate or not, at the times a market could be offered.

When responsibility for specific tasks needed to be left with them as one scheme after another evolved, it was delegated inconsistently, left to chance or, at best, left to ad hoc decisions with the result that no clear and consistent definition was given to the respective rights and powers of Village Constables, Councillors, tappers and owners - either those initially listed on the agreement or the wider group said by informants later to have exercised these rights.

The fluctuations in the form of marketing schemes also engendered doubts as to the justification of the methods of determining the price or royalty they received. Uncertainties were not resolved by the lacunae in the scheme which some or all of the villagers were abruptly faced with at one time or another.

651 The people who planted coffee in 1956-7 had hoped that the income from the new crop would exceed their shares of the small revenue from rubber and could be depended on to provide enough for their annual tax paid to the newly established local government council. However, the income from the village plot would have been too low to provide this for everyone who participated in planting the coffee, if they had all been allowed to share in the money.

433 Whatever the cause of their unrealistic expectations, their disappointment and their bitterness over an alleged inconsistency in the payments made to different people or on different occasions for similar quantities of produce of uniform quality have been obstacles to the expansion of the present areas under coffee and to the introduction of cocoa as a second new cash crop. Growers express the view that, because their efforts with coffee have been

794 not necessarily leaders in the old authority structure but often 177 people with particular experience of white rule (e.g., policemen).[1] Both cults were suppressed by the Administration although the Taro 178 cult persisted until 1928 and possibly reappeared in the Gona-Buna area in 1941 (Worsley 1957:124), concurrent with rumours of imminent Japanese landings.

178 The ending of inter-tribal skirmishing, which directly affected the social roles of the sexes, also extended the physical range of ●657 interactions open to individuals and resulted in the proliferation of hamlet groups, comprising single clan-branches, i.e. a fragmenta- 361 tion of the main villages. Administrative efforts in this period [721] were directed towards countering this latter process and concentrating settlements along the roads to facilitate supervision, encouraging improved building styles (particularly the erection of houses on stilts above the ground) and establishing more ordeted 'line' villages built around a central square.

(b) Commencement of cash cropping

241 From its beginnings the mainstay of government policy was the [657] encouragement of indigenous cash cropping. Regulations introduced in 1894 and 1903 provided for compulsory plantings of economic trees, particularly coconuts, rubber and citrus, but few were exploited commercially. Under the Native Plantations Ordinance 1918 and the Native Plantations Ordinances 1925-52, twenty-six community plantations were established in the Orokaiva area with both government and villagers participating.[2] Cocoa, coffee, oil palm, cotton, [466] tobacco and rice were all tried; however, owing to a fall in prices, all but coffee were abandoned. According to Crocombe (1964:16), there was no enthusiasm among the people for the scheme as they [434] considered the cash returns inadequate: each man was required to work sixty full days per year and returns varied from less than $1 to $8 per year, which was well below the returns from working on European plantations at that time. Some 10,000 trees, predominantly coconut, were planted in 1914-15 in the Orokaiva area and by 1921 it was estimated that there were 46,404 coconut trees in the Northern [433] Division and some 7,000 rubber trees (mostly in the Awala area). The planting of coffee commenced in 1923 and by 1936 there were

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[1] Such a development may well also have been characterised by the building up of more extensive group solidarities. Burridge (1960:25) does suggest, however, that the Taro cult may have been a particular expression of a similar type of cult occurring in the pre-contact era.

[2] Proceeds deriving from the sale of the crops were shared on a 50-50 basis. For a detailed treatment of these communal plantings see Crocombe 1964.

241 242 acres[1] which yielded 84 tons of hulled coffee in 1938-39. Some [433] 1,000 cocoa trees were also planted in the pre-war period, although only the copra and coffee were worked during this time. All com- [177] mercial agriculture ceased with the Japanese invasion in the second world war and was again interrupted by the eruption of Mt Lamington [731] in 1951. The principle of compulsion was withdrawn in the same year and community enterprise largely ceased in the mid 1950s with an [466] increasing trend towards individual plantings. The whole scheme was characterised not only by low returns to labour, delays in payment,[2] frequent disputed claims to plantings and serious problems in work organisation, but also by a definite feeling of resentment on the part of the indigenous participants.

(c) War and natural disaster

177 [131] The Orokaiva view of the government was no doubt influenced by the second world war, which led to the Japanese occupation of the Northern District from July 1942 to January 1943, and by the eruption of Mt Lamington in January 1951, causing the death of over 4,000 people and the destruction of the district headquarters and staff at Higaturu.

● 657 The impact of the Japanese invasion and subsequent Allied re-advance has never been assessed but must be considered profound. All Australian administration ceased and, when resumed, was vested in the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU), a military [466] authority. Several thousand men co-opted as carriers by both Australians and Japanese worked under very arduous conditions.[3] Since the Orokaiva lay athwart the main Buna-Kokoda route which was the scene of fierce fighting, many villagers retreated into the surrounding hills where they were obliged to subsist on very [687] limited resources because of the absence of much of the potential labour force.[4] Others sided with the Japanese or profited by the [541] power vacuum to attack or betray Allied troops and civilians or to assert their authority over other Orokaiva. On resumption of Australian rule, twenty-two men were sentenced for such deeds by a military tribunal and publicly hanged at Sangara and Higaturu.[5]

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[1] An estimated 111,000 trees at a spacing of 10 by 10 feet.

[2] As much as three years lapsing between delivery and payment (see DDA, DS-17-4-5).

[3] For details of terms for the conscription and of conditions, see McCarthy 1959:116, 132.

[165] [4] A 1948 report refers to a rapidly decreasing population on the northern slopes of Mt Lamington and attributes it in part to the war when many died from malnutrition while hiding in the bush (Higaturu 29-8-33).

[5] A European informant stated that 'several thousand Orokaiva' witnessed the execution, the women 'wailing and mutilating themselves'.

797 The majority of Papuan teachers remain unqualified teacher-evangelists although the mission is largely responsible for education in the sub-district at the primary, secondary and technical levels. A significant feature of their education programme as a whole remains its total disregard for agricultural training, except incidentally at the Martyrs' Memorial Secondary School where the pupils maintain a coffee garden as well as their own food gardens.[1]

[743] [657] Medical work has already formed a large part of the mission's activities and most mission stations operate a clinic and small hospital while a T.B. hospital is maintained at Embi. As with education, these activities are largely standardised by the Administration and the Department of Public Health is gradually taking over from the mission in this field.

(e) Recent developments in commercial agriculture

241 In 1941 a European planter obtained an agreement, under the Transactions with Natives Ordinance 1893-1935, to exploit the communal rubber plantations in the Awala area.[2] These had not previously been worked. Production commenced in 1943 and continues to date, interrupted only by the Mt Lamington eruption. However, the number of plantations incorporated in the scheme fell steadily and by 1965 only about 30 stands were being worked and tapping had become irregular. This is due partly to poor communications, partly to the fact that an agreement satisfactory to all parties was never arrived at and partly to the planter's own trees coming into full production.[3]

[245] The re-opening of Popondetta agricultural station in 1954 led to a renewal of interest in cash cropping with, in particular, the extensive planting of cocoa. By 1964 there were estimated to be 491,000 indigenous-owned coffee trees in the sub-district, 244,000 cocoa trees, 25,700 rubber trees (almost entirely the product of natural increase) and 108,000 coconut trees. This pattern of steadily increasing plantings only levelled off temporarily in 1959-60 with falling coffee prices, a shortage of coffee seed and inadequate marketing arrangements for cocoa. At the time labour

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[1] However, agricultural training at several levels has been available since 1955 at DASF's Popondetta Agricultural Station (now Popondetta Agricultural Training Institute).

[2] These had been established during the first world war in that part of the District considered too far inland for worthwhile copra production. There were 137 stands in all.

[3] For a detailed description see Rimoldi 1966:86-93.

241 was also diverted to the plantations being established in the Sangara area under the Ex-Servicemen's Credit Scheme.[1]

The increased rate of development after the war, a re-orientation in policy towards individual rather than communal holdings, the allocation of the majority of settlement blocks under the ex-servicemen's scheme to Papuans and New Guineans, and the establishment of the Higaturu Local Government Council in 1956 and the Oro Bay Council in 1963 have probably all served to transmit to the Orokaiva 443 a sense of participation in the development process. At the same time, incentives for the acquisition of cash have grown with the proliferation of trade stores (including over twenty owned by Orokaiva men) and the establishment of companies seeking local share capital, while interest in the sale of produce has increased with improvement in communications and with immediate cash payments for such sales.

241 ● 657 [425] An important factor in the growth of interest in cash cropping has been the implementation of a variety of land tenure and marketing schemes, directed entirely towards the indigenous producers and in part initiated by them. Since 1957 the Higaturu council has been encouraging the registration of individual cash crop holdings,[2] the Yega people at Gona have begun subdividing clan land into permanent holdings, while similar developments within the context of the Land (Tenure Conversion) Ordinance 1963 have already been 474 initiated.[3] There are now ten co-operatives operating in the sub-district, predominantly along the coast; most are concerned primarily with marketing copra and providing retail stores, but this also includes the Orokaiva Coffee Growers' Society (OCGS), which was established in 1962 to operate a factory previously erected by the Higaturu Local Government Council and to purchase coffee from the growers.[4] By the end of 1964 subscriptions by villagers amounted to $7,010, held in $10 shares, 65 per cent of this total having been raised in the first six months of operation. The society paid its first dividend of 5 per cent in November 1964.

454 In 1963 an expatriate planter established a local trading company, Oro Ltd, comprising three Papuans on its board of six directors and seeking local share capital in minimum holdings of $5. Again

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[1] See Howlett 1965, for a detailed description.

[2] See Crocombe and Hogbin 1963:89-93.

[3] Each with varying degrees of success. The Higaturu scheme, for instance, fell into abeyance in 1964 due to a shortage of staff capable of surveying the holdings for which registration had been requested, as well as its doubtful legal validity.

[4] See Crocombe and Hogbin 1963:94-6.

73 [433] than might have been expected.[1] However, the withdrawal of the relief teams, including agricultural officers, after the emergency, may have left the people in a psychologically and technologically deprived state, thus further inhibiting their concern with commerce.

[178] [071] The instability of settlement consequent upon these disturbances may also have impeded the evolution of such new forms of leadership and effective group action as have occurred among the Tolai.[2] The careers of such new leaders as were emerging, perhaps with wider group loyalties, have frequently ended catastrophically at important points.[3]

177 [797] [657] (iii) Lack of co-ordination between the Anglican mission and the Administration. Keesing (1952:21-2) refers to the 'delicate' matter of 'Government versus Mission responsibilities' and alludes to the 'rivalry' between them in connection with the post-Lamington rehabilitation programme.[4] These two agencies are the most potent external forces operating on Orokaiva society and their activities and demands are not co-ordinated, thus accentuating the difficulties of implementing a consistent development policy. Their demands on the villagers' time may conflict, and their views on such important matters as the purpose of education, the role of the teacher and the role of commerce are at variance. The Anglican mission has no formal representation at the policy-making levels in the District though it has great influence in the villages.

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[1] Sjoberg, an authority on disaster research, states (1962:363): 'A typical adaption [to disaster in pre-literate societies] is resignation to one's fate. When catastrophe is thought to be engendered primarily by spiritual forces, man can himself do little to alter the course of events apart from recourse to religious and/or magical practices. Recall that he assumes the immutability of the natural-divine order, which includes also the social arrangements about him. Add to this the meagerness of technological know-how of the sort that would be useful in disaster rehabilitation and we see that mute acceptance of one's lot is the logical result.'

[2] See Salisbury 1962:338.

[3] For instance, the 'renegade' leaders hanged at Higaturu and Sangara; the administrative staff, teachers and the twenty priests-in-training who died at Higaturu in the Mt Lamington eruption, and [166] the Orokaiva leader of the co-operative movement who also died at that time. Many of the most talented Orokaiva are serving outside the region in government, missions and commerce.

[4] Belshaw (1951:248) makes a similar allusion.

474 grown. These were mainly used as food by the co-operative workers,
241 but in times of local food shortage they were sold to other vil-
lagers. All workers, Yega, Ahora and Beuru, lived in garden
[433] houses on the Ononda garden site during the week and returned to
[484] their home villages only at week-ends.

The establishment of gardens and the work organization were similar at Garara. There also, peanuts and sweet potatoes were the main crops. According to an informant the value of the first harvest in 1947 was $190.

[797] Unfortunately for the co-operatives, the mission organizers soon disagreed with Samuel, for the Rev. Benson's diary on 1 April 1947 speaks of him as a 'wife-deserter, and who in consequence has been put off the committee of the G.P.T.' (and presumably placed under Church discipline). It was also stated by informants that there was dissatisfaction among shareholders with Samuel's rather secretive management of the money.

At this point the G.P.T. ceased to function and the co-operative
efforts of the Yega proceeded in different directions. The Anglican
[797] Mission sponsored a Christian co-operative which became known as
the Gona Co-operative Society, while Samuel Ungega organized the
[614] Gombe Co-operative. He was supported by most members of his own
clan (Kurou), some members of his new wife's clan (Jambapa), a few
members of other Yega clans (Seseko and Konambo) and also by five
members of the neighbouring Bapa sub-tribe. Four of the Bapa men
were married to women of Kurou Dunemba sub-clan which joined the
Bapa people in past times but with whom Yega Kurou still maintained
exogamous relations. The fifth man was a brother of one of these
four, having no direct affinal link with Samuel or other members
of Kurou clan.

● [657] Early in 1948 the foreman in charge at Ononda was sent by the mission authorities to Boreo to instruct people in co-operative techniques. At about the same time the Ahora and Beuru labourers were forced by the Administration to return to their villages because of labour problems at home. Samuel's Gombe Co-operative then abandoned farming at Ononda and restricted its operations to the Garara site, where all land rights were held by members of the Jambapa clan, the clan of Samuel's wife.

[484] All members of the Gombe Co-operative workforce, including the Bapa men, lived in garden houses on the Garara site from Monday to Friday each week. The Jabapa landholders permitted the members of other clans and the Bapa men to use nearby secondary forest for their food gardens. This saved travelling time and permitted the maximum time to be spent on the co-operative gardens.

The Gombe Co-operative continued operations during 1948-9 but because of opposition from the mission it never gained popular

474 241 support, a peak number of 19 households being engaged during 1949. In 1950-1 Samuel attended a nine month's training course in Port Moresby at the invitation of the Administration Co-operative Officer. Samuel attempted to ensure the continuity of his scheme by appointing and training three men to oversee operations during his absence. Two of the men chosen were Yega men with close affinal ties with Samuel, the third was a Bapa man having only a remote kinship link but particular ability. The scheme continued to function smoothly during 1950. Samuel's plan was to grow annual cash crops and to build up a reserve fund for the first few years, then to undertake tree-cropping. He bought cocoa pods and had the seeds planted in a nursery in January 1951. During his training period Samuel made two trips to Gona to observe the progress of the co-[731] operative. On the second of these visits he took his daughter to the hospital at Higatutu and was among the 4000 killed when Mt Lamington erupted on 21 January. After his death no more cash crops were planted at Garara. No one knows what became of the money received but none was ever distributed to members of the Gombe Co-operative.

474 241 177 797 The mission-sponsored Christian co-operative embraced more people and a much greater area than the Gombe Co-operative. The Anglican Mission at Gona is responsible for an area that stretches approximately 30 miles north and 15 miles south and extends in a rough arc 5 to 10 miles inland. Little information was available from the mission records, but it seemed likely that the Christian co-operative, named the Gona Co-operative Society, was launched during April or May 1947, that membership among the Yega was almost universal (apart from the members of the Gombe Co-operative) and that there was no fixed share payment, each adult male contributing what he could afford. A large store was built.

[657] In September 1947 Mr John Millar, government officer in charge of co-operative development in the Territory, visited Gona and addressed a meeting of 500 people in the new store, explaining the Administration's plans for co-operatives in the area. He suggested that the present Gona Co-operative Society be split into an association of eight smaller societies, each centred in its own local community.[1] The meeting agreed and Mr Millar departed. The committee assumed that theirs would be among the first co-operatives to be registered when the necessary legislation had been passed and this was the position when Father Benson departed on home leave at the beginning of December 1947.

Mr Millar's advice was implemented after April 1948 by Rev. Alfred Clint who undertook to organize and co-ordinate the

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[1] The eight societies within the association were to be centred at Gona, Garara, Bakubari, Gombe, Soputa, Buna, Huhuru and Hamburata.

474 worked for eight. This became an important basis for resentment
241 and discontent among the workers.

The arrival of Rev. Clint in 1948 ushered in a period of
474 dynamic growth in the co-operative movement in the district. He
had a deep interest in co-operatives, and had been associated in
241 Australia with the Christian Socialist Movement. He was speci-
177 fically recruited by the mission to organize agricultural
co-operatives and within three weeks of his arrival he had held
797 meetings with the members of three of the co-operatives and had
discussed future development with the District Agricultural
[657] Officer, Mr Cockshott. In mid-May he commenced a weekly co-
operatives instruction class covering co-operative leadership,
[191] history of co-operatives, basic techniques, book-keeping and
English.

[782] Rev. Clint was insistent that Christian ritual be associated
with co-operative action. Educational and committee meetings
always closed with a special prayer, there were church services
at which tools were blessed and newly planted seed was blessed
[795] in the gardens. This aspect of the co-operative movement was
regarded with some apprehension by Administration officers who
[178] felt that it could be misunderstood by the Papuans and possibly
lead to the development of a cargo cult. There was some evidence
to suggest that a cult did in fact begin. Money was collected
surreptitiously (its disposal was never explained), and in the
opinions of some observers there was a belief among some participants that the mere formation of co-operatives and the routine performance of the work required would magically raise the Papuans in a short time to the status of Europeans. On the other hand, there was evidence to support the view that the people in their desire to improve their economic position saw co-operatives as the channel and adopted the idea wholeheartedly. There is something of both these views in the statement of the ex-chairman, who said: 'We wanted to be like other civilized countries and earn money by working together.'

In November 1948 there were 25 acres under dry rice at Gona No.1, and 10 acres under taro, 6 acres of rice and one acre of peanuts at Gona No.2. Similar areas were under crop at the other co-operatives. The first harvest in early 1949 appears to have been a success. On his return from leave in March 1949, Rev. Benson spoke of 'barns and storehouses bursting with rice, people happily busy...true comradeship and Christian co-operation'.

474 In August 1949 the first four co-operatives in the Territory
241 were registered.[1] They were, in order: Yega, Gona, Garara and

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657 [1] This registration was made under the terms of draft legislation. It was not confirmed by the Registrar of Co-operatives under the finally approved legislation, the Co-operative Societies Ordinance 1950.

474 Buna. The registering officer stated that 'the co-operative move-
241 ment in this district is the only one yet far enough advanced for
registration'.[1]
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About this time, discussions were held between Rev. Clint and
the local agricultural officers regarding the practicability of
474 planting tree crops - especially coffee and cocoa - as eventual
241 replacements for the annual crops then being grown. The problems
associated with the establishment of these tree crops were not
177 solved, however.[2] Had they been solved, a serious difference of
[797] opinion regarding policy would have been avoided. The divergence
of views was between Rev. Clint, who saw the production of rice
by co-operative methods mainly as a way of improving the subsist-
ence diet of the people, and the people themselves, who saw it as
a way of earning money. As time went on, it appeared to the
villagers that Rev. Clint's interests lay only in subsistence
crops and their enthusiasm began to wane. Towards the end of 1949
Rev. Clint became ill and he had to return permanently to Australia
in January 1950.

474 In Rev. Clint's view Christian co-operatives had 'grown naturally
241 out of the teachings of the Christian faith' (Clint 1950). Unfor-
177 tunately he did not recognize that material considerations weighed
at least as heavily as spiritual values in the minds of the people
433 among whom he was working. The people had readily accepted a
departure from the traditional practices of land tenure, an entirely
different system of work organization; and the cultivation of a new
crop, rice, which involved radical changes in their gardening
techniques. The Yega, anticipating a substantial cash income, had
welcomed these changes, but soon discovered that rice could not be
converted readily to cash. There was no possibility of rice being
grown in sufficient quantity in any one locality (for reasons of
land availability and manpower) to justify the establishment of
central milling facilities, and inadequate transport facilities
prevented combination with other areas, even had these existed at
that time. Without central milling, which would have produced a
brown rice, properly dried, and saleable to the Administration and
plantations, the only means of converting 'paddy' rice into a
storable product was to use smaller semi-portable mills to produce
243 white or polished rice. The milling, however, whilst converting

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[1] Quoted in the Gona Anglican Mission Diary.

[2] Specifically, lack of knowledge of the soils in the area, lack of any experimental plantings, and a shortage of trained staff.

243 'paddy' to food, prevented the conversion of the food to cash,[1]
[262] though it was quite suitable for village consumption as a supple-
mentary food. In fact, imported white rice has now become an
important 'status' food at feasts.

474 Rice continued to be grown for about a year after Rev. Clint's
departure; small quantities were sold by the cupful but the income
241 received would have been negligible. In 1951 the crop was attacked
[242] by a species of 'army worm' and on the recommendation of the
District Agricultural Officer was destroyed. No further plantings
were made and all co-operative agricultural activity lapsed.

By 1952 co-operative agricultural activity had ceased among the Yega. The death of Samuel Ungega (the only man in the co-operative who had any training in co-operative work and the only man capable of directing activities on a long-term basis), removed from the Gombe co-operative the main driving force.

[177] The basic reason for the failure of the Christian co-operative seems to have been that Rev. Clint's aim was to produce a storable food crop whereas the Yega wanted a cash crop. The scheme was established on an inadequate business basis and with insufficient understanding of the people's deep-seated desires.

The modern co-operative and the extent of Yega participation

474 A subsequent co-operative, organized by the Administration and
[241] known as the Gona Villages Native Society Limited, came into being
in May 1953. In that month share capital amounting to $2542 was
repaid by the Administration to 332 members of the old Gona, Gombe
(Iaga) and Garara co-operatives, most of whom immediately became
shareholders, at a uniform $10 per share, in the new society.
The new co-operative was to serve different purposes from the
earlier ventures. There was to be no attempt whatever at communal
[443] production. Functions were to provide marketing facilities for
the agricultural produce of individual members and to conduct a
retail trading store.

[347] Operations were begun in a store previously owned by A.H. Bunting Ltd on the Popondetta-Killerton Road, half a mile from Cape Killerton. Originally built from local materials and with a tin

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[657] [1] Only brown unpolished rice is issued as rations to the Administration and plantation labour. The endosperm and much of the vitamin content are removed in the production of white rice, so that employers issuing white rice would have to supply additional vitamins, an uneconomic proposition.

474 The finances of the store were under continual surveillance
443 both by the local inspector and by the Assistant Registrar of
Co-operatives in Port Moresby to whom regular reports were submitted
[657] by the inspector. A general reserve fund was maintained and was
[454] fully invested. Provision for depreciation was made every six
months; this money was banked so that the provision of a new store
building would be possible within about ten years.

[438] The Cape Killerton store operated as a normal retail trading
store but over three quarters of its business was conducted with
its shareholders. In January 1963 there were 578 shareholders in
the Gona villages co-operative store, of whom 108 (19 per cent)
were Yega people. Yega shareholders purchased 34 per cent of all
goods sold[1] while non-shareholders bought 13.5 per cent.[2]

[434] The high rate of spending of Yega shareholders relative to the
total membership was because the Yega people live nearest to the
store at distances ranging from nil to four miles, and because the
Yega probably received a higher cash income than the other groups.

464 The Yega had since the early 1930s been within walking distance
167 of one of the best mission schools in the Northern District, with
a European teacher permanently on the staff. In consequence young
[368] Yega men, who almost without exception left the villages to enter
paid employment, were able to obtain skilled and semi-skilled jobs.
[871] In a sample group of 18 such wage-earners interviewed, the average
[797] remittance to relatives and friends in the village during 1962 was
$110 p.a. As 40 per cent of the adult male work force was absent
[434] in wage-employment, a considerable amount of cash was being in-
jected into the Yega economy. In addition, some Yega obtained a
regular cash income from produce sold in Popondetta market (see
Dakeyne 1965:102 ff.).

474 Expansion of membership in the G.V.N.S. Co-operative had almost
ceased in 1964: 561 members in 1958 increased to 578 in 1961. As
443 a branch store was opened at Buna in 1962, effective shareholder
438 support for the Killerton store seemed likely to diminish. In any
event there could be no major increase in shareholder numbers among
the Yega, for nearly every adult Yega man resident in the area was
already a shareholder in the co-operative. The bulk of the store's
business was done with its shareholders but non-shareholding friends,
such as members of a shareholder's family or visitors from the towns,
were asked by shareholders to use their share numbers when making

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[1] Calculated from the rebates given in December 1962.

[2] Calculated on the basis of sales for the months October-December 1962.

FOREWORD

In the central part of the Northern District of Papua
101 there is a concentration of approximately 26,000 people who are
[619] known collectively as the Orokaiva. The term Orokaiva came
into use some years after European contact, and before that time
the Orokaiva did not recognize themselves as a single group, nor
did they all interact for any common purpose. Although they do
not claim common ancestry, the various sub-groups possess a
relatively homogeneous cultural heritage. The Orokaiva speak
several dialects which are mutually intelligible and belong to a
common language.(1)

241 During the last ten years there has been considerable
development of commercial agriculture within the area. Many
241 people have planted cash crops on land held under customary
423 tenure; some villages have planted communal blocks on land set
aside by the rightholding clans; the Higaturu Local Government
● 657 Council (which serves most of the southern part of the Orokaiva
culture area) has instituted a scheme for the allocation of cash
crop lands to individuals, and for the registration of the land
with the Council; some Orokaiva have taken up agricultural
leases of small, family holdings on government land, and they
are provided with capital, extension services and registered
land titles; others again have entered the plantation economy
(none as entrepreneurs as yet, but many as workers on European
plantations in the area); and at Beporo (on the coast) the people
have embarked on a new experiment involving the cutting of clan
land into rectangular blocks, allocation by ballot, and the planting
of cash crops by families.

121 The aim of the Unit's research is to determine which
of these systems has been or promises to be most productive
(in the economic sense) per man, per unit of capital and per
acre of land; which of them is best suited to the introduction of

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(1) The term Orokaiva has no precise connotation but is here used in its widest sense to include such culturally related groups as the Notu, Binandere, Aiga and Sangara. The word is often used in a more restricted sense to refer to those people (predominantly speakers of the Kombu-Sangara dialects) who are served by the Higaturu Local Government Council.

614 village, but one who was married to an Andiriha woman remained
429 and planted coffee. At his invitation, several Andiriha men
425 from Inonda village planted coffee in the same area. They
578 claimed that as the Endehi'undi had been defeated in war two
generations previously and had not occupied this land since, and as the scattered remnants of the Endehi'undi were long since absorbed into other villages, their rights had lapsed. They maintained that the person who cleared the virgin bush after the Mt. Lamington eruption had valid rights to plant cash crops there, and was entitled to invite his relations to plant there with him. As an additional precaution, however, the first man to plant coffee there obtained the approval of the only member of the Endehi'undi living in Hohota. When another Endehi'undi man from Ururu village was widowed about two years ago, he moved into the household of an Andiriha man who has coffee on this land.

Of course there is no traditional precedent to apply to rights to cash crops, but after the coffee had been planted for nearly a year, some of the Endehi'undi went to the Administration and claimed that the land was theirs, and that as the coffee had been planted on their land without their permission, it was also theirs. An officer of the Department of Native Affairs brought the parties together and it was ultimately agreed that the coffee planters could continue to occupy the land provided that they paid the Endehi'undi for the land. The Endehi'undi were given-about £16 in cash, pigs, traditional valuables and taro. The precise rights transferred by this exchange are not clear, and the participants have differing views as to their respective rights, for the Andiriha consider that they have acquired absolute proprietary rights, whereas the Endehi'undi maintain that they have not disposed of proprietary rights. It is perhaps significant that the Endehi'undi man from Ururu village, who was widowed about two years ago, was taken in to the house of one of the Andiriha men who has coffee on this land.

[657] The Department of Native Affairs has no legal power
[692] to determine land disputes and the arrangement is accordingly

614 not legally binding.(1) In fact, however, the parties to this dis-
423 pute assume that the officer concerned does have the necessary
power to enforce the agreement, and thus it is effective for the
425 present, particularly as it has been reinforced by registration of
657 the land with the council. The Endehi'undi nevertheless intend
692 to re-assert their rights to this land at a later date. When they
find that the existing arrangement is not binding, they may either
578 simply revoke it or apply to the Lands Commission for reinstatement of their earlier rights.

Our third example concerns the Jego'undi sub-clan
614 of Inonda. Neither of the two adult members of this sub-clan
423 has planted cash crops. One of them had prepared ground for
425 planting cocoa on the site of his former food garden, but his
578 right to do so was questioned by the Andiriha and he abandoned
the attempt. As already explained, the Jego'undi are in a subordinate position to the Andiriha, and though their ancestor did contribute to the transfer of gifts at the time the Inonda people acquired their lands, their numbers are small and their status is low. Their continued residence in the village is thus dependent on their passive compliance with the wishes of the Andiriha leaders. They spoke of leaving this village for either of two other villages to which they are linked by ties of kinship and marriage, but they are aware that wherever they move their

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(1) Officers of the Department of Native Affairs exercised widespread jurisdiction in land matters (and settled disputes in Inonda) until their power to do so was curtailed as a result of two important judgements. The first was a judgement made on 19th July, 1957, by the Court of Appeal in the case of Busia v. Havini in which it was ruled that although Regulation 59 of the Native Administration Regulations of New Guinea gave magistrates (usually in practice Native Affairs patrol staff exercising their magisterial functions) the power to decide the ownership of land, this power had been repealed by implication by the Native Land Registration Ordinance 1952, which provided that the ownership of customary land in both Papua and New Guinea could only be determined by the Native Lands Commission. This judgement made the situation in New Guinea identical with what it had always been in Papua i.e. that district courts could settle questions of land use but not questions of land ownership. On 8th April, 1960, however, in its judgement in the case Soape v. Wesiki, the Supreme Court held that district courts could not make decisions about land use where such decisions were based on implied assumptions about the ownership of the land concerned. As most decisions about land use are based on assumptions about its ownership, the district courts have generally declined to handle any cases relating to land matters of any sort.

423 621 166 614 578 the undisputed property of the Andiriha - albeit a different sub-clan. The occupying sub-clan is said to be agreeable to the shift, partly because one of the Inonda families originates from a lineage of the sub-clan at Hohota. Another alternative is to move to Ajoro, the "home" village of the Tandai'undi clan. The Ajoro people are said to have invited them to come, and to have offered them land on which to plant their food crops. Some felt that residence with the Tandai'undi would reinforce their existing hold on the land they at present use, but others fear that if trouble arose between them and the Tandai'undi they may have to leave.(1)

A further possibility which has been considered is for the village to split - the Jego'undi going either to Mosou to occupy the land given them by their mother's brother or to Urio to join their mother's lineage, the Andiriha who originate from Hohota lineage removing there, and the balance of the Andiriha, who have close kinship links with the Ajoro people, moving there to live. A final possibility is to remove the whole village back near their food gardens at Inonda I. The actual outcome will no doubt depend on the internal relations between villagers and the external relations between this village and the others in the vicinity.

614 423 578 The past history of the Inonda lands and the current problems encountered with cash crop planting there indicate that there are serious tenure problems at the sub-clan level. It appears that the definition of sub-clan or village boundaries and the rationalization of land rights in such a way that only one clan, sub-clan or village has rights in any one area would be [657] [692] conducive to higher productivity and less dispute. The Native Lands Commission has the power to define boundaries and rightholding groups on the application of any of the parties claiming rights in an area. But in fact there is one Native Lands Commissioner for the whole of the Northern District (with a population of 51,000) and he is required to do his own surveying, collection of genealogies and clerical work without

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(1) The people are clearly disturbed by the knowledge that the government survey recorded the Inonda land as "belonging" to the Tandai'undi.

614 assistance. The system of investigation followed by the Com-
423 mission is very detailed, and accordingly in the period of three
578 years since the Commissioner was posted to the district only
about five disputes have been settled. Already 34 other cases
657 are awaiting deliberation and many other disputants would take
692 their cases to the Commission if an early decision was possible.
Owing to the lack of staff it will probably be many years before they can be heard. The scale of the problem appears to be so vast that it may well be beyond the capacity of the Commission to cope with for many years to come.(1) To overcome the problem in a short time would require either tremendous expansion of the Lands Commission or delegation of authority to deal with such matters to local (and possibly indigenous) tribunals.(2)

614 In the meantime the area is left without adequate
423 machinery for the definition of rights and the settlement of dis-
putes. Indigenous leaders, whether councillors, clan heads or
578 other elders have no legal right to determine disputes, and
692 although they are frequently able to exert social pressure to
[627] have their decisions enforced, they cannot apply any legal
sanctions. It seems that such decisions are frequently effective within the lineage or sub-clan because the leaders are in intimate contact with the disputants and can apply effective social sanctions. This is much less so with respect to disputes be-

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(1)- Since this article was written, the Native Lands Commission has been joined with the existing Land Titles Commission to form a new Land Titles Commission. The enabling legislation (Land Titles Commission Ordinance 1962) was passed by the legislature in 1962 but was not assented to by the Governor General until April 1963. The new Commission has only seven commissioners to serve the whole of Papua and New Guinea.

(2) This is a widespread pattern elsewhere in the Pacific. For example, in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, the Lands Commission is composed entirely of indigenous members, though the Chief Lands Commissioner (who is an expatriate official) sits with them on appeal cases. The Lands Commission in Fiji is comprised of a commissioner (who is usually a Fijian) and a number of Fijian assessors who are elected for the particular area by the Provincial Council. The Land and Titles Court of Western Samoa is comprised of a President (who is also Chief Judge of the High Court), not less than two Samoan judges and not less than one assessor. In practice, however, it more frequently sits with three Samoan judges and two or more assessors who are usually Samoans.

614 tween sub-clans or villages.(1)
423
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692 Officers of the Department of Native Affairs are still
in some instances able to effect reconciliations or to settle dis-
[657] putes despite their lack of legal powers. This is not only be-
cause disputants are sometimes prepared to accept the judgement
of a disinterested third party, but also because almost all
Orokaiva people we have met are of the opinion that patrol staff
614 do have the power to enforce their "recommendations". The
423 fear of sorcery is still recognized as a sanction against trans-
gression of property rights and informants quoted instances of
578 sorcery having been used to punish transgressions of fishing
626 rights. It is a commonplace that where adequate alternative
754 facilities for settling disputes are not available, sorcery tends
to increase. Though it is certainly extant in Inonda we have no
evidence to indicate whether it is increasing or not.

614 The definition of boundaries and owning sub-clans
would increase social stability and security of tenure, but in the
423 course of time, due to population increase in some clans and
decrease in others, it would become increasingly unrelated to
clan needs. It is therefore necessary that any action to define
boundaries and ownership should be associated with facilities for
the transfer of rights between clans, or between individual mem-
bers of different clans.

721 In the pre-contact era warfare was probably the most
important means by which major areas of land were transferred
425 between descent groups, and when warfare is abolished it is
essential that alternative facilities for land transfer be provided.
In many colonial territories where warfare previously tended to
bring land areas into line with population numbers, colonial
governments have abolished warfare but have not provided
adequate alternative means of transfer, and this invariably leads

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(1) Disputes between sub-clans or villages are sometimes settled by the Executive of the Higaturu Council. They have no legal power to enforce decisions, but they are often able to persuade parties to accept their advice.

121 157 warfare. He sees their personality attributes as being "congruent with the social structure that favours individuality and mobility". Reay (1953:111) states that Orokaiva men are encouraged to be highly individualistic. Superficially at least, these views would suggest that the Orokaiva would tend to be receptive to the changes currently being wrought by cash cropping and paid labour though, as Keesing points out, their reaction will be dependent on the monetary and other incentives which these activities provide.

242 657 177 Extension services: McCarthy (1962:110) notes that the Orokaiva people "suffered at the hands of the Yodda valley goldseekers at the end of the nineteenth century and the severity of the magistrate Monckton at the beginning of the new century, and it is said that they have not forgiven either occasion." Subsequent contact experiences have not been such as to alter their attitudes very greatly, and this situation detracts from the effectiveness of the available extension services.

242 No agricultural extension workers had visited Inonda during the twelve months preceding our visit and it is understood that extension patrols seldom call there more than once a year, and then only for brief visits. Several Inonda people attended a one-day extension class on coffee harvesting at Popondetta during our stay, but this was the only such class they had been aware of in that year. People can, of course, consult extension officers in Popondetta at any time, but as a result of language difficulties and social distance the Inonda people do not take advantage of this facility. The number of extension staff at present in the area is quite inadequate to serve the needs of a community which has only recently become aware of the techniques and potential of cash cropping. More extension services would probably result in extension of cash crop plantings, improved husbandry, and higher output. Pig production could also be expanded to the limits of the existing market.

491 489 Transport and marketing: With the completion of the Girua road there will be all-weather road access to both Popondetta and the port of Oro Bay which is soon to be developed to handle overseas shipping. There is at present no commercial transport service to take produce to market and none of the villagers have transport of their own. The quantity of pro-

APPENDIX A

The Higaturu Local Government Council Land Registration and Coffee Processing Schemes

657 The Higaturu Local Government Council was formed in April, 1956. It serves 12,000 people who belong to the southern Orokaiva culture group of the Northern District of Papua, and has 54 councillors to represent its 86 villages (of which Inonda is one).

Land registration

657 423 [241] In the first year of the council's operation the Native Affairs officer who was responsible for supervising council affairs initiated a system of registering with the council all lands which were being used for cash crops. In practice, persons wishing to plant cash crops under the scheme applied to the supervising officer, who thereafter made a chain and compass survey of the land concerned, in the presence of the elders of the landholding clan. The councillor for the area also attended. A written declaration was made and witnessed by the clan elders, the local councillor, the applicant and the Native Affairs officer. The declaration allotted the land to the applicant and stated that he could thereafter transfer it or nominate heirs to it, without further reference to the clan or other group. The land described in the declaration was then entered in a register by the council clerk.

[241] During 1957 after about 150 blocks had been registered, the acting District Commissioner ordered that the scheme be stopped on the ground, it is said, that it did not conform to traditional practice. No statement of policy was issued, but no further registrations were made for nearly three years. The people were uncertain of the status of the registrations which had already been made but coffee planting continued throughout. In fact, the man who was then District Agricultural Officer considers that there was more planting during 1957-60 than either before or since.

It is understood that the main issues at stake were (a) whether the scheme constituted a modification to custom or

657 423 whether it merely provided facilities for recording customary land allocation; and (b) whether or not a council had the legal right to undertake the scheme at all. The answer to the latter question is really dependent on the answer to the former. This in turn depends on the legal definition of what constitutes custom, for if the scheme is considered to be in accordance with custom then it is legally valid, whereas if it is not in accordance with custom it is invalid. Various opinions have been expressed, but in the absence of clarifying legislation or a test case the matter remained one for administrative discretion.(1)

During 1958 the council passed a rule (Rule No. 4 of 1958) which required that before any man could plant cash crops, he had to obtain the approval of the leaders of the relevant clan or clans. This rule was disallowed by the Administration. In 1959, a new rule was adopted (Rule No. 2 of 1959) which stated in the preamble that "...tree crops should only be planted after notice has been given to the District Officer or District Agricultural Officer...so that help can be given efficiently in such things as transport and marketing and in control of pests and diseases. It is also necessary that future quarrels over land be avoided and that each man should feel secure in the knowledge that the benefits of the work he puts into his crop will come to him." The rule provided that no person could plant coffee or cocoa except on land which had been allotted to him by custom "to be used by him alone." Planting was not to commence until a chain and compass traverse had been made by an officer of the Department of Native Affairs. The rule was approved and implemented, though due to staff shortages it has not been possible to meet the demand for surveys, and planting generally precedes survey in fact.

657 423 425 While the rule itself made no provision for it, the draft form of agreement stated that the holder of land registered under the rule could transfer his rights to any indigenous person at any time. The Administration advised the councillors that this provision for transfer was not acceptable and a new form of

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(1) The Lands Commission Ordinance 1962, which was assented to in April 1963 after this paper was written, makes it clear that councils will no longer have the right to engage in such schemes. It is nevertheless possible for the Commission to investigate and ratify the registrations made by the council.

657 agreement was drafted and adopted. It reads as follows:

423 425 "Agreement to the right of land use.... It has been agreed by the people of [name] clan (or village) and all other interested parties that [applicant's name] has had allocated to him by native custom for his use alone the land marked on the attached plan, and that no other person has a claim to the land. It is also agreed that any coffee trees planted by [the applicant] on the land are his sole property and no other person has claim over them."

The form is dated, signed by the allottee and by "the clan leaders" (in practice it is usual for all resident adult males in the "owning" clan or sub-clan to sign), and by the local councillor. It is witnessed by an officer of the Department of Native Affairs. A map of the land is attached to the form. Forms and maps are prepared in triplicate and one set was to be held by the applicant, one by the council, and one by the District Office in Popondetta. In practice, the council copy is also held by District Office.

657 423 Registration under this new rule commenced in 1960, and surveying and registration of plots have continued to the present time. At 1st January, 1963, 588 plots covering 1,120 acres had been registered. A further 1,029 applications for registration had been made but not yet dealt with. Although it was originally intended that no plot would be registered if it was less than two and a half acres in area, many smaller plots have in fact been dealt with and the registered plots at Inonda village measure 1.4, 2.6 and 1.6 acres respectively (though these areas have not yet been fully planted). Some areas of under one acre have been registered. Wherever possible, villagers are encouraged to allocate blocks contiguously, not only to facilitate surveying and identification of land, but also to reduce the extent of border clearing necessary, and to facilitate pest control and extension services.

(242) Provisions for ensuring higher standards of husbandry and output are contained in Rule No. 3 of 1959 which requires that persons with cash crops must:

657 423 242 "(a) ... keep the land clear of all rubbish

(b) ... cut down and burn out all diseased plants and trees....

(c) ... obey the orders of any Agricultural officer......"

A full-time inspector is employed by the council under the ordinance and a number of persons has been prosecuted for failure to keep their coffee and cocoa gardens cleared.

657 428 The question of inheritance of rights to land registered under the scheme has been raised by the council on a number of occasions, particularly during 1962 when it formed the main topic for debate in a number of meetings (most of which were attended by Unit staff). Most councillors favoured either (a) the nomination by the registered "owner" of a single male heir (usually the eldest son), or (b) the inheritance of the coffee block by all sons either jointly or by subdivision to individuals. In the absence of sons, rights were to devolve on brothers, on (614) sisters' sons or on daughters' sons. On the other hand, Native Affairs staff who attended the meetings advocated that as the clan as a whole had made the original allocation, the clan as a whole would need to select the heir. There appeared to be inadequate realization of the different nature of the rights held at the levels of the clan and sub-clan, the lineage and the individual. The fact that all members of the sub-clan were required to sign the agreement was merely a written affirmation of a customary allocation made at some previous time. Under Orokaiva custom, once land rights are allocated they are transmitted thereafter in the male line (subject to occupation, the existence of sons and so on). The councillors were merely asking that the rule be based on the existing custom; a custom which seemed to be appropriate to the circumstances. However, the difference of opinion was not really a matter of great consequence as councillors were informed that advice had been received from headquarters in Port Moresby that the council would not be permitted to make any rule on the question.

657 423 The aim of the registration scheme is to promote the planting of cash crops on individual plots with some security of

tenure. Registration is of doubtful legal validity, but to the extent that the Orokaiva people accept it as binding (and they appear to do so unreservedly at present) it functions in practice. Although no public statement has been made on future policy to be followed with regard to the scheme, the Land (Tenure Conversion) Bill 1963, would, if it were made law, enable the Lands Commission to issue freehold titles to replace the existing documents issued by the council.

Subsidiary developments

An interesting development took place in February 1962 when the people of Hohorita (which is within the council area) devised a scheme of consolidating their fragmented holdings on an area of land which they wished to set aside for cash cropping, and registering the lands allotted to each individual with the Higaturu Council. Their plan grew out of their experience of the council registration system (the most prominent leader of Hohorita, Councillor Brian, is president of the Higaturu Council) and of a visit of Hohorita leaders to the Yega project at Beporo. The Yega project involved the voluntary division of certain clan lands among individual clan members for cash cropping.(1)

The Hohorita plan was presented to officials of the departments of Native Affairs and Agriculture in Popondetta. They are said to have been sympathetic and to have appreciated the advantages of such a system whereby consolidation would be effected by the people themselves and registered (in the early stages at least) with their own council. Not only time and expense would be saved by the people undertaking the operation themselves, but an opportunity was thereby provided to rationalize the tenure system with the full co-operation of the people concerned. The Hohorita people have since been advised on instructions from headquarters that they are not to proceed with their proposal though consolidation may be arranged by the Lands Commission at a later date on their behalf. Popular

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(1) The Yega project is described in detail in a paper by R.B. Dakeyne which will be published in a subsequent issue of this Bulletin. The visit of the Hohorita people to Yega was sponsored by officers of the Department of Agriculture.

657 423 support is an essential prerequisite to land reform in a democratic state, and many examples exist in the colonial world wherein provisions for reform have been resisted or boycotted because of opposition to the institution prosecuting the reform rather than to the reform itself.(1)

Coffee processing and marketing

657 274 From its inception the council expressed the view that processing and marketing should be handled by the Orokaiva themselves (either through the council or some other authority set up for the purpose). Administration officers were generally sympathetic to this view though some doubted the capacity of the council to operate such an enterprise efficiently. It was agreed that the factory and equipment should be owned by the Orokaiva, but the question of management was left in abeyance.

[245] During the 1920's "communal" village plantations were established throughout the Orokaiva area under the Native Plantations Ordinance 1918.(2) Part of the proceeds of produce sales was distributed to villagers and part was deposited in a fund to be used for specific purposes including education. The project was resumed for a short time after the war and a credit balance remained in the Sangara Native Coffee Trust Fund. This money was used as part payment for the purchase of hulling, winnowing and polishing machines for the factory. The balance was met by a loan from the Native Loans Board (which is an [348] agency of the central government). A factory building was erected for the council by an indigenous contractor at a cost of £500. The building was completed and the machinery installed by January 1959. Until this time the processing and marketing of coffee had been undertaken by a private firm.

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(1) Local reaction will be determined largely by the relations between the people and the authority implementing the reform. Owing to the precarious nature of relations between people and government in this Territory considerable emphasis will need to be given to public participation if the reforms proposed in the Lands Commission Bill 1962 and the Land (Tenure Conversion) Bill 1963 are to be successfully implemented.

(2) This project will be described in detail in a forthcoming issue of this Bulletin.

The Department of Agriculture thereupon took over 657 274 the factory and began operations. The Orokaiva raised strong objections,(1) and a public meeting of about 1,200 people was held on 6th October 1959. Government officers are said to have informed the meeting that the factory was being run at a loss which was being borne by the government. Nevertheless, negotiations were then held with the council and it was agreed that in future the processing and marketing would be run by a committee to be known as the Higaturu Council Coffee Factory Committee which was to consist of the District Agricultural Officer, the Assistant District Officer (Local Government), a representative of the Higaturu council and a representative of the growers (who was not necessarily a member of the council). The committee held its first meeting on 25th February 1960 and met at monthly intervals thereafter. The day to day operation of the factory was controlled by the Department of Agriculture.

Early in 1962 it was decided that a new body to be known as the Orokaiva Coffee Growers Society would be set up to handle the processing and marketing of coffee. The society serves a wider area than the council and is independent of the council. It is run by a board of directors with an officer of the Department of Agriculture as adviser, and replaces the former [473] Higaturu Council Coffee Factory Committee. The society is raising capital by selling shares at £5 each to indigenous coffee growers and by the end of 1962 it had a membership of 470 and a share capital of £2,350.(2) It is intended that the society should buy out the council's investment in the coffee factory. Six coffee buying centres have been set up by the society, and all coffee in the area (35 to 40 tons in parchment per year) is now bought through them and processed at the factory. The processed coffee is marketed in Australia through the Territory Department

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(1) These were undoubtedly aggravated by a drop in overseas prices soon after the Department took over, and by the fact that the Department several times ran out of funds for buying the coffee and had to send growers home without payment.

(2) Late in 1962 a European planter applied to join the society but his application was disallowed on the ground that the legislation under which the society operates (the Native Economic Development Ordinance 1951-2) does not permit of non-indigenous participation.

657 274 of Agriculture. Those Orokaiva people with whom we have discussed the matter appear to be satisfied by the present arrangement and to appreciate the experience they are thus gaining in running a commercial enterprise.

463 The five subjects who had hired labourers who were not related
472 to them all paid cash wages. A and H have received $1,500 govern-
ment loans to develop their blocks and have thus had the capital
464 to pay for labour. They have not relied on kinship assistance at
426 all. The loan has been an effective substitute for kin ties. L
derives the capital necessary to hire labour from her trade store.

657

It will be noted that all non-relatives are paid in cash, but
463 most relatives are paid in kind. Most entrepreneurs are still
dependent on the help of relatives, as they do not have the cash
472 to pay hired labour, and are thus forced, willingly or not, to
465 exploit their kinship ties.

464 **Property**

602 Land and cash crops. Most of the twelve subjects did not have
any records of cash crop production or sales, so it was impossible
463 to calculate their success in cash-cropping according to these two
criteria. For this reason their cash-cropping activity has been
472 assessed in terms of the number of economic trees each has planted.

423 Ten of the twelve entrepreneurs have cash crops, and another has
245 cleared land for 500 coffee trees. The following table shows that
the most successful entrepreneurs have the fewest cash crops. The
[426] largest cash croppers (A, D and H) have leases of government land
[427] and government development loans of $1,500, but even when they are
[657] omitted the proportions between the three groups remain similar.

Table 13

Commercial trees owned by each entrepreneur*

Entrepreneur	Coffee	Coconut	Cocoa	Total economic trees	Title to land	Years since cash-cropping began	Average trees
A	100	-	1,085	1,185	L	3	702
B	-	-	-	-	-	-	
C	334	88	-	422	C	?	
D	-	-	1,200	1,200	L	4	
E	1,600	11	-	1,611	C	20	1,800
F	300	46	100	446	C	9	
G	388	52	-	440	C	7	
H	-	-	4,702	4,702	L	4	
I	-	170	200	370	C	11	168
J	intends to plant	-	-	-	C	-	
K	150	-	-	150	C	9	
L	150	-	-	150	C	10	

* Coconut and other trees used for home consumption only have been excluded.

Liquid assets. The three groups of entrepreneurs show a clear 463
progression in average savings, group I averaging $37.32, group II 472
$212.01 and group III $322.66. The details are given in Table 17. 454

Table 17

Entrepreneurs' liquid assets

Entrepreneur	Savings bank	Settlers Savings Club	Shares in co-operative or cash society	Cash	Total	Average for group
A	30.00	6.00			36.00	$37.32
B	5.30		60		65.30	
C	42.00				42.00	
D	6.00				6.00	
E	300.90			62.00	362.90	$212.01**
F*	2.65				2.65	
G	?				?	
H	320.00		12.50		332.50	
I	224.00		10.00		234.00	$322.66**
J	?				?	
K	536.00				536.00	
L	198.00				198.00	

* Savings were much higher but used on brother's wife's funeral and food to supplement garden produce during drought.

** Averaged for three persons only. G did not have his account book with him and said he did not remember the amount. J is said to have substantial savings but was not home when the data were collected and his brother did not know the extent of his savings.

The loans received by the entrepreneurs are shown in Table 18. 463
As mentioned above in connection with cash-cropping, there is a 472
negative correlation between extensive cash-cropping and success
as an entrepreneur. This is further borne out by the fact that 426
the only three entrepreneurs to receive loans of $1,500 from the 657
Land Board have planted the most cash crops and are among the less
successful entrepreneurs.

The receipt of a loan to assist in the establishment of a store seems to be correlated positively with entrepreneurial success. It must be remembered, however, that none of the most successful stores had been open for more than fifteen months.

Table 18

Loans received

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A	$1,500 (land board)	E	-	I	$200 (from brother-in-law for store)
B	$178 (from younger brother for store)	F	-	J	-
C	-	G	-	K	$390 (from brother and share money for store)
D	$1,500 (land board)	H	$1,500 (land board)	L	-
	75%		25%		50%

Conclusion

463 472 444 Analysis of the three groups with respect to variables which may be classified roughly as economic and social reveals a degree of differentiation. The data do not enable firm conclusions on whether the different variables of themselves explain the relative success of the sample in trading activities.

The most successful group had fewer economic trees than either of the less successful groups, had considerably higher liquid assets, but fewer traditional valuables. They had more tools and equipment than the traders whose stores were closed, but fewer than the traders who, in this sample,can be classed as moderately successful.

The traders with highest turnover had been in operation for considerably less time than the other two groups, and their stores were more frequently outside the owner's home village. They had received more loans to assist with their stores, and fewer loans from the Land Board than either of the other groups.

[871] With respect to social variables the most successful traders were younger than the other groups. Directly related to their lower age was their higher level of education and their shorter [554] experience of paid work. However, the positions they had held had carried more responsibility and status than those held by the less well educated, younger and less successful entrepreneurs.

[621] They were as often elected to positions of community leadership as the least successful, though the moderately successful most often held such positions, and more often held more than one such position (an achievement never realised by the least successful traders).

Chapter 1

Introductory

657 654 241 The first legislation aimed at encouraging Papuans to engage in cash cropping was introduced in 1894 by Lieutenant-Governor MacGregor six years after the beginning of the British administration in Papua. Nevertheless, policy was mainly directed towards the promotion of European enterprise until after the 1914-18 war, when the difficulty of attracting European settlers to Papua caused a shift towards promotion of indigenous agricultural development.[1] At first communal cash crop gardens were promoted but as the disadvantages of this system became known,[2] emphasis shifted to encouraging each family to cultivate an area of cash crops separately. Cheetham (1962:68) states that this policy was clearly established by 1956.

657 423 An ad hoc committee was established in November 1956 to consider the conversion of land from customary tenure to individual freehold title.[3] The committee submitted its report in 1957 and there followed a period of research and discussion, culminating in the policy statement on land tenure in the House of Representatives on 7 April 1960 in which the Minister said:

> (1) The ultimate objective was to introduce a single system of land holding regulated by the central Government by statute, administered by the Department of Lands of the central Government, and providing for secure individual registered titles after the pattern of the Australian system.
>
> (2) Only the central Government...may issue and register land titles.

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[1] On the history of official policy on agricultural development see Crocombe 1964a.

[2] See Crocombe 1964a:33-7.

[3] Land under 'customary tenure' includes 97 per cent of the total area of Papua-New Guinea. The Administration has purchased 2.5 per cent of the total area, and non-indigenes have freehold title over 0.5 per cent.

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423

> (3) Land subject to native custom remains subject to native custom only until it is taken out of custom either by acquisition by the Administration or by a process, to be provided for by ordinance of the Territory, of conversion of title to an individual registered title. (Hasluck 1960:1021.)

Five bills embodying the new land policy were passed by the Legislative Council in 1962-63. The most significant of these from the point of view of the individualisation of tenure were the Land Titles Commission Ordinance 1962 under which the old Native Lands Commission was replaced by the Land Titles Commission, and the Land (Tenure Conversion) Ordinance 1963 which sets out the procedures to be followed in tenure conversion (see Appendix A). The Land (Tenure Conversion) Ordinance 1963 was brought into operation on 3 December 1964. It embodied safeguards against fragmentation in that no land which is less in either area or frontage than a certain minimum may be registered, and no more than six persons may be registered as joint tenants or tenants in common of any interest in land.

The five current ordinances relating to land allow village people holding land under customary tenure three alternatives. First, they may continued to hold the land under customary tenure. Second, where a group has undisputed control of a piece of land and desires a more formal recognition of its rights it may secure title under native custom by having the land registered as communally owned under the Lands Registration (Communally Owned Land) Ordinance 1962. Third, individuals or groups of not more than six persons may apply to convert land previously held under customary tenure to individual registered title in accordance with the Land (Tenure Conversion) Ordinance 1963. This action may only be taken with the approval of all those holding customary rights in the land to be converted, and where all clearly understand that the land is being placed outside the jurisdiction of traditional custom.

Land tenure

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Among the Orokaiva there are no land rights at the tribal level. Each tribe is divided into a number of clans, each of which is further composed of a number of sub-clans, which are usually dispersed over the tribal territory. Each sub-clan holds rights to specific areas of land. Within the sub-clan rights are held by individuals and groups of individuals.

Thus the traditional Orokaiva system was not one of 'communal tenure' and individuals as well as groups held rights to land.[1]

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[1] Ironically, it appears that by registering areas of land as communally owned under the Lands Registration (Communally Owned Land) Ordinance 1962 the Administration is introducing communal holding of land where it did not exist previously.


POPONDETTA DISTRICT
LOCATION MAP
Roads
Conversion schemes
0 1 2 3 4 5
MILES
Holnicote Bay
Killerton
Buna
Awara
SANGARA CROWN LAND
Popondetta
Beriwori 1
Beriwori 2
Dobodura-Buna
Saiho
Awala
Ombi-Tara
Mt Lamington

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Post-war tenure innovations in the Northern District

657 654 423 The Higaturu Local Government Council land registration scheme, begun in 1956, was one of the earliest attempts to rationalise tenure in the Northern District and to increase agricultural productivity. Under this scheme all lands on which cash crops were being planted were to be registered by the Council after a survey by chain and compass. The individual in whose name the land was registered could transfer it or nominate heirs to it without reference to the clan or any other group. The scheme was superseded by the tenure conversion legislation of 1962-63.[1]

A second post-war tenure innovation in the Northern District was the Yega agricultural scheme[2] under which in 1960 a group of villagers agreed to set aside a portion of uncultivated land for use by individual members of the group. External boundaries were agreed upon and individual blocks were marked out and plotted. The 1962-63 land legislation has enabled persons holding title under native custom to convert to individual registered title in accordance with the Land (Tenure Conversion) Ordinance 1963 and on 16 December 1965 fifty-six applicants from Yega were granted individual titles to blocks averaging ten acres in area (Smith 1965).

No conversions were made under the 1962-63 legislation until late 1964. Following a recommendation from the Land Development Board it was decided that conversion under the new legislation should be confined in the first instance to the Northern District in order to test and refine procedures. Applications for conversion were being received at a rate of over one hundred per month in the Northern District during 1965. At the end of December 1965, thirty-four tenure conversion schemes[3] were under way in the Northern District, covering 1,725 blocks (i.e. farms) and 33,566 acres. By 10 February 1966 Land Titles Commission hearings had been completed for five schemes, covering 219 blocks and 4,328 acres.[4]

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1 (continued)

361 themselves in small groups over the face of the country is growing in the land.' Feinberg (1956) suggests that the tendency to spread in this way is common in recently contacted societies.

[1] For details of the Higaturu Council registration scheme see Crocombe and Hogbin 1963:89-96.

[2] For a detailed discussion of the Yega scheme see Dakeyne 1965.

[3] Each of which comprised up to sixty or more blocks (each of which would become one farm).

[4] In addition, 120 blocks (3,148 acres) had been formally surveyed; 269 blocks (2,960 acres) were awaiting survey; and 596 blocks (12,570 acres) were awaiting investigation by officers of the Department of Agriculture.

654 Planting of cash crops on converted blocks has proceeded steadily.
The forty blockholders at Ombi-Tara planted an average of three
657 acres of high-yielding rubber each in the first fourteen months.
311 At Barisari fifty-six blockholders have planted an average of two
241 acres of coconuts in fourteen months and this was expected to increase to four acres by the end of 1966 (Williams 1966:6). Blockholders at New Warisota have planted an average of three acres of cocoa after eighteen months. By contrast, fifty-seven farmers at the Yega scheme have averaged slightly less than one acre of cocoa planted in more than three years.

654 A rough attempt was made to estimate the value of the time,
657 materials and services expended on the conversion schemes in the Popondetta area.[1] This worked out at approximately $8 per acre[A] or $162 per block.[B] This suggests that the growth of conversion throughout Papua-New Guinea on a sufficient scale to have a significant economic and social impact will depend, inter alia, on the development, with experience, of less costly technical and administrative procedures.

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[1] See Appendix A.[C]

A [Corrigendum: For $8 read $6--Analyst]

B [Corrigendum: For $162 read $116--Analyst]

C [See Category 423, pp. 38ff.--Analyst]

Chapter 2

The Ombi-Tara conversion scheme

●657 Two Orokaiva villages, Ombi (also known as Ombisusu) and Tara
423 combined in the Ombi-Tara conversion scheme which was among the
631 first to be promoted in the Northern District under the Land (Tenure Conversion) Ordinance 1963.[1]

[621] Ombi and Tara contain two clans, Mumu and Kuei. The Mumu clan
[614] is concentrated in Ombi village and the Kuei in Tara. However, Ombi has three Kuei households and Tara has one Mumu.

At the time of our stay 178 people were living at Ombi-Tara. There were twenty households in Ombi, nine in Tara, and six on the converted blocks, close to the access road running between Ombi and Tara (see the conversion plan on p.12).[A]

Thirty-five of the forty-one resident adult males had applied or wished to apply for converted blocks; the remaining six were old men who said that they were too old to apply for blocks. Four of them had sons who had applied.

Cash cropping experience of the Ombi-Tara people

249 The Ombi-Tara people's experience with cash crops began when
654 they planted some bush rubber seedlings after the first world war. They were encouraged by the Administration under Native Regulation No.121 (Native Regulation Ordinance 1908-30).[2] Although the trees were neglected for some years they continued to grow, demonstrating the suitability of the area for rubber (Mann 1954:35). After some time villagers began tapping the trees and selling the latex to a local planter.

383 In mid 1964 the Department of Agriculture suggested that the
654 Ombi-Tara people should process their own latex with hand rollers and coagulating pans at first supplied by the Agriculture Department,

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[1] On the Ombi-Tara environment see Appendix B.[B]

[2] On village planting of bush rubber in what was then the Kokoda District see Rimoldi 1966:86-93.

A [See Category 102--Analyst]

B [See Category 133 pp. 49ff.--Analyst]


To Popondetta (27miles)
Access road
To Ajeka (2miles)
Ombi village
MUNU CLAN LAND
KUEI CLAN LAND
Tara village
DAPARI LAND
SOHARA BLOCKS
MUNU CLAN LAND
KUEI CLAN LAND
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40
OMBI-TARA TENURE
CONVERSION SCHEME
House
Blocks not yet surveyed
0 8 16 24 32 40
CHAINS

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242 Department of Agriculture. Clonal seedlings for the nursery were
249 obtained from Malaya and from the Agriculture Department's experi-
mental stations at Itikinumu and Bisianumu. Villagers can buy
[654] seedlings at 1 cent per stump.

While the seedlings were growing, several meetings were held in
the two villages to discuss how the rubber should be planted. The
suggestion of a communal plantation received little support, which
is not surprising in view of the recent failure of the communal
[423] cocoa experiment. At these meetings the Agricultural Officer
suggested that each man might plant some of the new high yielding
[425] rubber on his own land. He was supported in this by Charles and
eventually the people asked for individual blocks of land. There
appears to have been no opposition.

657 The history of conversion at Ombi-Tara admirably illustrates
Fisk's contention (1964:159) that the personality and character of
177 the administrators, officials, missionaries and other members of
654 the advanced sector involved are often as important to the success
of a planned programme of intervention in a subsistence economy as
the composition of the programme itself. Although the Agricultural
Officer has since left the country he is warmly remembered by the
Ombi-Tara people. It is a tribute to his understanding and tact
that most of the villagers consider conversion was their own idea.

The significant role played by Charles in gaining the approval of the Ombi-Tara people demonstrates the value when introducing innovations in a rural community of working through an influential member of that community. After studying the introduction of changes in techniques in a Victorian country area, Emery and Oeser concluded (1958:52-3) 'No matter how highly regarded he may be the District Agricultural Officer remains, sociologically speaking, an outsider' and has much greater effect if he works through a local leader. These findings are extremely relevant in Papua-New Guinea where the sociological gap between Agricultural Officer and farmer is far greater than in Victoria.

The new land system

657 The new land tenure arrangements were worked out by the villagers
and the Agricultural Officer during late 1963 and early 1964. It
423 was decided that 800 acres of the total area claimed by the two
[311] clans should be converted into forty blocks of twenty acres (see
the conversion plan on p.12). Most of the 800 acres was formerly
covered with bush and appears to be of relatively uniform agricul-
tural potential.

657 The unconverted land outside the scheme has not yet been surveyed
and estimates of its area vary from 2,000 to 4,500 acres. All
423 rights to land held by individuals before conversion have been
425
614

657 423 425 abolished by agreement of the two Ombi-Tara clans,[1] including both rights to the 800 acres which have been converted and to land remaining outside the scheme.

614 Each twenty acre block is now held under individual registered title by one man, the blockholder. No rights are held in any block by the clans or other entities.

Lands held by members of the Mumu and Kuei clans are still separate, and a large tree stump continues to mark the boundary between them. However, while individuals formerly had some rights in clan land held under customary tenure the land outside the conversion scheme is now held communally by agreement of clan members.[2] The clan leader has control of the unconverted land and his approval must be gained by anyone wishing to cultivate it.

However, each man is considered by the villagers to have the presumptive right to clear the bush on unconverted land behind his block in order to extend his planting as far as the clan boundary. He may do so without consulting the clan leader, and regardless of who held rights to the land under the old system. This right is not recognised in law, and appears to be derived from traditional practice. A similar presumptive right of extension at the rear of one's block was agreed upon by the Yega villagers (Dakeyne 1965:136).

The conversion process

657 423 The Department of Agriculture carried out a preliminary survey of the land to be converted in July and August 1964, clearing bush from what was to be the access road and along the boundaries of the blocks. During December 1964 and January 1965 field staff of the Land Titles Commission, assisted by Department of Agriculture personnel, completed the surveying and marked all corners with cement and wooden pegs.

657 423 425 Thirty-five applications for blocks had been formally lodged up to 9 February 1966 when the Land Titles Commission conducted its hearing. No objections were raised so unless there is an appeal within ninety days, individual title in fee simple would be granted to each of the thirty-five on 9 May 1966.[3] Eight more men wished to apply in the near future. Since only forty blocks were marked out, three of these eight men intended to apply for blocks as yet unsurveyed.

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[1] See p.27 ff for some problems raised.[A]

[2] In law it is regarded as being held under 'customary tenure'.

[3] There were no appeals. Titles had not been issued at the beginning of November 1966, but it was expected that they would be issued soon.

A [See Category 423--Analyst]

Allocation of blocks

657 423 425 The principles applied by the Ombi-Tara people in the allocation of blocks are not clear, but it appears that men tried to get blocks on land in which they formerly held rights. It seems that no single person controlled the allocation of blocks but that each person claimed the block he desired. We were told that two people claiming a single block settled the problem themselves without reference to a third party.

[614] As far as possible men claimed blocks on land recognised as belonging to their own clan; thus the three men of *Kuei* clan at Ombi got blocks furthest from Ombi village, about two miles away. One man of *Mumu* clan was given a block on *Kuei* land, reportedly because of a shortage of *Mumu* land. The *Kuei* clan leader said he was very happy to give him a block on his clan's land because 'we are doing a new thing and we want to be friendly with each other and not fight as we sometimes did before'.

The forty-three blockholders[1] include thirty-five men resident in Ombi and Tara villages; two men each from Ombi and Tara who were absent working for wages; a man of *Mumu* clan who lives in a neighbouring village but intends to move to Ombi in the near future; two Anglican Mission staff, one a Bishop due to transfer soon from Samarai to Popondetta, the other a priest stationed at Sasembata, about three hours' walk from Ombi;[2] and the Papuan Agricultural Assistant who is stationed full time at Ombi-Tara. None of the last three people has kin ties with any person at Ombi-Tara.

Clearing and planting blocks

249 476 [311] [654] Blockholders began clearing the portion of their blocks nearest the access road soon after the preliminary survey of July-August 1964. For clearing the villagers worked in several groups, with each group spending one or two days on the block of each of its members. The first one year old G.G.I. (Malayan) rubber stumps from the Department of Agriculture nursery were planted in late September 1964. Planting was done by individual householders and their families, with only occasional help from kinsmen. It is traditional Orokaiva practice for clearing of bush to be undertaken by groups of kinsmen but for planting to be carried out at the level of the individual household.

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[1] 'Blockholder' is used for convenience throughout the rest of this paper to refer to the forty-three people who have applied, or intend to apply for blocks.

[2] It is not clear for what purposes these two blocks will be used.

423 had rights.[1] Conversion has caused a redistribution of land rights,
311 with some people losing and others gaining land. Several men who
claimed they had less land after conversion than before said that
361 twenty acres was ample for their needs and that they were pleased
829 to give up some land to help their co-villagers.

There are indications that conversion at Ombi-Tara has facili-
657 tated co-operation between villagers who are planting cash crops.
423 Previously any man who wished to plant cash crops had to work with
182 little assistance, often in a relatively inaccessible area. Since
476 conversion has been introduced, the new road gives easy access to
all blocks and people are more easily able to help one another.

361 Paradoxically, conversion to individual holding of land appears
491 to have strengthened intervillage, interclan and interpersonal
co-operation and to have fostered a community spirit. Intervillage
657 co-operation is demonstrated by the establishment of a joint Ombi-
Tara bank account to purchase equipment for the bush rubber
423 processing unit, and by joint discussions on the nature of the
621 new tenure system. Interclan co-operation is seen in the leader
182 of the *Kuai* clan granting permission for the allocation of a block
on *Kuai* land to a man of *Mumu* clan. Interpersonal co-operation is
illustrated by the apparent willingness of large landholders to
give up all previously held land rights without receiving any
compensation, in order to enable all to take part equally in the
scheme.

657 The Ombi-Tara people are pleased and flattered that many people
423 visit and inspect the blocks. They heard that Ombi-Tara was men-
tioned on the radio and are happy that others ('people all over
182 Papua-New Guinea') should know of their experiment. When two
186 Australian friends of mine paid a short visit to Ombi they were
asked with expectant pride if they had heard of the Ombi-Tara
scheme in Australia. The leader of the *Mumu* clan said, 'We want
Ombi-Tara to have a big name like England, Japan, Hong Kong, Rabaul
and Lae'.

Publicity and information

657 Most Ombi-Tara people (82 per cent) said that they first heard
423 of the possibility of converting land to holding under individual
title after the visit of the Agricultural Officer in late 1963.
177 No one reported hearing first about conversion through Local Govern-
ment Councils, from the Anglican Mission, on the radio or through

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[1] The then District Agricultural Officer considered consolidation of fragmented holdings to be one of the main benefits that would emerge at Yega, the first tenure conversion scheme in the Northern District (Belfield 1962:1-2).

657 the Yega tenure conversion scheme. An influential minority (18 per
423 cent), which included Charles, both clan leaders and the custodian
of the savings account, said that they had first heard of blocks
177 through the Sangara ex-servicemen's resettlement (not conversion)
scheme which is about twenty miles from Ombi.

Many of the Ombi-Tara people had at some time worked at Sangara clearing bush, planting seedlings or tapping rubber trees. Six of the seven men who said they had first heard of individual blocks from Sangara had worked there as had ten of the fifteen men who mentioned Sangara in answer to the more specific question 'have you heard of any other scheme where there are individual blocks?' (Nine people mentioned Yega in response to this question.)

Moreover, the European ex-servicemen at Sangara live a life
[185] which many Ombi-Tara people find attractive. Several people sug-
[461] gested that they would like to employ labourers and work less hard
themselves, 'like the Europeans at Sangara'.

Four people reported that Administration and/or mission personnel had warned them that if they did not use their land 'properly', people from other places might come and take it. Russia, Japan, Indonesia and Hanuabada were the places mentioned. I am unable to determine how much weight the Ombi-Tara people placed on this factor in their decision to implement tenure conversion.

After two or three successful conversion schemes were introduced, the demand for tenure conversion spread rapidly throughout the Northern District. In February 1966 the District Commissioner wrote (Williams 1966:5): 'Far from having to sell the idea we have been somewhat embarrassed by the number of requests which have been received.'[1]

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[1] Similar experience has been reported from Kenya (see Healy 1961:77).

Chapter 4

Effects of conversion at Ombi-Tara

Land use

657 423 182 Since conversion the blockholders have each planted an average of three and a half acres of high yielding rubber and some have cleared a further two or three acres in preparation for further planting.

311 241 Most households are interplanting their food crops with the rubber seedlings as they say it saves time and effort if all crops are on one plot instead of scattered as before conversion. Thirteen people reported that they have food crops growing on unconverted land outside their blocks. Six of these had blocks about twenty-five minutes' walk from the village, and have planted some food on clan land closer to home. Three of the others said that they intended to transfer their food crops on to the blocks shortly. Three people reported that they have coffee trees which were planted before conversion growing outside the block.

[614] The Ombi-Tara people intend to keep the clan land outside the converted area for use by future generations or by members of the present generation who wish to expand their holdings.

Residence patterns

657 423 182 [361] Those people whose blocks are closest to the village have tended to remain in the village. Those with more distant blocks have either abandoned their village houses and moved to the blocks - six families have done this - or planted some food crops on clan land close to the village to avoid having to walk long distances to get food.[1]

[592] The traditional Orokaiva custom of living in single family households has been maintained, with only four of the thirty-five households at Ombi-Tara containing more than one family. In three

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[1] Dakeyne (1965:136) notes that the Yega people moved on to their blocks soon after the Yega conversion scheme began.

657 of these four households one of the resident families intends to
423 build or is building a house into which it will move shortly.

182 Many who have remained in their village have erected temporary
592 shelters on their blocks in which they spend one or two nights at
a time. None of the Tara people has left the village, but no one
657 has to walk more than ten minutes to reach his block.

423 Five of the six men who have moved with their families on to the
182 blocks are living in two hamlets. In the first settlement, about
361 twenty-five minutes' walk from Ombi village, two men have built
houses on their own blocks on either side of the access road. In
addition, they have built a 'meeting house' in which passers-by
can sit and chat, and a latrine. One is the son of the other's
mother's brother.

In the second settlement, about forty-five minutes' walk from Ombi, three households are situated on one block. The three households belong to the blockholder, his sister's son (who holds an adjacent block) and his father's brother (who is not a blockholder).

[789] The sixth man to have moved from the village claimed that one of the old men at Ombi was destroying his taro by practising sorcery, and moved to his block, ten minutes' walk from the village, to protect it.

[592] Apart from this last man those who have moved to the blocks are
living in small kinship groups rather than as individual farmers
[484] each on his own block. In addition, each of the block residents
spent a considerable amount of time in Ombi village during our
[525] stay, particularly while gambling during the weekends. One brought
his family to Ombi after his wife had a baby and stayed for a few
days in the house of a kinsman.

Although only six men have moved to the blocks, another twenty said they would like to do so in order to be able to work on their rubber away from the distractions of village life, like Council and mission work. Most of these people said that they were 'not allowed' to move. Some said it was Administration policy that people should stay in their villages and quoted particular officers (from two different departments) who had told them not to leave the village. Some said that they were not allowed to move to the blocks until they had a 'licence' (possibly a reference to the title document) or until all the people in Papua-New Guinea had done so, or until the local member of the House of Assembly had been told about it in the House. Some said that they should not move until the Administration told them.

Three people said the Administration favours villagers living on their blocks. Two of these do so and the third said he is waiting till the other villagers move before he moves.

657 423 192 361 The Local Government Councillor presumed the Administration wanted people to stay in the village. He said that he would prefer to live on his block but would not move as he might be gaoled for doing so.[1] He had ordered two men from Ombi who started building houses on their blocks to stay in the village.

Administration officers said there was no longer an official policy on where people should live, but that individual officers had different ideas on the matter. As this is the source of much of the misunderstanding an official statement of policy through the Local Government Council may be helpful. Over half the people replied to the question 'where would you prefer to live - in the village or on the blocks?' by saying that whichever the government wanted they would do.

It has been said that conversion leads people to settle on their blocks, thus encouraging the breakdown of the village and lessening the attractions of village life for the younger generation, causing them to 'drift' to the towns. Several people, however, including one man who had intended going to Rabaul, mentioned that they preferred growing cash crops at Ombi-Tara to working for wages now that conversion has been introduced. It seems possible, therefore, that conversion may help to increase the attractiveness of the village rather than decrease it.

Social organisation

657 423 182 The land tenure system lies at the heart of social organisation and 'may actually define the social and economic status of individuals in an agrarian economy' like that of Papua-New Guinea (Parsons 1963:4). Any alteration in the tenure system is bound to have far-reaching social implications.

Social changes occurring at Ombi-Tara are related not only to tenure conversion but also to the wider adaptation which occurs when a subsistence society comes into contact with the market economy. Some traditional practices are abandoned, as the initiation ceremonies, the taro festivals and multi-village feasts have

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[689] [1] The idea that a person may be gaoled for moving out of his village seems to come from observing other people in the area being gaoled under Native Regulation 101 (Native Regulations 1939 of the Territory of Papua as amended). This Regulation empowers the magistrate to declare any isolated group of less than three houses a 'Forbidden Settlement' and to direct the native inhabitants 'to remove to a regular village or villages within their district within a time to be specified by him'. Failure to comply with such an order carries a fine of not more than $2 or imprisonment for up to two months.

657 been at Ombi-Tara, in favour of briefer parties which distract less
423 from market oriented activities.[1]

182 There was verbal evidence at Ombi-Tara of further rejection of
[829] old customs since the introduction of tenure conversion. Informants often suggested that conversion marks the beginning of a new life - 'Before we were not using our land well but now we are changing everything and we will live better'. Several previous innovations in the Northern District have been greeted in like fashion (see Belshaw 1951:249, and Crocombe 1964a:29-32).

[622] Leadership in the traditional societies of Papua-New Guinea is
[554] generally not inherited but achieved through personal excellence in economic and political organisation and the main activities of the society including a knowledge of land tenure arrangements. It
[614] was decided by the members of the Mumu clan that their clan leader was too old to understand and adapt to the new land system. His son was not considered clever enough to succeed him and eventually the thirty-five year old son of the leader's brother was chosen as successor.

[621] The introduction of tenure changes tends to favour younger men who no longer need to defer to their elders for cash crop land. Tenure conversion at Ombi-Tara may also affect the balance of 'informal' authority in the area by altering the balance of land rights. Before conversion some individuals had rights to consider-
[556] ably larger areas of land than others. This was of some significance in determining status and prestige. Since conversion, each individual has rights to twenty acres of land. The long-term effect of this equalisation on social organisation and informal status and prestige systems may be of some significance.

[614] The functions of the clan leader are little changed by the new
[627] tenure system. As before, he has no jurisdiction over land held by individuals. He previously had limited authority to intervene if one man planted on another's land without permission and under the new system can prevent one man planting behind another's block. He is charged with preventing people from other clans or other areas planting on his clan's land in much the same way as before tenure conversion, with the difference that now his jurisdiction in this matter applies only to the clan land outside the blocks.

Obligations

571 Mutual assistance and mutual obligation patterns provide a system of social security, a form of institutional safeguard

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[1] Similar changes have been reported in another Orokaiva area by Crocombe (1966:71-2) and Hogbin (1966:81-3).

571 against sickness, crop failure and other catastrophes. The mutual
[602] obligation system which operates among kinsmen 'acts as a man's
trade union, his friendly or benefit society, his slate club and
[182] his orphanage; it takes the place for him of health insurance, and
if needs be provides for his funeral' (Lawrence 1964:34).

121 If it is hoped to set up individual farmers independent of their kinsmen some substitute must be found for the traditional method of social insurance. For as Fisk (1961:777) has pointed out, 'in an underdeveloped country...ready and prompt access to assistance in time of need is a variable of considerable importance to the settler'. Attempts to break down traditional obligation patterns by individualisation of tenure have often met with little success. In Egypt (see Gadalla 1962:80) and in various parts of the Pacific (Crocombe 1964b:127 and 1965:15) land registration schemes designed to result in individual tenure have failed to achieve individual ownership and use of land.

476 There are indications that traditional obligation patterns may
be continuing at Ombi-Tara since tenure conversion was introduced.
571 Blocks were cleared by kin groups in accordance with custom. Two
178 men mentioned that there had been an arrangement whereby if a
person worked on the block of another man but the second man did
[689] not reciprocate, he would have to pay the first man 80 cents.
However, both people said that no one had had to pay it. Two men who were working for wages on road maintenance near Ombi village bought food from the nearby store for those who helped clear their blocks. Five people claimed that they had helped clear other people's blocks but had not received any assistance in return. Everyone who was questioned said that no new obligations had been established by the process of clearing but this may be open to question.

423 It has already been mentioned that conversion involved substan-
tial redistribution and equalisation of right holdings. Whether
657 obligation to the 'donors' will be established as a result is a
matter for future observation.

The blocks of three of the four absentee blockholders were being cleared and planted by kinsmen. The block of the fourth absentee had not been cleared at the time of our stay. It is likely that some obligations will be established by this assistance.

Two families are living in houses constructed on the block of another man; and several people have cocoa, coffee or bush rubber trees growing on blocks held by other people. These situations are discussed on p.29 below.[A]

The Ombi man who moved to his block to protect his taro from the sorcery of another villager replanted some of his taro on the block of a kinsman, for further protection. This was the only reported case of a person planting crops on the block of another

[A] [See Category 425--Analyst]

657 man since tenure conversion was introduced. It suggests that in
423 situations of stress, as when sorcery is feared, traditional tenure
patterns may take precedence over the newly introduced system.

Several people mentioned that they will in future share the proceeds from their rubber with non-blockholding kinsmen, but most said they would not.

Inheritance of converted land

657 In law blockholders may depart from the traditional pattern of
423 inheritance when disposing of their land. As far as could be
428 ascertained, most of the Ombi-Tara people wish to continue the
traditional Orokaiva inheritance pattern, under which the first
[178] son generally has some precedence. The first son is not, however,
the sole owner but rather the nominal trustee of the land for all sons. If the landowner has no sons, his daughters may keep the land in trust for their sons and in some cases the daughter's husband may also acquire some rights.

Several people intend to pass their blocks to the first son only and expect any other sons either to take up another block on what is now clan land, or to gain wage employment in an urban area.

Work organisation

657 The time spent in Ombi was too short to enable any conclusions
423 to be drawn about the effects of conversion on work organisation,
but a few general points may be made. There was no set routine in
182 the sense of particular days being set aside for particular kinds
512 of work. A number of people reported that Wednesdays and Fridays
are set aside for Mission and Council work when required. During our stay no Mission work was done and Council work was done only on the first Friday, when most of the men went to a village two miles away to cut the grass around the Administration school, due to open the following week. Gambling occupied many people for much of Saturday and Sunday but others carried out normal work in the gardens on these days.

657 Husbands and wives worked together on food and cash crops, but
423 I am unable to estimate whether husbands work more on cash crops
182 and wives more on food crops as has been observed at times elsewhere.

[462] Five men were employed on maintenance work on the Popondetta-
[464] Kokoda road near Ombi for the full period of our stay, receiving
$6.42 a fortnight. The need for cash to pay the Council tax and
[465] the Mission jubilee contribution led five others to work on road
maintenance during the final week of our stay. Although working a thirty to forty hour week, the five longer term roadworkers have planted an average of 410 rubber seedlings each which is greater than the average of 346 seedlings for all Ombi-Tara blockholders.

657 423 476 The five work on their blocks in the later afternoons and on weekends and their kinsmen help to clear their blocks while they are absent on road maintenance work.

Some future problems

657 423 177 While the long-run consequences of current alterations in land tenure are always difficult to foresee, some indications of future difficulties at Ombi-Tara may be seen.

Rights to land. Although all individual land rights which existed before conversion in the 800 converted acres have been legally abolished, and all land outside the blocks is held communally,[1] this appears to have been understood and accepted by only a small minority. Each person interviewed was asked if he has any land apart from his block. Thirty-three of the Ombi-Tara people answered in the affirmative, and three more said that although they themselves do not have any land outside the converted area, other people do. Only four people said that they have no land outside the converted area, as all individual rights existing prior to conversion have been abolished and the land outside the blocks is held communally. These four include Charles, one of the clan leaders, and two men who are living on their blocks. There is a wide divergence between the few people who accept the new system of holding clan land worked out with the Agricultural Officer in late 1963 and early 1964, and the many who do not appear to fully [614] understand or accept it. The majority appear to consider that clan land outside the converted area is held under customary tenure, which includes differential individual rights.

The situation is further complicated by the presumptive right of each person to extend his holding by clearing the bush behind his block without consulting the clan leader or other member of the clan. (This right is recognised by the villagers but is not valid in law.)

Several people indicated that they considered they owned the land behind their blocks in the same way as they owned the block, with the difference that the land behind the block had not yet been surveyed. This presumptive right appears likely to cause conflict whether the land outside the converted area is held under customary or communal tenure. It remains to be seen whether all previously existing rights to land will in fact be given up by the villagers, and if this does not occur, what sort of solution will eventually emerge.

At least three of the men absent from Ombi-Tara in outside wage employment have not been contacted since tenure conversion was

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[1] See p.14.A

A [See Category 423--Analyst]

657 initiated and hence are not party to the agreement to set aside 800
423 acres for individual holdings. Problems could arise if, on return-
177 ing home and finding all forty blocks occupied, they should refuse
to accede to the new arrangements. It also remains to be seen whether the man of *Mumu* clan whose block is on *Kuei* land will be permitted to extend his holding beyond the present twenty acres. The leader of the *Kuei* clan suggested to us that this would be allowed.

Concepts of title. While everybody interviewed said that the blocks belong solely to individual blockholders it remains to be seen whether in future all people will be prepared to cede to the blockholders all rights which they previously held in the converted area.

There was considerable confusion concerning the exact time that the blocks became the property of individual holders. Most people considered that this occurred immediately after the application forms had been signed, while some thought it was as soon as survey had been completed and others thought it was after the blocks had been distributed. Nobody realised that the block did not legally become his until ninety days after the Land Titles Commission hearing.

No one understood the purpose of the Land Titles Commission hearing. A genealogy was prepared in the hope that this might be required by the Land Titles Commissioner. At the hearing, the Commissioner read out the names of the thirty-five applicants and asked each applicant to call out the number of his block. The Commissioner explained that he would send a list of the applicants' names to Port Moresby and after ninety days each man would get a *pas*[1] - the title document - saying the land was his.

After the hearing the Ombi-Tara people indicated in conversation that they thought the Commissioner had come to check that each man knew the number of his own block. They considered that the piece of paper which they would get merely confirmed that each man held his own block as he had done for the past seventeen months. This lack of understanding by the villagers of the true function of the Land Titles Commission hearing could be significant if objections to conversion were raised at the hearing.

657 Development of a market in land. The Administration hopes, by
423 converting land from customary tenure to holding under individual
registered title, to facilitate the development of a market in land.
425 This is essential to ensure that no person with agricultural ability
and initiative is deprived of land. It has been pointed out by

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[1] A neo-Melanesian word meaning 'letter'.

657 423 425 Lord Hailey (1957:802) in Africa that people showed great reluctance to face commercialisation of land rights, by sale, mortgage or lease. I cannot say how far conversion will contribute to the development of a market in land as it is not clear whether the Ombi-Tara people understand that in law each man may sell his block to anyone he wishes. An attempt was made to gauge this with three questions.

> If any man from Ombi wanted to sell his land and go and live in Port Moresby, is he allowed to do that?
>
> Would he have to discuss it with somebody first?
>
> What if the clan leader said 'no': could he still sell it?

Five people, including Charles and the two clan leaders, replied that individuals could dispose of their blocks without consulting anyone, even if the clan leader opposed the sale. Ten more said that a man was allowed to sell his land but would have to discuss it first, and could not sell if the clan leader was in opposition. The remaining twenty-five said they could not sell or did not know whether or not they could sell. A common reply was that no one wanted to go and live in Port Moresby but that if anyone did go he would leave the land in the care of his son or some other kinsman.

657 423 Cash crops planted before conversion. There are a number of cases at Ombi-Tara where cash crops planted by one man before conversion are now situated on another man's block. The usual solution to this problem has been for the planter (or in the event of his death, his heir) to retain sole rights to the crop. When the trees die out the land will revert to the blockholder, and the planter may not plant more trees on the same land.[1]

There have, however, been some variations from this solution. Where the crop concerned was cocoa the planter has in many cases abandoned it, allowing the blockholder to clear it and plant rubber. In one case sole rights to the cocoa will be retained by the planter until the rubber begins to yield a return in about seven years, when rights to the cocoa will be ceded to the blockholder. In another case the cocoa is jointly harvested with planter and blockholder sharing the income received from the sale of beans. Each of these solutions was worked out by negotiation between the persons concerned, and appears to have been determined largely by considerations of kinship and mutual obligation.

The existing situation contains potential difficulties. The blockholder, or his heir, may decide that he needs the land on

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[1] This seems to follow traditional Orokaiva practice, as described by Dakeyne (1965:61): '...the right to harvest the produce of a permanent tree is vested in the planter or his heir, irrespective of the rights to the land on which the tree is planted.'

657 423 which the planter's crops are standing and may wish to cut down the trees. Where the planter's crop is coffee, the trees may reseed so that the grove may not die out, and the planter may retain a semi-permanent right to portion of the blockholder's land. If the coffee does die out, the planter may still be able to make out a case that he has a continuing right in the land, claiming that when individual title was granted in 1966 the blockholder recognised his right to use part of the block for coffee growing. Similar problems may arise where one man has built his house on another man's block. Eight of the nine houses of Tara village, and two of the houses in the hamlet located forty-five minutes' walk from Ombi are situated on blocks belonging to persons other than the householder.

Multiplicity of rightholders. While it is theoretically possible to provide against more than one person holding rights to converted land by appropriate legislation, there is no simple way of preventing _de facto_ multiple rightholding since no law can prevent the villager from meeting his moral obligations to his relatives. It would not be unique to Papua-New Guinea if multiple rights to land should exist despite legislation forbidding them.[1] In Tahiti, land rights are still passed on to illegitimate children although this is against the introduced law. Land fragmentation in Tahiti after the legislation to individualise tenure is worse than it was previously (Panoff 1964:136-9). In the Cook Islands the attempt to individualise tenure was followed paradoxically by a significant increase in the number of rightholders per acre of land (Crocombe 1964b:127).

We saw earlier that most Ombi-Tara people wish to continue their traditional pattern of inheriting rights to land and that there are signs that traditional obligation patterns may be continuing. The effect of these factors on the number of rightholders per block, and therefore on the achievement or otherwise of the policy of individualising tenure, may be significant in future.

Planting before title is granted. Planting of rubber on the blocks at Ombi-Tara began in September 1964, twenty months before title was due to be granted. Planting of rubber is continuing on the four demarcated and three undemarcated blocks which have not yet been formally allocated.[2] Planting before title is granted is

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[1] The existence of multiple rights and the spreading of an individual's usufructuary rights over several pieces of land may, if land is of uneven quality, equalise people's shares in the agricultural potential of an area. Consolidation of holdings in such areas tends to have the reverse effect.

[2] Two of the undemarcated blocks are situated immediately behind demarcated blocks (see the conversion plan).[A] This may cause difficulties if the holders of the demarcated blocks exercise their

[A] [See Category 102, p. 12--Analyst]

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423 also likely to occur if any of the blockholders decides to extend his holding beyond the present boundaries.

[249] More than 13,000 rubber trees were planted before the Land Titles Commission hearing took place. Although this caused no difficulty at Ombi-Tara, a similar occurrence at other schemes could have serious repercussions if a dispute should arise at the hearing, or if an appeal should be lodged afterwards. At the Yega scheme the villagers agreed to give a block to the Papuan Assistant Agricultural Officer who had helped them with subdivision and planting of cash crops. On the day of the Land Titles Commission hearing they withdrew this offer. A similar offer was made to the Papuan Agricultural Assistant at Ombi. By the day of the Land Titles Commission hearing he had planted more than 700 rubber seedlings on his block. Awkward consequences would have ensued if the people had decided to withdraw their offer at the hearing. The possibility of quicker registration, perhaps by the Local Government Councils, may be worth examining.

121 Pest infestations and declining soil fertility. If the introduction of individual farming on consolidated blocks leads to the cessation of the bush fallowing system of agricultural production there will be pest problems. Otherwise the holdings would have to be larger than the amount of arable land available in most areas. It was noted earlier[1] that the bush fallowing system is well suited to the production of annual food crops in tropical areas. Newton (1960:85), writing about New Britain, concluded: 'The concentration of food crops into an area cleared from rain forest has resulted in a fairly rapid multiplication of diseases and pests of colocasia, sweet potato, peanuts and sorghum.' Without fertilisers and advanced agricultural techniques soil fertility may decline in areas where there is continuous cultivation of food crops.

[452] Credit. The government decided not to offer credit facilities to participants in land tenure conversion schemes in order to prevent people assuming that tenure conversion was associated with financial assistance, but the District Commissioner of the Northern District has said that contrary to his expectations only two applicants for conversion have asked for financial assistance. One was extremely tentative and the other sought a loan of perhaps $25 (Williams 1966:7).

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2 (continued)
presumptive right to extend their holdings. We were told that in each case the two persons involved had negotiated a solution to this problem.

[1] See p. 6.A

A [See Category 241--Analyst]

121 The need for credit at Ombi-Tara where rubber is being planted
may be less than at schemes where other crops are being promoted.[1]
452 Bauer (1948:318) stated that where tapping and processing of rubber
is done by family labour, 'many small-holders could almost be referred to as no-cost rather than low-cost producers'. The visiting World Bank mission suggested that credit could play an important part in securing local interest in planting rubber in consolidated areas, in organising group processing and marketing, and in providing scope for enterprising men to increase production (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1965:111).

It has been suggested both by the District Commissioner (Williams 1966:7) and by a former Agricultural Officer in the Northern District (Cheetham 1962:67-78) that it may be an appropriate time to reassess official credit policy, looking particularly at the criteria for providing credit to smallholders. Cheetham (1962:77) concluded: 'A farmer's ability to repay may be a better criterion on which to provide loan capital than the present notion of "credit-worthiness" in the sense of adequate tangible farm assets.'

Cash cropping and productivity

657 It is too soon to determine the effects tenure conversion will
have on cash cropping and productivity. However, even at this early
423 stage a few observations may be made. The acreage under cash crops
182 at Ombi-Tara has increased significantly since conversion. Before
conversion was introduced, 167 cocoa trees, 92 coffee trees and 19
[311] bush rubber trees were planted per adult male at Ombi-Tara.[2] In the fourteen months after the villagers began planting high yielding rubber on the converted blocks an average of 304 seedlings was planted per adult male.

There is no shortage of food or suitable agricultural land. Both
[434] terrain and climate are favourable for growing rubber. There is easy
[464] access to Ombi-Tara from Popondetta. Villagers are able to earn money
to buy rubber seedlings from the Department of Agriculture by tapping their bush rubber, by working on road maintenance, or by working for wages on the Sangara ex-servicemen's plantations. The proximity of the Sangara plantations and the existence of bush rubber stands at Ombi-Tara provided villagers with experience in tapping and handling
[177] rubber. The Sangara plantations also serve to demonstrate a 'European way of life' which many villagers find attractive and wish to emulate.

Tenure conversion appears to have contributed to the improved
[241] cash cropping performance mainly by reducing the labour inputs
required to establish cash crop gardens, thus increasing labour

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[1] For example, the processing of green leaf into tea requires substantial investment (Clayton 1961:623).

[2] Excluding the two 'outside' blockholders and a man from Tara who declined to be interviewed (see p.1).

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productivity. Consolidation of an individual's scattered plots reduces the amount of time devoted to travelling and increases the acreage which can be planted with cash crops in any one location. The road running through the converted area allows easy access to all holdings and facilitates interpersonal co-operation by reducing the amount of travelling time involved.

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Consolidation has facilitated the provision of assistance by Department of Agriculture staff, increasing the effectiveness of officers. Planting, pest control and general crop maintenance can be more efficiently supervised where there is easy access to all holdings.

Increased assistance from the Department of Agriculture has been an extremely significant factor in the increase in cash cropping activity at Ombi-Tara. In the Northern District there are more agricultural extension officers per head of local population than in most areas in Papua-New Guinea.[1] The diligence, patience, and understanding of the Agricultural Officer who initiated the conversion scheme, the stationing of an Agricultural Assistant full time at Ombi-Tara to supervise the rubber nursery and the bush rubber processing unit, and the regular visits of extension officers from Popondetta have helped to provide the essential technical and managerial skills which are lacking in the village situation.

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Tenure conversion appears likely to enable economies of scale when the rubber trees come into production, hence increasing the productivity of village labour. Economies may be gained in processing the latex, since the relatively large output may warrant the introduction of larger and more efficient processing equipment; in transporting the processed rubber in bulk; and in marketing. One of the problems previously faced by Ombi-Tara cocoa producers, especially when prices were low, was that buyers did not consider it worthwhile to make the journey to Ombi-Tara from Popondetta for the relatively small amount of produce.[2]

While conversion introduces economies of large scale production it also retains one of the better features of the small holding system, the maintenance of individual incentives to increase production.

Ombi-Tara experience appears to support the well-known maxim of the Food and Agriculture Organization that tenure reform, in order

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[1] The principle of concentration of development effort was endorsed by the visiting World Bank mission (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1965:35).

[2] The argument for increasing returns to labour in an economy moving from pure subsistence to the production of a market surplus has been stated by Fisk 1964:164.

657 to be effective, must be associated with improvements in technical
423 skills and the provision of credit, transport and marketing facili-
182 ties. That individualisation of tenure does not necessarily lead
to improvements in productivity has been demonstrated in many areas
433 including South Africa (Yudelman 1965:239), Ongoho in the Northern District of Papua (Crocombe 1964a:36), and the Cook Islands, where Crocombe (1964b:142) concluded that

> the issue of registered freehold titles by the Land Court of itself made little if any contribution to output in the early decades of the century and of recent years has had a negative effect.... Security of tenure must also be complemented by other measures if major increases in productivity are to result.

Tenure conversion at Ombi-Tara has enabled labour inputs in the establishment and maintenance of the rubber plantations to be reduced and appears likely to lead to economies of scale when the trees come into production. Conversion has facilitated, and has been complemented by, increased agricultural assistance. These factors together have contributed to the increase in cash cropping activity and improved labour productivity at Ombi-Tara.

Chapter 5

Summary and conclusions

657 423 Current Administration land policy aims at the introduction throughout Papua-New Guinea of a single system of land holding under secure individual registered title, and the promotion of indigenous agricultural development.

Land tenure conversion has been confined to the Northern District of Papua where it is at present costing the Administration about $116 per block or $6 per acre. This estimate includes the cost of providing salaries, staff housing, stationery, and office facilities, and excludes provision of planting materials, field equipment and extension services. There appears to be some scope for simplifying and reducing the costs of tenure conversion. The costs of tenure conversion should be compared with the costs of other methods of promoting indigenous agricultural development, for example land resettlement schemes, in order to determine which methods are most economical of public funds.

To what extent are the two aims of the tenure conversion legislation being achieved at the Ombi-Tara conversion scheme?

Individualisation of tenure

[178] Land rights at Ombi-Tara were traditionally held both by individuals and by groups. There are several indications that the *de facto* tenure system introduced since tenure conversion may be little different in some important respects from traditional tenure arrangements.

[428] (i) The Ombi-Tara people intend to continue traditional inheritance patterns (with some modifications) in future, and this may lead, as it has in other Pacific countries, to several persons holding *de facto* rights in a block of land which is considered in law to belong to a single individual.

[476] (ii) It appears unlikely that traditional Ombi-Tara obligation patterns will be broken down by tenure conversion since the obligation system provides the main means of social security for the villager.

657 423 (iii) As was the case before conversion, a man whose crops stand on another man's land retains his rights to those crops (in the local view, but not in law).

[425] (iv) As was the case before conversion, each man is considered by the villagers (but not in law) to have the right to extend his planting behind his present holding without consulting the clan leader or other members of the clan.

(v) It remains to be seen whether all villagers fully understand that all previously existing rights to land have been abolished since conversion, and whether in future some people may make claims on the basis of such rights.

[361] [178] (vi) Residence patterns appear also to be in accordance with traditional custom as those people who have left the village are living in hamlets composed of kinship groups and not as single farmers each on his own block.

Promotion of agricultural development

657 423 182 433 Even if tenure conversion alters the tenure system less radically than expected, it is still possible that it may act as a stimulus to indigenous agricultural development. The acreage under cash crops and labour productivity has increased at Ombi-Tara since tenure conversion was introduced. The improvement seems to be due more to the benefits arising from the consolidation of fragmented holdings than to increased security of tenure since the land rights that Ombi-Tara people held before conversion were sufficiently secure to allow them to plant cash crops.

Consolidation of holdings has reduced the labour inputs required to establish cash crop gardens by reducing the time spent travelling between the village and food and cash crop plots. Whereas previously each man had relatively small areas of land on each plot, making extension of plantings difficult, all his land has now been brought together on one twenty acre block. The provision of easy access to all blocks has facilitated interpersonal co-operation particularly in clearing bush lands, and has enabled officers of the Department of Agriculture to supervise planting, pest control and general crop maintenance more efficiently. This increased assistance from the Department of Agriculture has played an important role in increasing the acreage under cash crops by providing essential technical and managerial skills. It is questionable whether conversion would have led to a greatly improved cash cropping performance if it were not accompanied by increased agricultural assistance.

Tenure conversion appears likely to enable economies of scale to be gained in processing, transporting and marketing of produce when the Ombi-Tara rubber trees come into production, thereby increasing labour productivity still further.

423
657 I am unable to determine how far tenure conversion will facilitate the development of a market in land.

Several problems apart from those considered under the individualisation of tenure may arise from tenure conversion as it operates at present. The villager's concept of individual registered title appears to differ from that of the framers of the tenure conversion legislation. There may be future disputes over rights to cash crops planted before conversion now situated on the block of a man other than the planter. Because of the long delays required by the conversion legislation, planting of cash crops has preceded the granting of individual title by up to twenty months, which could be significant if objections to conversion were raised at the Land Titles Commission hearing. The consolidation of holdings implies the cessation of the traditional bush fallowing system of cultivating food crops, which may lead to problems of pest infestation and declining soil fertility. A lack of credit facilities could hamper efforts to increase cash cropping at some tenure conversion schemes, particularly those requiring large capital outlays for processing, transport and marketing. This is not, however, a current problem at Ombi-Tara.

The Ombi-Tara people regard conversion, which they perceive as consolidation, as the road to improved standards of living. While this faith is retained there seems every chance that conversion will succeed in raising agricultural output. Continued faith will probably depend on the extent to which the expected improvements in terms of living standards and income are in fact achieved.

Appendix A

Process and costs of tenure conversion in the Northern District

121 This Appendix attempts to estimate roughly the economic costs of tenure conversion. Land tenure conversion can only be justified if the economic and social benefits to be derived from it exceed the economic and social costs of its execution. Information is not available to allow comparison of costs and benefits from alternative methods of promoting agricultural development.

Procedure

657
423 The procedures to be followed in converting land held under customary tenure to individual registered title are set out in the Land (Tenure Conversion) Ordinance 1963 and the Land Titles Commission Ordinance 1962. The country is divided into a number of 'adjudication areas' and within each a 'demarcation committee' (with a majority of indigenous members) is established to prepare demarcation plans marking the boundaries of all native held land within the area. If a group is acknowledged as the undisputed holder of an area of land, members of the group may apply to hold portions of the land under individual registered title.

The Land Titles Commissioner prepares a conversion plan and publishes notice that the application will be dealt with after three months, during which time objections may be lodged. If he is satisfied that all persons with rights in the land agree to the application and that adequate compensation is provided for interests abolished or reduced by conversion, the Commissioner issues a conversion order. Ninety days is allowed for appeal and thereafter the conversion order is sent to the Registrar who registers the applicant as the owner of an estate in fee simple. Upon registration of individual title the land ceases to be subject to native custom and all previously existing rights are abolished.

The procedure followed in the Northern District differed from that laid down in the Ordinance in that conversion began there over a year before adjudication areas were mapped out (in January 1966) and no compensation was paid to persons losing rights to land - nor has any been requested by villagers.

657 423 The procedures which operated from the introduction of tenure conversion in the Northern District are summarised in Appendix B. Procedure was altered by Circular 31.1.9 from the Administrator to all field officers, dated 3 November 1965. Since all tenure conversions up to 1 January 1966 were carried out under the old procedure this has been used as the basis for the following cost estimates.

Method of estimating costs

[128] An attempt was made to gather information on eight conversion schemes in order to estimate the costs of tenure conversion in the Northern District. The stage of development reached at these eight schemes by 9 February 1966 is set out in Table 1. All except the Dapari scheme were among the first ten conversion schemes promoted, and consequently are among the most advanced conversion projects in the country.

Table 1

The state of eight tenure conversion schemes at 9 February 1966

Name of scheme	Blocks	Acres	Crop	Stage of progress
Barisari No.1	55	1,680	coconuts	Hearing completed for 47 applicants on 29 Sept. 1965. Applications filed for other blocks.
New Warisota	32	640	cocoa	Hearing completed 14 Dec. 1965.
Ahora	36	720	cocoa	Hearing completed 28 Jan. 1966.
Ombi-Tara	40	800	rubber	Hearing for 35 applicants completed 9 Feb. 1966.
Somara	10	200	rubber	Awaiting conversion plans to accompany applications.
Barisari No.2	7	210	coconuts	Awaiting conversion plans to accompany applications.
Dobadura-Buna	63	1,260	coconuts	Awaiting applications.
Dapari	44	1,000	rubber	Land Titles Commission survey in progress.

The costs in salaries of each stage in the conversion process were estimated separately. The number of days[1] spent by an officer on a particular task was converted into the number of days needed per thousand acres and per hundred blocks. Salaries assumed for costing purposes are set out in Table 2.

Although every effort was made to cross-check all information on costs, the figures represent an approximation only. Where possible Field Officer Journals were consulted to determine the number of days each officer spent at a particular scheme. Otherwise estimates were made from discussions with officers concerned. The number of vehicle days in each stage was estimated from the rest of the data.[2]

Salary costs of each stage of the conversion process

(i) Preliminary discussions. Officers of the Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries (D.A.S.F.) or sometimes the Department of District Administration (D.D.A.) are approached by village people who request a tenure conversion scheme for their area. Discussions follow on the nature and implications of conversion. This involves two days each for an Agricultural Officer and his assistant. The number of days spent by officers does not vary with the size of the scheme.

(ii) D.A.S.F. investigation. Agricultural Officers investigate and submit a report on accessibility, names of neighbouring villages and schemes, topography, soil type, vegetation, people's attitude to conversion, crop recommendation and a recommendation concerning priority to be given to the scheme. Estimated time at Ombi-Tara was four days each for an Agricultural Officer and assistant.

(iii) District Development Committee meeting. The D.A.S.F. report goes before an informal meeting of the District Development Committee which allocates priorities for further investigation. Tenure conversion is only one of the committee's many spheres of

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[1] Based on 219 working days a year for expatriate officers, being 365 days less forty-five days leave (overseas officers are entitled to three months leave after twenty-one months' service), less ninety-one Saturdays and Sundays, less ten statutory holidays. Local officers receive three weeks annual leave and hence have 236 working days.

[2] 'Vehicle' is used in this appendix to include vehicle and driver unless otherwise stated. A full day for vehicle and driver was assumed if the officer requisitioning the vehicle spent the whole day at a scheme and returned the same evening. A half day was assumed if the officer was left at the scheme and the vehicle returned to Popondetta.

Table 2

Salaries (and allowances) assumed for costing purposes*
($)

	Annual salary	Salary assumed	Allowances added**	Total	Cost of one man-day
Land Titles Commissioner	6,050	6,050	818 +360***	7,228	33.0
Field Officer - L.T.C.	2,084- 2,588	2,336	818	3,154	14.40
Field Assistant - L.T.C.	440- 760	600	-	600	2.54
Agricultural Officer, grade 1	2,106- 3,814	2,960	818	3,778	17.25
Asst. Agric. Officer	720- 1,000	860	-	860	3.64
Agric. Assistant	440- 760	600	-	600	2.54
Farmer Trainee	172	172 (incl. rations $133)	-	172	0.73
Asst. District Officer, grade 1	4,058- 4,324	4,196	818	5,014	22.89
Interpreter - Dept of District Admin.	440- 760	600	-	600	2.54
Clerical Assistant	440- 760	600	-	600	2.54
Draftsman, grade 2	3,814- 4,058	3,936	818	4,754	21.71
Clerk	2,838- 3,326	3,082	818	3,900	17.81
Driver	440- 760	600	-	600	2.54
Vehicle	($0.70 per hour = $5.60 per day)				

Camping allowance (per night in the field for all except Farmer Trainees)

expatriate, single	1.05 per day
expatriate, married	2.00 per day
local, single	0.45 per day
local, married	0.75 per day

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* Salaries and allowances are as listed in the Public Service (Salaries and Overtime) Determination 1964 and the Public Service (Overseas Officers' Allowances) Determination 1964. Most second division salaries were increased by 1½ per cent during late 1965. These increases have not been taken into account. Vehicle costs are official estimates.

** Overseas officers receive an Overseas Allowance ranging from $500 to $960 per year depending on marital status and length of service, and a cost of living allowance of $370 per year. They are required to pay $52 per annum as contributions to the cost of child allowance payments. Therefore, assuming that the minimum Overseas Allowance is applicable, $818 per annum has been added to the basic salary ranges of overseas officers for costing purposes ($500 + $370 - $52). One man in five is assumed to be married. Hence an extra $360 per annum or $1.64 per man-day has been added when costing one-fifth of the man-days involved in conversion.

*** The Commissioner is assumed to be married.

657 interest and the time it spends on conversion has not been included
423 in these cost estimates.

(iv) D.D.A. investigation. An officer investigates the ownership of the land to be converted. This involves walking around the boundaries of the land with representatives from the claimant clan or clans, and neighbouring clans. The investigator checks whether any persons are absent from the area to be converted and whether they are agreeable to conversion. He submits a written report. There was no D.D.A. investigation at Ahora, Barisari No.1 or New Warisota, all of which began before mid 1965 when the D.D.A. investigation was introduced. The figures for Dobadura-Buna were not available. The schemes at Ombi-Tara, Somara and Dapari were investigated jointly, and D.D.A. officers accompanied by Land Titles Commission surveyors spent two days there, but they spent five days at Barisari No.2.

(v) Survey. If D.D.A. findings are satisfactory, Land Titles Commission staff make a chain and compass survey of the scheme to a design approved by D.A.S.F. Block boundaries are cut with the help of D.A.S.F. staff and local villagers and corners are marked with cement and wooden pegs. A plan is prepared from this survey and reduced size duplicate copies are made.[1] Time involved in surveying includes that spent on preliminary discussions, preparations, obtaining supplies, travelling, surveying in the field, and plotting and mapping. The most reliable information is for Ombi-Tara and Somara. The estimates for most of the others are almost certainly an understatement. The relatively large differences in time involved at different schemes (Table 3) reflect partly differences in topography and density of vegetation.

During the twelve months to 5 October 1965 nine schemes totalling 294 blocks and 6,650 acres were surveyed. Excluding work other than conversion, a total of seventeen Field Officer months was worked in the period, giving on the average 17.3 blocks surveyed per Field Officer month. Two Field Assistants were employed throughout. Since requests for tenure conversion were being received at a rate of more than one hundred per month during 1965, a large backlog remained.

(vi) Completing applications. An Agricultural Officer obtains five copies of each of the Application for Registration, the conversion plan, and the statutory declaration by the Land Titles Commission surveyor, and assists the village people to complete their application forms. This is time-consuming as repeated visits are often required to locate people who were absent at the time of the first visit. This involves an estimated four days per thousand acres for an Agricultural Officer and nine for his assistant.

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[1] The Ombi-Tara conversion plan is reproduced on p.12.[A]

A [See Category 102--Analyst]

Table 3

Survey - man-days per 1,000 acres

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1. Salary and allowances

Scheme	F.O.	F.A.	A.O.	A.A.O.	A.A.	F.T.	Veh.
Barisari No.1	45	79	32	45	-	90	5
New Warisota	26	18	3	-	30	-	14
Ahora	27	27	3	27	27	-	11
Ombi-Tara	94	94	33	43	352	525	12
Somare	110	110	10	-	585	440	65
Barisari No.2	72	72	-	72	-	144	24
Total	374	400	81	187	994	1,199	131
Average	62	67	14	31	166	200	22

2. Camping

Scheme	F.O.	F.A.	A.O.	A.A.O.	A.A.	F.T.	Veh.
Barisari No.1	40	74	28	40	-	-	-
New Warisota	18	10	-	-	26	-	-
Ahora	21	21	-	21	22	-	-
Ombi-Tara	87	87	26	39	225	-	-
Somare	60	60	-	-	320	-	-
Barisari No.2	48	48	-	48	-	-	-
Total	274	300	54	148	593	-	-
Average	46	50	9	25	99	-	-

Abbreviations:

F.O.	Field Officer, Land Titles Commission
F.A.	Field Assistant, Land Titles Commission
A.O.	Agricultural Officer
A.A.O.	Assistant Agricultural Officer
A.A.	Agricultural Assistant
F.T.	Farmer Trainee
Veh.	Vehicle

(vii) Processing applications. An Agricultural Officer spends about two days per 1,000 acres checking, amending and correcting all applications.

(viii) Registering applications. The applications are registered in the office of the Deputy District Commissioner by a Clerical Assistant who spends about one day per 1,000 acres.

(ix) Drafting notices of hearing. The applications are forwarded to the Land Titles Commissioner who makes out notices of the Land

657 Titles Commission hearing. This occupies the Commissioner for one
423 day.

(x) Conducting hearing. After at least three months the Land Titles Commission hearing is conducted. This is usually accomplished in one day's work each for the Commissioner, a Field Officer and a Field Assistant.

(xi) Drafting conversion orders. Conversion orders are completed by the Land Titles Commissioner and if no objections are lodged within ninety days they are sent to the Registrar of Titles in Port Moresby. This takes the Commissioner about one day per 1,000 acres.

(xii) Drafting and registering titles. The applicant is registered as the owner of an estate in fee simple by the Registrar of Titles in Port Moresby. Three copies of each individual title are drawn up by hand by a draftsman in the Registrar-General's Branch, Department of Law. No individual title documents had been drawn up by the end of February 1966 but it was assumed that a scheme of 1,000 acres containing fifty individual blocks would require about fifty days for a draftsman and a clerk.

(xiii) Programming and progress reports. At different stages of the conversion process an average of four days is spent by Agricultural Officers organising, planning, checking on conversion schemes and writing progress reports.

(xiv) Total salary costs. The costs in salaries of the thirteen stages of the conversion process are summarised in Table 4.

Other costs

The total costs of conversion must include capital costs which are even more difficult to estimate than the recurrent costs.

(i) Staff housing. Assuming 1,000 blocks of twenty acres are converted each year,[1] we can make an approximate estimate of the staff housing requirement of the tenure conversion programme.[2]

Table 5 sets out the number of man-days spent on converting 1,000 blocks by those officers for whom housing is provided.

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[1] This assumption was made in estimating the funds required for tenure conversion during the five year period 1966-67 to 1970-71 (Department of Agriculture 1965:1).

[2] It was assumed in the D.A.S.F. plan that housing would be provided for all officers engaged on conversion except Farmer Trainees, interpreters, and drivers; and that one officer in five would be married. These assumptions are followed here.

Table 4

The process of tenure conversion - man-days per 1,000 acres and salary costs per 1,000 acres and per 100 blocks

Process	Man-days per 1,000 acres																				Cost per 1,000 acres $	Cost per 100 blocks $
	Com.	F.O.	F.A.	A.O.	A.A.O.	A.A.	F.T.	A.D.O.	Int.	C.A.	Dft.	Clk	Veh.	Camping								
														F.O.	F.A.	A.O.	A.A.O.	A.A.	A.D.O.	Int.		
Prelim. discussions	-	-	-	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36	36
DASF investigation	-	-	-	6	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	3	-	3	-	-	95	195
DNA investigation	-	4	-	1	-	-	-	4	6	-	-	-	6	1	-	-	-	-	1	1	236	530
Survey	-	62	67	14	31	166	200	-	-	-	-	-	22	46	50	9	25	99	-	-	2,366	5,229
Complete applications	-	-	-	6	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	129	257
Process applications	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35	71
Register applications	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3
Notices of hearing	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	33	32
Hearing	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	58	58
Conversion orders	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	33	33
Register titles	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,009	4,018
Programming	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	71	71
Total man-days	3	67	68	31	31	181	200	4	6	1	50	50	36	47	50	12	25	107	1	1		
Cost per 1,000 acres ($)	99	986	172	546	113	460	146	93	15	3	1,102	907	293	58	26	15	13	53	1	1	5,102	
Cost per 100 blocks ($)	99	2,230	399	1,037	295	902	315	209	43	3	2,204	1,814	627	131	60	33	33	107	2	1		10,532

Abbreviations:

Com.	Land Titles Commissioner
F.O.	Field Officer, Land Titles Commission
F.A.	Field Assistant, Land Titles Commission
A.O.	Agricultural Officer
A.A.O.	Assistant Agricultural Officer
A.A.	Agricultural Assistant
F.T.	Farmer Trainee
A.D.O.	Assistant District Officer
Int.	Interpreter
C.A.	Clerical Assistant
Dft.	Draftsman
Clk	Clerk
Veh.	Vehicle

Columns do not add to totals because of rounding

Cost per acre - $ 5.10

Cost per block - $105.32

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Table 5

Man-days per 1,000 acres and per 1,000 blocks for officers for whom housing is provided

	Man-days per 1,000 acres	Man-days per 1,000 blocks
Overseas officers		
Land Titles Commissioner	3	60
Field Officer - L.T.C.	67	1,340
Agricultural Officer	31	620
Asst District Officer	4	80
Draftsman	50	1,000
Clerk	50	1,000
Total	205	4,100
Assistant Agricultural Officers	31	620
Other local officers		
Field Assistant - L.T.C.	68	1,360
Agricultural Assistant	181	3,620
Clerical Assistant	1	20
Total	250	5,000

Overseas officers would require 4,100 man-days on a year's programme of converting 1,000 blocks, and thus need housing for nineteen overseas officers (four married and fifteen single). Housing has also to be provided for three Assistant Agricultural Officers (one married, two single) who spend 620 man-days on converting 1,000 blocks and for twenty-one other local officers (four married, seventeen single) who spend 5,000 man-days.[1] The cost of providing housing for these officers is set out in Table 6. The annual cost of providing staff housing for a programme to convert 1,000 blocks averaging twenty acres in area is $9,030 which represents $0.45 per acre or $9 per block.

(ii) Office facilities. Proportionate costs of office space have been estimated at $0.05 per acre or $1.00 per block.

(iii) Stationery and materials. Each individual title document will require materials which are estimated by persons concerned with them to be worth $0.60.

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[1] Using days of work as set out in footnote 1, p.40.

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Table 6

Cost of providing staff housing for a one year programme to convert 1,000 blocks

	No. of officers required	Total cost* ($)	Cost of housing per year (1/15th capital cost)
Overseas officers			
single	15	75,000	5,000
married	4	40,000	2,666
Assistant Agricultural Officers			
single	2	4,000	266
married	1	4,000	266
Other local officers			
single	17	8,500	566
married	4	4,000	266
Total	43	135,500	9,030

* Based on Department of Agriculture 1965:3.

The costs of field equipment (e.g. compasses, cement pegs, etc.), agricultural extension work, the provision of planting materials,[1] transport and marketing facilities have not been included in this cost estimate as they are not part of the immediate process of tenure conversion. They are, however, essential to the success of any conversion scheme and may add significantly to the overall costs of the conversion programme.

Total costs

Insufficient data were collected to enable an accurate estimate of the total costs of tenure conversion. The available information is summarised in Table 7.

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[1] D.A.S.F. estimates that the cost of planting materials over five years for 2,500 blocks on which rubber or coconuts are grown would be $233,200 or $93.28 per block. Farmers on the other 2,500 blocks could obtain cocoa and coffee planting materials locally at little or no cost.

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423

Table 7

The costs of tenure conversion per acre and per block

Item	Cost per acre $	Cost per block $
Salaries	5.10	105.50
Staff housing	0.45	9.00
Office facilities	0.05	1.00
Stationery and materials	0.03	0.60
Total	5.63	116.10

Note. Field equipment, extension services and planting materials have not been included.

It may be useful to spell out some of the implications of these estimates. In the twelve months to October 1965 work was commenced in the Northern District on converting 2,000 blocks (covering about 40,000 acres). The cost to the Administration when conversion of these blocks is complete (excluding the provision of planting materials, field equipment and extension services) will be about $232,200.

If the Administration were to extend tenure conversion to 5 per cent of indigenous heads of households in Papua-New Guinea each year (that is, to about 20,000 people, assuming one person in five is a householder) the cost (excluding the provision of field equipment, extension services and planting materials) would be about $2,322,000 per annum. There may be ways in which these costs could be reduced, but these fall outside the scope of the present paper.[1]

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[1] Discussion of such topics as degree of accuracy of survey, maximum use of indigenous staff, costs of registration procedure, and the possible delegation of certain functions to local officers and/or local governments, merit discussion. It may be that costs of future conversion could be significantly reduced. On the other hand, the changes in procedure introduced by Circular 31.1.9 from the Administrator, which had not been put into effect at the time of this study, appear likely to increase costs and slow down the conversion process. In particular, the reports from both the District Development Committee and the Department of Agriculture are to be sent to the Administrator's Headquarters Advisory Committee on Land Tenure Conversion.

262 The principal food at Ombi-Tara is taro, while other foods of
importance include sweet potatoes, yams, bananas and plantain,
edible pit-pit (saccharum edule) and a wide variety of leaves and
bush cabbages. Bread-fruit, pandanus, betelnuts, coconuts, pine-
[224] apple, pawpaw, watermelon and sugar cane are also eaten. The main
sources of animal protein are provided by wild pigs, birds, flying
foxes and the occasional cuscus. These add variety but provide
231 comparatively little food. The keeping of domestic pigs in vil-
651 lages has been outlawed for health reasons by the Ilimo Local
Government Council which serves Ombi-Tara, but one old man, a
former clan leader, kept three pigs under his house.

342 Readily available natural vegetation provides housing materials. Timber is used for the framework and walls, blackpalm or timber for the floor, and thatched sago leaves for the roof. Houses have an average life of about four years.

162 The population of Ombi-Tara by clan and location is presented in Table 8.

Table 8

Resident population of Ombi-Tara by clan and location, January 1966

Clan	Ombi			Tara			Blocks			Total		
	M*	F*	C*	M	F	C	M	F	C	M	F	C
Mumu	20	20	56	1	1	2	6	7	13	27	28	71
Kuei	3	3	7	11	8	20	-	-	-	14	11	27
Total	23	23	63	12	9	22	6	7	13	41	39	98

M* Adult males. F* Adult females. C* Children.

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[464] Note. In addition there were seven Ombi men and six Tara men absent from the area working for wages, that is, roughly one man away for every three remaining at home.

602 Kinship groups are of major importance in
the functioning of village society in New
[619] Guinea. Every individual is a member not
only of a parish but also of groups of closer
[614] kin, a clan, and maybe a lineage. Lacking any
[613] system of payment in cash for services rendered,
602 the villager obtains the assistance of his
relatives for heavy work such as the felling of
464 big trees to make a swidden, dragging a canoe
476 log to the beach, or making a long seine fishing
net. Obligations thus incurred are met
either by reciprocating when asked or by
602 making a gift. The kinship group provides
social stability and in practice the pattern of
311 land use is frequently decided by the senior
241 members of the group. The planting of food
crops by any member, even on land to which
he does not control cultivation rights, causes
no concern because rights to temporary usage
may be easily granted, but the planting of
tree crops, which may remain in the ground
from thirty to eighty years, is a different matter.
Planting tree crops is tantamount to
alienating the land for at least a generation
and very often some members, at least, of the
kinship group object to such long-term use.
Even if they do agree to an individual member
planting tree crops, there is almost always
the assumption that he must share any profit
he makes with other members of the group.
Individuals who have planted cash crops under
these conditions generally become discouraged
when they see the fruits of their labours being
reaped by kinsmen who contribute little or
nothing towards production.

657 In its attempts to stimulate production of
cash crops by indigenes, the Administration
423 has approved a series of land tenure laws, the
177 last and most radical of which was passed in
1964 providing for the registration by indigenes
of individual freehold title to land: a
measure designed eventually to establish a
European system of land tenure throughout
the Territory. In the meantime, such measures,
[578] by pitting traditionally conservative
people against the products of modern Western
education, are a cause of internal conflict
within indigenous society.

632 The establishment of towns, unknown before
the coming of Europeans, has forced an
177 even more drastic adaptation than have the

[P.3-A]

177 for short periods as indentured labourers on
474 the newly-established European plantations or
[464] on the wharves of Port Moresby or Samarai.
Most men sampled the novelty for a short time
but quickly returned to the village; some
showed little interest in the wider life introduced by the white men but a few were greatly influenced and spent years away from home in paid employment such as the Papuan Constabulary.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

101 The Yega constitute a social and political unit
and regard themselves as separate and distinct
197 from the similar groups around them, even
619 though all speak mutually understandable
dialects of the same language. Each of these
619 groups may therefore be termed a parish.
Before the enforced abandonment of warfare early this century, these parishes lived in a situation of constant enmity and changing military alliances. In the absence of effective natural barriers on the plain, each group concentrated upon the production of its food supplies as close as possible to its home villages; tracts of forest which served as hunting areas and as reservoirs of wild food and building materials also served as 'no man's lands' surrounding the territory of each parish group.
As hunting rights to these forest areas were
[423] obtained by daring individuals who ventured
[578] far into them, near the swidden areas of neigh-
bouring groups, it is not surprising that such
[657] [P.5-B]
[692]

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657
619
423 claims by two or more groups frequently
578 overlapped (Fig. 2). Because of this situation,

102
131
797
423
578


146°16'E
Mangrove Isl.
08°37'S
BAPA
GONA MISSION
UNDISPUTED
YEGA
TERRITORY
JAJORA
GARARA
Popondetta – Gona Road
N
AHORA
CROWN LAND
MILES
0
½
1
Area claimed by Bapa people
" " " Jajora "
" " " Kahendatte "
" " " Garara people
Area claimed by Ahora
Yega boundary undisput
Additional area claimed
by Yega people

Fig. 2. *Disputed land boundaries of Yega territory. (Redrawn from an original map by the Land Titles Commissioner, Popondetta.)*

[P.6-A]

619
423 a Land Titles Commissioner today has the
578 difficult task of adjudicating the rival claims
of two or more groups to the same areas of
692 forest land; each group can, moreover, pro-
657 duce men who can point out the trees marked
by their ancestors and each group is convinced
that they alone are in the right and the others
merely conniving liars, who will use any
methods to steal the land. The intensity of
feeling which people generate over land became evident one day when I attended a
meeting called by the Land Titles Commissioner to discuss rights to a small area between
the Yega and a neighbouring parish. As my
Yega friends and I left at the conclusion of the
meeting we came on a group of Yega men in
the bush fifty yards from the meeting site;
they had prepared a supply of sharpened 8 foot
poles 'just in case', they said, 'the others started
a fight over the land!' Doubtless the other
side was similarly prepared.

614 The Yega parish is composed of eight named,
613 exogamous, localised clans most of which are
divided into sub-clans and lineages; descent is
[619] patrilineal. On marriage, a girl leaves her
father's house and goes to live in the house
591 provided by her husband; in past times the
couple invariably went to live in the same
178 village as the husband's father, but nowadays
the rules have been greatly relaxed. Each clan
614 has a different totemic emblem which serves
as a kind of trademark. If the totem is an
784 animal or edible plant it may not be eaten
for food.

614 An abbreviated table illustrating the Yega
social structure is given in Table 1.
613 [P·6-B]

361 173 coral sand and lumps of dead coral. Although
[133] there are mangrove trees on the islands, there
would be no possibility of growing food crops
there. At some time well before the arrival of
white men, the Yega moved from Baroda
Deuga and founded a large village, Basabuga,
on the eastern shore of Waususu Point. In
Basabuga each clan was allocated a specific
[614] area in which family heads built their homes.
Probably there were only three original clans,
but these were joined at intervals by the an-
cestors of the other five clans who now make
up the Yega parish. Basabuga is in an ideal
defensive site, protected on the landward side
by mangrove swamps to the south-east, and
on the south-western side by swamp filled de-
pressions running parallel to the beach. The
sea provided an escape route to the north.

361 By about 1910 when the first school was
begun at Waususu Point, some clans had
[871] moved eastward or westward and settled in
other coastal villages. In each village the male
361 members of a clan lived together with their
wives and children, and although there was
614 a good deal of inter-clan contact, the clan
village was the main social unit. The main
reason for the dispersal of clans from Basabuga
was [illegible]bably population pressure but the en-
for[illegible] cessation of inter-parish warfare un-
doubtedly contributed. The movement west-
361 ward along the beach continued until about
1930. People were encouraged to move by the
increasing effectiveness of Government control
[657] and by the establishment at Gona Mission of
[797] a school and hospital staffed by Europeans.

[P.12-B]

361 The new village sites also reduced walking
time to the gardens.

648 The war of 1939-1945 affected the Yega in
several important ways. Their territory became
722 one of the major battlefields of the Pacific
War. Every person migrated from the area
with the exception of one old crippled woman
who somehow managed to survive for eighteen
648 months in the bush. Almost all able-bodied
men served in the army or labour corps and
701 the women and children lived at another
722 Anglican mission about thirty miles to the
north. When they returned, they found all
727 buildings, and any belongings that they had
left behind, destroyed and most of their coconut
palms cut down or damaged by gunfire.
727 There were some compensations. The Australian
Government paid thousands of dollars
657 in war-damage compensation for all trees and
property but, more important, the stimulus of
177 travel, and meeting and working with Australian
and American soldiers, gave the younger
men in particular a broader view of life
which triggered off changes in their traditional
economy. In addition, the transfer of the
177 Administrative headquarters from Buna to
491 Higaturu resulted in the construction of a
major road to the port of Cape Killerton and
brought the Yega into closer touch with the
outside world than ever before. As a result,
361 between 1945 and 1950, about twenty families
left their re-built villages and moved east to
166 found the new village of Surilai at Cape Killerton
(Fig. 9). Men living at Surilai have since
[464] found regular employment on the Government
wharf at Cape Killerton.

178 Major post-war changes in the Yega economy
have resulted from their attempts to
433 increase their cash earnings. Before the war
464 many men worked as indentured labourers on
plantations or on the wharves at Port Moresby
466 [P. 13-A]

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 14-B]

245 By a fortuitous circumstance, the land selected
423 was regarded by all Yega as communal
hunting land. It had belonged in the past to
[614] the Bowori clan, but when they were wiped
out in inter-parish warfare it had never been
(726) re-allocated among the remaining clans. Nobody,
therefore, had to be compensated for
245 the loss. The Yega followed the DAO's advice
and over the next two years cut down a large
654 area of forest and planted shade trees and
657 young cocoa. In order to supervise this work,
the Agriculture Department built a small
village at Ononda to house a field instructor
and a group of trainees.

245 Many people came to believe that their
433 future prosperity lay in the development of
cash cropping. As the cocoa blocks were a long
361 walk (four miles) from their homes in Beporo
village, many decided to move inland; this
245 was a rational decision. An additional incentive
[484] was the development of the weekly market
at Popondetta. With the rapid growth of the
[443] town since 1960 there has been an increasing
361 demand for fresh fruit and vegetables. Many
Yega have taken advantage of this to sell surplus
443 produce for cash. Residence in the inland
438 settlements reduces the distance from the market.
By 1964, over half the population was
living in the new villages.

361 In addition to the dispersal of population,
the breakdown of traditional clan groupings
178 continued. The inland settlements are all
614 numerically smaller than Beporo and in all of
them the old homogeneity of clan membership
has disappeared. A man chose his house site
for convenience and access to his place of
work, rather than on the basis of his kinship
ties.

361 The most radical change occurred in the
establishment of Binjapada village. It is a
collection of fourteen households, spread for
over half a mile, along a narrow strip of grassland.
361 Six of the occupants had been allocated
cocoa blocks in the near vicinity and four of
423 these men attempted to locate their houses on
the projected extensions of their cocoa blocks;
this represents the beginning of a dispersed
pattern of settlement foreign to the Yega tradition
of clan-based clusters of dwellings. As no
boundary surveys were carried out, one man
located his house on his neighbour's block.

[P.15-B]

245
177 b) The production of crops specifically for sale.

c) The acceptance by the indigenes of
[654] supervision and advice from European and
indigenous members of the Agriculture Department:
[657] people with whom they had no
kinship ties.

d) The location of houses on the blocks.

[423] e) The registration, by some individuals,
of freehold title.

245 It is unfortunate that the scheme which
appeared so successful in its early stages should
have failed largely because of circumstances
outside of the people's control.

464 Many Yega have made no attempt to earn
cash from commercial agriculture. From the
[434] time of earliest contact with Europeans some
of them have left home to work for wages. At
[166] the present time, almost one third of them are
absent working, studying, or as dependents.
464 Forty-four per cent of all Yega men are away
working. Those who are married are accompanied
178 in almost every instance by their wives
and children. This situation represents a
592 marked change from the pre-1940 years when
166 many Yega men worked as indentured or
casual labourers and could not take their dependents
with them. Nowadays most Yega
[466] work in semi-skilled or skilled occupations in
which family accommodation is often provided
by employers. Even if accommodation is
not supplied, the breadwinner's earnings are
apparently adequate to provide living quarters
for his wife and children; frequently town
accommodation is of poor standard but evidently
family life is preferred to separation.

The main factor in the marked improvement
871 in skills is education. The educational
178 opportunities which have been available to
the Yega for nearly fifty years have been exceptionally
favourable, when compared with
those of most other New Guineans. A mission
[799] school has operated in the area since 1909;
since 1932 (except for war years) it has had at
least one European teacher permanently on
the staff. This educational background has
[464] enabled the younger generation of Yega men
to take advantage of opportunities for employment
in posts of responsibility and higher income
which have become available in increasing
numbers during the post-war period.

[P16-B]

434 home in the villages. By doing this, they are
431 bringing about changes in the established
178 rules of leadership in village life. Under tradi-
tional custom, improvement in status was
554 associated with the ceremonial distribution of
goods: the recipients were placed under obli-
gation to repay in similar kind at some future
date, or else lose status. Among the Yega, the
older recipients of gifts in cash or manufac-
tured goods find it impossible to repay such
gifts. As a result there has been an increase
in the prestige of young or middle-aged, edu-
cated men. An instance of this trend was the
[666] almost unanimous election, in 1964, of such
a person, recently returned from paid employ-
[657] ment, as the Yega's first councillor on the Oro
Bay Local Government Council.

[P.17-B]

73 that was uppermost in the people's minds—to return to an environment of their choosing. In many cases families had been separated. Many close relatives had been killed, and in some cases it was not known whether such relatives were alive in other camps or not. Although short visits to old villages and gardens were sometimes permitted, the devastation that was seen there was always worrying, and time was not long enough for anything to be done about it. The future was uncertain; and there was always the underlying question, often expressed, "Will the volcano blow up again?" Although the people showed no signs of nervousness in the danger area, they are still not confident that our assurances of their safety outside the perimeter are correct—we have made mistakes before.

[158] It is perhaps surprising that, given this worry and tension, and an apparently highly-strung people, there were not more cases of mental derangement. Those cases I enquired about proved to be either long-standing affairs or temporary disturbances which seemed to pass. On the other hand, there was much excitement in the camps, and quarrelling and violence. Every move of the administrative staff was watched with interest, crowds would gather to hear the latest news. The presence of large squads of native police in the camps led to friction, sometimes over women, sometimes through a general resentment at being ordered about. [684] Court cases, and administrative cases settled out of court, were mainly charges of violence against wives. Some of these were led up to by sexual misbehaviour, but in many cases it seemed that there was nothing more than irritability over some [861] domestic misdoing, such as being late in carrying water. Children were frequently cuffed and beaten, and I often saw little wrongdoers being hurried away by older brothers or sisters to prevent a visitation of parental wrath.

This general irritability was carried back into the villages, where worry was not 731 very much less than in the camps, and even the degree of daily control by European 657 authority was maintained as far as possible. For here administrative officers tended to enter into the minutiæ of daily life, marking the spots where the houses had to go, decreeing the layout of the village, often when the people thought they would be [578] better employed elsewhere. An example of village violence occurred in the new Popota while I was there. At this time women with small children were expected to remain at Ilimo camp until husbands had built them adequate shelters. Many of the women resented this, and some slipped into the bush and back to their husbands. In this particular case the baby lost a little weight when it returned to the village. The husband told the woman that she should have stayed near the clinic in camp. The women, resentful at this lack of appreciation of her presence, lost her temper and rushed at her husband with a knife. The husband swung at her head with an axe, and mother and baby ended up in a Mission dispensary which had been set up some distance away. To my mind this incident sums up many of the relevant points—the impression made by the new services, the urgent desire even of the women to be getting on with the job, and the domestic tensions and irritability that resulted from the situation.

Before the eruption, a new type of village had been established in the Kokoda 657
sub-district, consisting of a large village square of neatly clipped grass, with houses
arranged in a single row along three sides of it. Although such villages have a 361
monotonous regularity and lack of individual character, Europeans think of them [363]
as being æsthetically attractive, and they appeal to the administrative officer's
sense of the fitness of uniformity in a well-ordered community. Attempts to
introduce such villages in the Higaturu sub-district had largely failed, and the
standard of housing was much lower. Further the people of this area tended to
live in small clan-hamlets and resisted propaganda for them to come together into
larger village groups. After the eruption, however, the general desire for new things, 177
the sense of guilt at having resisted such innovations before, and a feeling of insecurity
combined to make most of the people reconsider their earlier decisions. Although
the move was not quite universal, by far the greater proportion of people decided to
rebuild their homes in large village units situated close to existing or proposed jeep
roads, and on administrative advice decided to follow the Kokoda village plan with
substantially improved housing. Such a move raises numerous social problems.

The actual decision as to who should live together in a village group was by and 621
large easy to make. Mr. Plant's enquiry, referred to earlier, showed that individual
patrilineal clans are often segments of a maximal lineage, the other segments of 613
which live in different areas, and this finding accords with Williams' material. But
in a given hamlet there would be two or more clans, not segments of the same
lineage; and a number of hamlets occupying neighbouring ground would be considered together as a single village-group. Sometimes the village-groups were
combined as a large area-group. Thus we have the hamlets Pengipe, Isivita,
Huworituru and Bosiseta combining as Isivita No. 1 village; Egaturu, Tambori,
Koropata and Kiorata as Tambori village; and Kakita, Hamamuta, Pija and
Popondota as Popondota village; and the village-groups of Isivita No. 1, Tambori
and Popondota, together with separate hamlets of Barewaturu and Kombeturu
constitute the area-group of Isivita No. 1. Just how far these groupings result
from administrative practice we cannot tell, but it is fairly certain that they represent
genuinely-felt units. This does not, however, necessarily apply to the combination [619]
of the area-groups into tribal groups. Though the people we are considering appear
to be one in language and custom, and to regard neighbouring groups as somewhat [101]
different, they are vague as to an over-all group name. Williams calls this group the
Wasida tribe; Plant considers the correct name to be Periho. Although I think
Plant is more correct than Williams on this point, it seems to me that the people
themselves do not attach much importance to such a name.

The village-group was taken by the people as the new unit of residence. The 621
earlier hamlets would take a side or section of a side of the village square, each clan 361
building its houses contiguously. This meant that the residential group increased
in size from units of 20 to 100, to units of 125 to 400. Further, the village-groups 731
were much closer together, sometimes now being in sight of each other along the

731 remember the dead in such ways. In the meantime one may hear the drums beating
765 in some villages as the men spontaneously come together for recreation and practice.

The programme of reconstruction, then, is very much a matter of the allocation
731 of time between such ends. To regard it simply as a matter of building houses and
making gardens would be a mistake. But even within that simple framework the
311 rate of reconstruction is dependant upon the availability of resources and the
organization of work. It was estimated that the re-established population would have about five acres of land per head outside the danger perimeter—over 100 to the square mile. This is small compared with other areas of Papua, but it is held to be sufficient to maintain present standards of shifting cultivation. The forest building resources, with the possible exception of grass and sago thatch, appear to be adequate for immediate purposes, and it is hoped that thatch can be imported from near by areas. But there are indications, as we shall see, that agricultural requirements may alter; and it is not certain what effect this dense population will have on permanent timber resources. As against this, the people are permitted to extend gardens into the danger perimeter provided they do not stay there overnight. Unfortunately the immediate benefits of this are reduced by the fact that taro and other gardens are choked by weeds and the roots have in many cases rotted. It will take time to build up a stock of reliable seed and to turn this into good crops.

731 Papuans, and particularly the Orokaiva, work with great vim and energy when
they can work as a team, within sight and sound of each other. The melodious
461 song that rose as village groups combined to fell the forest on their new sites was
exciting, and as the song died away the rhythm of the work continued, this time accompanied by back-chat and joking. All reconstruction work cannot take place with such groups—timber and cane materials, for instance, are gathered by people working apart from each other. But attempts were made to increase the frequency of directly co-operative work by a typical modern Papuan device, the allocation of work days by village constables and councillors, acting after a village meeting.
[657] The custom of Government Day, the day a week which is set aside for village hygiene
and improvement, is universal in Papua. To this has been added, in some cases, a
[797] Mission Day, set aside for work in support of Missions. From this it is an easy
step to allocate work for the week in such a way that most villagers will be doing the same type of job on the same day, and hence the possibilities of co-operation are increased. In most of the reconstruction villages Monday and Wednesday were set aside for house building, Tuesday and Thursday for garden work, Friday for hygiene and road construction (the latter a most important activity in the area at the present time), and Saturday free or for Mission work. This calendar was somewhat complicated by the rather inopportune demand of the Mission for a tithe of labour to expand Mission stations in the area, a task that could well wait until the people are more settled.

657 So far I have been writing mainly of the immediate problems of re-settlement. The Administration is however taking a much wider view and there is a great deal of

discussion as to the best method of undertaking community development to meet 657 the desires of these people. Such desires of course cannot be taken for granted, and indeed the pre-eruption history of the people led many to believe that the time is not appropriate. Certainly any grandiose schemes must wait until the people are relieved of pressing immediate worries. But at the same time there seems to be a genuine change of heart. It is true that this change of heart is accompanied by a feeling of guilt, as I have pointed out before. Yet it would be folly to ignore it.

I obtained many statements of the hopes of these people for the future. Some 829 of them were clearly stimulated by experiences in the refugee camps. All of them contrasted their hopes for the future with their experiences of the past. Here are 177 some that were given to me in the Popota, Hagenahambo area:

"Our lack of progress is the European's fault for not teaching us better." (This point of view was very much in the minority.)

"We get knowledge from school, but we are race people. The European taught us very well, but it is hard for us to learn because of our race. All people say there is one name in Papua, but some go their own way. Australians learn just the same but they are superior because they pull together."

"We want the white man to come and teach us, but no one teaches the Papuan very good. How can we give white people good food or furniture, because we're not taught properly? But this time the Government helps us with food. It is time for us now to try hard to learn. We want natives and white man like one family. We were very bad when the volcano blew up. But now we want to help. We want to give what we can and we want to start a new life for ourselves."

How do the people conceive of this new life? In the first place, it is to take place 657 in a new environment, particularly with new villages and new roads as escape routes in case of a renewal of volcanic activity and as an outlet for produce. In the second 474 place, it is to be related to the "Co-operative"; and this concept of the "Co-operative" requires a great deal of explanation.

Examination of files and interviews with the people show that the history of co-operation in the area covers the whole period following the expulsion of the Japanese[3]. It originally formed an extension of the Christian Co-operative Evangelist movement founded by the Anglican Mission, which appears to be successful in the Gona and other areas. The movement spread to the Kokoda sub-district, and to the intervening Periho group, by means of propagation by Mission teachers. Its first appearance in the Kokoda area caused some consternation in administrative circles, as the unauthorized collection of money always causes alarm. A most interesting report[4] was written by the Assistant District Officer, as a result of which

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[3] "In addition to the co-operatives, numerous native commercial activities were begun by the Administration before the war. These included the compulsory planting of rubber, the trees now being tapped under contract to a European planter, and the native-owned but Administration-managed coffee plantations, of which only Sangara has recently been worked." [654]

[4] Memo. Mr. Yeoman to District Officer September 7, 1949. "Co-operative Rumours Kokoda Sub-District." [113]

657
474
a Co-operative Officer was posted to the Northern Division. His later reports cast further light on the nature of the movement.[8]

When the movement first appeared in Kokoda its apparent objects were to produce rice, as did the more regular co-operatives of the coast, and to build a store at Killerton, the port, apparently with the object of cutting costs. The rumours held that it was an order from the King that co-operatives should be formed, and that there had hitherto been no co-operatives in the area because the Government was angry with the natives for killing some Europeans during the war. Further, the co-operatives would have "bosses" appointed by the mission teacher who led the movement, and as a result of their activities the white people would leave Papua and the villagers would be in charge of their own affairs. At this point the movement seems to be very similar to a watered-down version of the "Masinga Rule" movement of the Solomons; but there is no clear evidence that there was actually a cargo cult.

The first duty of the Co-operative Officer was to regularize the position of these people, and to do this he visited the villages to obtain lists of contributors of money. He met with some resistance as a government agent, but seems to have been very successful in obtaining public confidence and in most cases lists were made. In accordance with official policy, the money was then handed back to the contributors, with the promise that regular co-operative activity would be supported and that contributions could be collected again when the people were ready for it. The Officer then moved to the Periho area, where the same situation obtained, and began to hull rice. At this stage the volcano erupted.

The reports of the Co-operative Officer at this time were frankly pessimistic. Many people refused to allow him to hull the rice when it was grown, though demonstration hulling tended to alter their viewpoint. The Officer interpreted this as showing that the people did not understand the objects of their activity, and that [797] they were not ready for co-operation. In fact, however, the position was complicated by the way in which the co-operatives had grown up as Mission-sponsored organizations, and the resistance seems to have been not so much to the idea of production, but to the intrusion of Government in a field the people wanted to keep for themselves, with Mission assistance. Government assistance was nevertheless very necessary, as the Mission had allowed crops to ripen without hulling and in general took an unrealistic view of business aspects of the movement.

At the same time it is true that the people were vague and mystical about their activity. Co-operative gardens and co-operative houses were made. The gardens were to produce rice and vegetables for sale. The principal feature of the activity seems, however, to have been religious rather than agricultural. A cross was erected overlooking the garden, and prayers were said before activity took place. The gardens were far too small to be economical—smaller indeed than many gardens of individual villagers. The houses were built on a standard pattern, not, as might be 657 thought, to act as warehouses or storehouses or as offices, but as eating places for the 474 co-operators. Long tables and benches were erected in them where meals were eaten on return from work. The whole movement seems to have been built upon faith—faith in God's assistance, and faith that, if certain procedures were adopted, certain results would follow.

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[8] Co-operative Inspection Reports 1950-51, Co-operative Officer Northern Division to Registrar of Co-operative Societies.

Despite these very grave disadvantages, the future for native enterprise is not necessarily bad. "Co-operation" to these people does not necessarily mean co-operation in our sense. The word is used by them sometimes to mean nothing more than rice-production, sometimes to indicate the house built for the co-operators, sometimes simply meaning a better way of life. The Northern Division is remarkable [242] for the variety of agricultural experiment that has taken place over a number of years. There are native owned rubber and coffee plantations, excellent citrus fruit is grown, and a wide variety of introduced vegetables have been planted and marketed. It may turn out that co-operative finance and marketing is more useful than co-operative production and that rice is not the most suitable crop. The whole matter needs skilled agricultural investigation and much more discussion with the people. But there is no doubt that some form of native business activity is required. And despite the ravages of the volcano there is still a fund of ready cash available for initial capital outlay. The Mission holds several hundred pounds on behalf of co-operators, and there are several hundred more still held by co-operative officials in village boxes. In addition to this money already subscribed, the people still [454] have savings. I examined, for instance, thirteen savings bank books as a sample for the Hagenahambo-Timbeki-Popota people. The money in these originated entirely from War Damage Compensation payments, and there was an average of £4 held in balance, in a range from £1 17s. to £8 1s. In addition the same people stated that they had money in boxes, with an average of just under £10, in a range from nil to £2 to £39. It is impossible to work out from this sample the money likely to be held in the whole area; but it does indicate that there is capital available for minor equipment.

The general desire for co-operation and community development which, in a 657 vague way, underlies the present aspirations of the people, raises numerous problems of a technical nature. Mass literacy, education in bookkeeping and technical trades, medical services, agricultural research and extension, all have their part to play, and political organizations have to be devised which are suitable instruments of control for these backward people. The role of anthropology in such a situation, which is 121 becoming more and more common in the Pacific, is not only one of research to delineate the starting line of change. We need to know a great deal more about the ways in which people react to such stimuli and the way in which adjustments are made within native society over periods of time. Knowledge of adjustments which come through migration would have been particularly valuable in the Lamington situation. There is a need to perfect techniques of interpreting the hopes of people

> 731 the fire. At night it is like a torch,
> and we do not understand the sign.'

We cannot be entirely sure what the mountain people would have done had they not been under European influence. Informants at Hohorita told me that the people wished to run away, but that the Europeans persuaded them to stay. It is likely that people seriously considered leaving the mountain during the few days before the eruption, but it is also likely that they feared the dangers and troubles that would have followed their departure. Where could they have gone? How could they have found food? Most important of all: would other clans occupy their land during their absence? The evidence shows that, in the circumstances, the mountain people contented themselves with statements of their apprehensions to European authorities and placed upon them the responsibility of deciding what should be done in this unusual and frightening predicament.

731 657 The two main power centres of the Orokaiva district at that time were both very close to the mountain (see Map II).[A] The headquarters of the Northern District government administration was at Higaturu; Martyr's School and the main mission centre was at Sangara; both these places were subsequently destroyed by the blast and their residents killed. These were the foci of decision. Two of my informants were able to tell me something of what happened there: Fa. Albert McLaren, who was at Sangara until the day before the eruption and Mr. C. Searle who visited Higaturu on Friday, 19 January. Both told me of apprehensive Orokaiva asking European authorities what they should do.

The District Commissioner decided to discourage the people from leaving their home villages. He maintained throughout that there was no need to worry about the mountain. The circumstances that led him to this decision were described to me by Mr. Searle, by Mr. Paul Sebire, Assistant District Commissioner, Popondetta, in [155] 1966 and by other informants. There had been several earlier eruptions in the district, one at Tufi in 1943 and another at Rabaul in 1937. The District Commissioner at Higaturu, Mr. Cowley, was well informed about the former while the latter had been witnessed by the Chief Justice of the Territory, Mr. M. Philips. The District Commissioner asked the Chief Justice for an opinion and the latter overflew the mountain on Friday, 19 January, to assess the situation. The Chief Justice advised that evacuation of the station was unnecessary. On the assumption that Mount Lamington was like the other volcano which he had seen in eruption, The Chief Justice believed that Mount Lamington could not be very dangerous, seeing that emissions on such a large scale had already occurred. On that premise the pressure built up inside the mountain had already been reduced, and only relatively harmless cold ejecta could now be expected.

[A] [See Cat. 118, pp. End Map 2(A)-End Map 2(B)--Analyst]

731 This line of reasoning was spread around fairly rapidly. According to Father Albert, a message from the District Commissioner 657 was read in churches on the Sunday after the Chief Judge's visit, i.e., on the morning of the eruption. This message said that the volcano would erupt, but there would be no reason to worry. Ashes would come but they would be cold. People should not run away. Not only the Churches, but also the Village Constables were advised in these terms. The Village Constable at Sivepe gave me a somewhat different description of the District Commissioner's message, but it was equally reassuring. Supposedly, there was water under the volcano which would come out sooner or later. The people should be told that this would happen. People were told, said the Village Constable, people waited two or three days and then the mountain blew up.

As Sivepe is not particularly close to the district centre of Higaturu, we may notice that district organisation in 1951 must have had a rather efficient communication system, using both the Church network and the Village Constable network. The Village Constable at Sivepe told me that he used to be in very regular contact with Higaturu and that the communication came to him during a routine visit. He added that he had been asked to return the Higaturu the following Tuesday for another meeting about the volcano.

In view of the subsequent events, there has naturally been criticism of the District Commissioner because he did not order the evacuation in time while he did evacuate his own wife and child. In his defense it may be said that he was expecting a proper vulcanological investigation that would have taken place as from Monday, 22 January. Furthermore, by calling a meeting of Village Constables for Tuesday, 23 January, he showed serious concern to keep the population informed and protected. Finally, it would have been hard for two laymen like himself and the Chief Justice to spot the difference between preliminaries of the "Vulcanian" type of explosion, similar to those of Rabaul and Tufi which they expected and the disastrous Peléan explosion that actually occurred.

731 There is no evidence that any Orokaiva people fled their villages before the eruption. This is striking because their own interpretation of the events, namely the anger of Sumbiripa, was a frightening one indeed. We shall gradually come to see that the alternative of leaving their villages was, to the Orokaiva, perhaps more frightening still.

731 The vulcanologist, from the facts already at his disposal, was able to warn the administration that a prolonged phase of violent explosive activity was to be expected. This is characteristic of Peléan eruptions: at Mont Pélée paroxysmal activity lasted for four months and St. Vincent produced powerful explosions ten months after its initial activity. Hence, the refugees would be in danger were they to return to their villages. A generous area was therefore at once tentatively marked off as uninhabitable; this stretched from Inonda, Higarata to Mongi to Agenahambo, to the Kumusi and in a wide circle round the rest of the mountain. Special permission was needed to enter this restricted area; thus, the refugees would be forbidden, by regulation, to return to their homes.

This policy lies at the core of the entire resettlement scheme: the inhabitants, first of the camps, later of the resettlement villages, never exercised a free choice of residence but were kept by a benevolent government from returning to places where they [628] might come to further harm. Clearly, no other course was open to the Australian government: in its own eyes and in the eyes of the world it was responsible for the well-being of the Orokaiva survivors; the continuing danger of the volcano was a scientific fact of which the Orokaiva could not possibly be aware nor could they be expected to believe it; there were at that time no forms of political organisation such that Orokaiva leaders could have taken decisions on residence that would have been binding upon the people and such that the Australian government could have systematically approached and consulted them. The decision to relocate, therefore, from the beginning rested solely upon the Australian government. No Orokaiva participated in the discussions, held on 22 January, during which the policy was laid down. As a result of the discussions, officers went to the Sangara Estate, to Waseta, and to other centres of the affected population and transmitted the Administrator's instructions. If arguments were needed, they were clear enough and extremely cogent: the government expected further trouble at the mountain.

Section 5: The Decision to Relocate

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657 Under this heading there are three aspects to consider: the participants, the procedure and attitudes towards the necessity of relocation. In the previous section I have made it clear that only the administration participated in the decision-taking process; this was in line with the then existing governmental structure. The local government councils which today might conceivably be involved in discussions did not yet exist in 1951. The only existing

657 intermediaries between government and people were the village constables. These were definitely not conceived by the government in the role of consultants on matters of policy. They were, however, a crucial link in the chain of command. The government was accustomed to transmit its orders directly to the village constables whose duty it then became to see that the people under their control obeyed the orders. It goes without saying that in this moment of crisis these accustomed methods of communication were followed.

731 The people who came down on the Sangara side were (judging by the ones I interviewed) no longer together in village groups. Some just said they ran to the plantation and then to Cape Killerton, others mentioned a European at the plantation who told them to go to Cape Killerton. A small band of rescue workers entered the devastated area to look for survivors. Of the casualties they carried back, an unknown number died, but 70 were evacuated to hospitals at Lae and Port Moresby. Only three of the evacuees died. (Taylor, 1958: 48.) Other casualties were treated at a field hospital in Popondetta. After the rescue workers had buried those who had died outside the area of devastation, they proceeded to Cape Killerton. The Seva people likewise went there, but a week or so later reappeared at Inonda.

To the West of the mountain, where the casualties were far lighter, the people had a number of alternate courses of action. Data from Sivepe and the Sasembata area show no uniform reaction to the disaster even though village constables continued to exercise authority and village communities were not torn asunder. The Sivepe pattern was probably not untypical.

Here the village constable was not actually in the village at the moment of the eruption. He had gone to Kendata, a village two miles closer to the mountain, to see what was wrong with the mountain. A feast was in progress there, but only the two leaders of the feast were still at Kendata. The rest had become frightened at the smoke from the mountain and escaped to the bush. While the village constable, with four companions, was at Kendata, the mountain blew up. He returned at once to his own village, entering the wrong house because it was too dark to see. When the thunder and lightning wore off, he said, he saw white stuff (pumice) on the ground; the roosters started to sing; it was daybreak; the light started again. Many of the people had gone down; he took as many as possible with him to Awala. He arrived at Awala on Sunday night. (It was not Monday night, as a superficial reading of this paragraph might suggest because on that Sunday, the day broke twice, once in the morning, and once in the afternoon when visibility improved by a temporary lull in the emission of ash.)

But not everyone went to Awala; one or two, as at Kendata, had gone to the bush for safety; some old people simply refused to leave the village land and stopped at a hamlet called Kekita,

731 In the second phase, which is well documented through the
reports of Keesing and Belshaw, attitudes were more complex. Our
present concern is solely with the question whether the evacuees
continued to regard absence from their home villages as necessary.
Later, we shall refer to the gratitude that was shown to the
Europeans for helping them in their hour of need, the extraordinary
degree of cooperation and orderliness that prevailed, the sense
of guilt that may have motivated the people in their compliant
attitudes. We shall also refer to the anxieties the people under-
went at this period: the usual anxieties of camp life, the
uncertainties of the whereabouts of many kinsfolk who might or
might not be alive, the fear that somehow they would be unable to
[823] get their land and villages back. Informants stressed to me that
the worst suffering of those days was simply home sickness, the
sense of desolation at being separated from the places to which
they so intimately belonged. Hence, in spite of the fear for the
mountain, the Orokaiva very soon began to exert pressure upon the
camp authorities to let them return home.

731 This pressure is especially evident from Belshaw's data:
people argued that the Europeans would not necessarily know what
657 would be a safe area should the volcano blow up again--hence the
maintaining of the camps could not logically be justified by their
supposed safety (Belshaw, page 244). When the authorities inquired
whether the people favoured consolidation of villages, many of the
answers "were framed so as to assure the authorities that all
would be well if they left the refugee camps immediately; everything
was subordinated to this end." (Belshaw, page 246). Every excuse
was given for making trips to the home area, and the authorities
seem to have tried to restrict the number of persons joining such
expeditions; also, they evidently forbade women to join their
husbands, all no doubt to ensure that people would really return
to camp. In spite of this battle of wits, the period was one of
relatively excellent Orokaiva-White relations. The point is,
however, that the evacuation camps were soon regarded as increasingly
unpleasant and unnecessary.

731 Attitudes also varied according to the distance between
the camps and the home villages. At Cape Killerton and Oro Bay,
[823] the Orokaiva were deeply disturbed at being in foreign territory,
far from their homes, and close to the sea which they particularly
feared. I was told this by all Sangara informants and it is also
stated in Keesing's report. My informants also ascribed sickness
[753] of many people, especially old people, to homesickness. This does
not conform to the medical record, as presented to me verbally by
Dr. Gunther who was personally in charge of medical care in the
[164] camps. Dr. Gunther said there was not much sickness; there were
cases of spinal meningitis and paratyphoid, which he ascribed to
close living together in the camps and which were "not very much
[753] more" frequent than in any camp. It is significant, however,

731] that the Orokaiva explained these cases not by sorcery (as they
[753] regularly do) but by homesickness.

The administration, in any case, seemed to be concerned
about the malaise of refugees kept in coastal camps. All Australian
informants to whom I spoke agreed that it was this malaise (and
pressure by the Orokaiva) which led to a shift of the Eroro Bay
refugees to Popondetta at the earliest opportunity (in April).
A few weeks later they were allowed to go to Irihambo, a new
settlement at the boundary of Sangara territory. Thus, one of
the variables of special significance in the comparative study of
displaced communities--removal from the home territory--was of
minor significance in the case of the Orokaiva. Almost as soon
as the immediate danger of the eruption was passed, people pressed
for a return to their home territory and this pressure was not
[182] resisted for long. If the eruption had a lasting effect on
Orokaiva norms of behaviour and belief, this was not due to
changes of location, but rather to the experience of the disaster
and the unexpected scope of Australian assistance, and to new
residential patterns introduced when the displaced communities
were resettled.

● 657 The government had long followed a policy of consolidating
hamlets and villages, not only in Orokaiva territory but in all
361 parts of Papua. This policy existed long before the government
began to pursue actively its present objectives of social and
economic development. When I asked senior officials of the
administration for the reasons behind this policy, I was always
told that village consolidation made patrolling and the maintenance
of law and order easier and that regulations concerning hygiene,
housing standards, road building were more easily enforced. It
was the practise, well before the eruption, to keep lists showing
the names of all inhabitants of the Orokaiva district. These
lists were subdivided into village lists; a patrol officer visited
(and still visits) each listed village once a year and all the
persons listed as living in that village must then report themselves
present. Deaths and births and marriages are recorded. It seems
to have been the practise for patrol officers to instruct groups
living in small hamlets to join other village units. Thus, in
Sivepe many amalgamations of population groups occurred over the
years and the people claimed that all these amalgamations were
made in response to government instructions. Even if this is not
always strictly true, there is nothing novel in the pressure put
upon Orokaiva after the eruption to go and live in consolidated
villages.

[731] On the other hand, there were several factors favouring such
a development. The first of these was the continued restriction
placed upon residence near the mountain. Even after May, 1951,
there were several thousand Orokaiva who could not return to their
old village sites. The villages where they were settled were

657 either new or of far greater size than before the eruption. Some
361 of these still exist today and still stand out by their unusual
size. When one finds a village with a population of over 200,
731 this is almost invariably (I know of no exceptions myself) a village set up near Mount Lamington after the eruption--either immediately after the eruption, such as the present Mumuni, Awala, Soroputa, Agenahambo, Koipa, or set up a few years later, when most of the restricted area near the volcano was made available for settlement, such as Hohorita, Kiorota, Bagavaturu, Kendata (see Table 2). These more recent villages are made up of people who, immediately after the closing down of the evacuation camps, were placed in resettlement villages such as Irihambo, Koipa, Agenahambo, Kongohambo and then resettled again closer to the mountain when this became possible. In all these cases, the unusually large size of the villages is due purely to government action.

The case of Sivepe, though atypical, may illustrate this. Before release from the Ilimo camp, it was arranged that the Sivepe people would be settled at Awala, which was on the main road and at a respectable distance from the mountain. The Awala people agreed to this; the Sivepe people agreed. Thus they went to Awala and the government intended that they should stay there in a large consolidated village. One of the two main clans now making up Sivepe expressed a strong desire to return home and, as Sivepe was outside the restricted area after May, 1951 (the boundary being at Kongohambo), no objection was made but the consolidation of Sivepe with another village was insisted upon. This did not bring Sivepe anywhere near the size of one of the major resettlement villages, but some measure of consolidation was achieved nonetheless. Here we see the operation of several administrative principles. First, we see the pressure towards large villages; Awala has 250 inhabitants even now; if Sivepe and other villages in the vicinity had been added to it, as had been intended, Awala would now have something like 600 inhabitants. On the other hand, Mr. Kaad, who administered this resettlement, evidently did not believe he should exert very strong pressure. He therefore allowed the settlement of Sivepe and several other villages between Sivepe and Awala. The one Sivepe clan which had stayed behind in Awala in 1951, returned to Sivepe a year later.

We may therefore distinguish two types of post-eruption settlements: (1) very large villages created with government encouragement; (2) medium-sized villages (generally still larger than pre-eruption villages) created with government connivance. What were Orokaiva attitudes to the necessity of this kind of relocation? I find this question hard to answer because the term "necessity" (employed in the questionnaire to which this report is the answer) does not fit what I understand to be Orokaiva logic. Settlements such as Irihambo, Awala, Kongohambo were certainly regarded as "necessary" for the mere reason that the government

657 361 731 (or in the case of Irihambo, the Bishop) had decreed them. Had these people been Westerners rather than Orokaiva, they might have asked themselves the question whether the decision of the government to prohibit the Kongohambo people, for instance, to go and live further East in their old villages was a reasonable one. However, there is nothing self-evident in the asking of such a question. Criticism of an administrative decision is, i.e., a calculation of probabilities, fiduciary responsibilities and expediencies. For the Orokaiva, the problem was not whether the government decision was a "necessary" one, but rather: what was the most advantageous action they could themselves take in the circumstances. The advantages of going back to their old village sites were obvious. [784] But these were clearly outweighed by two grave disadvantages: first, the probability of punishment by Australian authorities and secondly, the chance (to which I shall refer in detail later) that the whole eruption might have been a punishment by the Christian God for their earlier disobedience to government and Church demands, and that further disobedience might elicit a further eruption. It seemed foolhardy indeed to challenge both the government and the mountain at the same time. In this sense, we may confidently say that the Orokaiva felt the necessity of relocation.

361 In the period from January, 1951-1967, the location of the
villages now known as Sivepe and Inonda changed several times. In
[114] the Sivepe area settlements had always been unstable. Rimoldi
has made a valiant attempt to reconstruct shifts of residence from
the time of European contact to the present; involved though his
reconstruction is, it probably tells only part of the story. In
50 years, the groups now represented in Sivepe had between them
been involved in shifts of residence between a series of 14 village
sites within an area of about two square miles adjoining the Sohu
[659] River. It is clear that the government carried out some village
consolidations in the district after the second world war, but
before the eruption. Most of the people now living at Sivepe were,
at that time, shifted to a village called Pamba, which had been
occupied earlier by the Saho clan only. After the eruption, Pamba
was at first reoccupied, but soon the village was shifted almost
a mile away, to a place which was called Sivepe. This new village
(see Map V)[A] differed from the pre-eruption one in layout, method
of house construction and spacing of the dwellings. It conformed
to the model advocated by the administration and observed by the
refugees when they were at Wairopi and Ilimo. In 1965, Sivepe was
shifted to its present site, and higher building standards and
better sanitation were again introduced (see Map VI).[B]

Both these shifts were connected with topographical relation-
[578] ships and social relationships outside the village. The first of
them, in 1952, seems to have been precipitated by a quarrel between
[628] the Timumu clan of Pamba and the resettlement village of Kongohambo,
which then had a population of almost 1,000, over garden damage
caused by pigs. Sivepe was much farther away from Kongohambo than
Pamba. The second shift was in the opposite direction. It was a
move which brought the village closer to the road, closer to the
mission, and the reduced distance from Kongohambo no longer mattered
as this is now a village of average size, with which good relations
exist. The people who lived in Kongohambo in 1952 have returned to
their homes closer to the mountain.

These shifts in village sites are accounted for by almost a
361 superfluity of reasons. Rimoldi was told of almost all the shifts
659 he recorded that they were made upon the instructions of the
government. I was told of shifts that were made because of deaths
attributed to sorcery and because of quarrels between neighboring
361 villages which were too close together for comfort. I witnessed
[628] one shift after a death of an old man where sorcery was not
suspected (as he was old) but being unbaptised he could not be
[954] buried in the Christian cemetery which made people fearful of his
ghost. The population of this village shifted to nearby Hohorita,
[764] a move which was in any case favoured by the government. A reason
[775] that was also sometimes given was that the houses were all old and
the place was becoming unsanitary. A reason never explicitly given,
but perhaps as important as any other is the Orokaiva's dislike for

A [See Cat. 116, p. End Map 5--Analyst]
B [See Cat. 116, p. End Map 6--Analyst]

361 cultivating gardens that are more than a mile or so away from his
village.

When Rimoldi made his careful notes of cultivated gardens,
241 these seemed to be predominantly in the Northeastern part of the
311 village domain. These gardens are ordinarily fallowed for eight
years or so and then cultivated for one season. The gardens in the
Southwestern part of the village domain were undoubtedly being
cultivated shortly after the eruption; they are again being cultivated
today. It therefore seems to make sense that after the eruption
people were living in Pamba, in that part of the domain and that
the new Sivepe is again in that area.

731 Inonda experienced three shifts since the eruption: first
to the vicinity of the airstrip (1951), then to the village
361 described by Crocombe and Hogbin (1955), then to the village where
I myself stayed (established 1964; see Map VII).[A] The pre-eruption
village was just behind this new village, again suggesting an
orderly exploitation of garden land. In 1964, Inonda returned to
garden land that had been fallowed since the eruption. People told
me that before shifting to the present site, they had to walk much
too far to their gardens.

361 While the layout of Pamba was traditional--with the houses
close together and little space between the rows--both post-eruption
657 settlements of Sivepe and all the four post-war Inonda settlements
followed what one may call the Australian standard plan: two fairly
regular parallel rows of equidistant houses facing each other, with
a few houses joining the two rows, thus forming a quadrangle, and
a wide field in the middle, used for playing soccer and basketball
and as a separation of the two "halves" of the village which tend
[364] to belong to different clans. A modern village will contain, in
addition to residences, privies for each family, while some have
[345] built a hall for the women's club, sponsored by the government.
Inonda built a very stylish one, using as a floor a slab of concrete
[575] which the Americans laid down during the war. Sivepe got no further
than the foundations, after which a quarrel blocked progress. In
addition all villages contain a number of arara or jataka--covered
platforms where men sit and receive visitors. Many villages, including
[591] Sivepe, still have a bachelor's house. Typically, each house is
occupied by a two-generation family comprising no more than one
married couple. A stream is always close to the village.

The change in village layout as between Pamba and the two
later Sivepe villages must be discussed in a little more detail as
the eruption was clearly influential here. The Australian government
has long been concerned about village layouts; this interest went
beyond consolidations and included the improvement of housing
657 standards, village sanitation and roads. We find Wilfred Beaver,
in the Annual Report for 1914-15, already claiming that he had
364 "insisted on these three essentials in village life," in the

[A] [See Cat. 116, p. End Map 7--Analyst]

657 Kumusi Division in which both Sivepe and Inonda are situated. It
364 would be wrong, however, to imagine that the tidiness which will
strike a modern visitor to Orokaiva villages may really be ascribed
to resident magistrates and patrol officers. Col. Kenneth McKay
who visited these villages in 1906 reported that he saw village
grounds absolutely bare of grass, being swept so clean that a man
might literally eat his dinner off it (quoted in Monckton, 1922:
[462] 131-132). The sweeping of village grounds as a feminine duty is,
indeed, already a subject of Orokaiva mythology.

364 Beaver, in the report already cited, sets out his concept
of village improvement as follows: "In the old days, doubtless,
361 the people were careful enough not to leave food refuse about the
village for fear of sorcery, but a good cleared space around the
outskirts of the settlement was beyond them. There is certainly a
danger that in maintaining this cleared area the people may be
tempted to build their houses closer together, but I have not yet
found this tendency." (1916: 49). Today, this cleared space around
the outskirts is very sparing, though the privies that have
become customary tend to be a few yards behind the houses and
clearance extends just beyond them. There have, however, been
interesting changes in housing architecture, to which I shall refer
in due course. One significant change in the village "eco-system"
has been the gradual elimination of the pig complex.

342 The Pre-contact house was invariably built with a pig
enclosure so that men and pig spent the night together. The
231 Australians lost no time in imposing the taboos of their own
657 society: they did not object to human symbiosis with dogs; they
even encouraged symbiosis with fowls but regarded symbiosis with
pigs as the height of barbarism. The new house designs made no
provision for them, so that they were left free to sleep under
231 the houses, or elsewhere, as they wished. Since the Local
Government Council was established in 1956, a vigorous campaign
657 was conducted to eliminate them altogether. Thus, Inonda had no
pigs in 1966, except for one which belonged to a Seva man who had
left it with an Inonda man "to look after," and a very little one
that had just been caught in the bush. When the new Sivepe was
established in 1965, it was decided that this would be a pigless
village; the remaining pigs were left in the old village. In
practise, they wandered through the surrounding bush and gardens, so
that it became useful to shoot them all as quickly as possible.
Other villages, however, had not progressed so far in the direction
of the pigless village ideal. Hohorita was indeed nearly pigless
when I visited, but this was perhaps because a feast had been held
there very recently.

657 Belshaw makes the following remarks about village development:
"Before the eruption, a new type of village had been established in
361 the Kokoda sub-district, consisting of a large village square of
neatly clipped grass, with houses arranged in a single row along

657 three sides of it. (Administration) attempts to introduce such
361 villages in the Higaturu sub-district had largely failed and the
standard of housing was much lower. Further, the people of this
area tended to live in small clan-hamlets and resisted propaganda
[731] for them to come together into larger village groups. After the
eruption, however, the general desire for new things, the sense of
[784] guilt at having resisted such innovations before, and a feeling of
insecurity combined to make most of the people reconsider their
earlier decisions. Although the move was not quite universal, by
far the greater proportion of people decided to rebuild their homes
in large village units situated close to existing or proposed jeep
roads, and on administrative advice decided to follow the Kokoda
village plan with substantially improved housing" (1951: 245).

At the time of Belshaw's research the only resettled areas were those West of the Waseta-Sairope line, and the villages Belshaw visited appear to have been in the Sairope area. As it turned out, the Kokoda village plan was in fact adopted in a great many villages in the Higaturu sub-district, though by no means as an immediate result of any decisions that may have been taken at Ilimo. In the Sivepe area, it seems clear that the people's first plan was to return to Pamba and only when Pamba became uncomfortable, partly through quarrels, partly through damage done by the eruption and partly through administration pressure, did they decide to build a new village in the new style. Within a radius of three miles from Sivepe, there are still a considerable number of old-style villages even today: Hamburata, Garombi, Torogota, to mention only three larger ones. Others, such as Duve and Binduta, were beginning to adopt the new style only around the time of my visit in 1966. In 1951, only those villages in which the government took a strong direct interest, such as Awala, Kongohambo, and the villages visited by Belshaw (but I could not enumerate them all) adopted the Kokoda style.

There is also a minor incompleteness in Belshaw's data when he refers to the neatly clipped grass and the rows of houses as being innovations due to the Kokoda influence. The neatly clipped grass was in evidence in 1906 and the regular rows of houses were reported by F. E. Williams (1930: 68). This was, admittedly, reported as late as the 1920's but the layout is consistent with the less explicit descriptions of Orokaiva villages given by Walker (1901) and by Monckton in his descriptions of his battles with the Dobudura and Sangara. The novelty of the Kokoda plan lies rather in the wide central field, the house design and use of materials, and the sanitation.

Undoubtedly, credit for the introduction of the plan must be given to the Ilimo experience but the spreading of the plan over the majority of Orokaiva villages must rather be ascribed to the growing influence of the Local Government Council in the 1960's.

657 Sivepo, as it happens, was one of the villages in which the plan
361 was pioneered.

Finally, I should refer briefly to communications. One
[491] general effect of the eruption was a shifting of villages to the
side of jeep roads, as Belshaw also mentioned. The administration
favoured this trend which greatly facilitated patrolling the
villages. The Orokaiva always seem to have a liking for the
Australian-built roads; Monckton already refers to their fondness
for travelling over it and explains it gave a sense of security
against possible attack by hostile tribes. Though this can hardly
be the reason today, the liking remains. Over the last few years,
the roads have begun to yield economic and practical advantage:
trucks collecting coffee visit the villages and occasionally
people can pick up rides from passing vehicles. Speed of travel
is also improved for pedestrians. I shall discuss ideological
aspects of this liking later.

872 The accessibility of facilities has also improved since
797 the eruption. Sivepe children now all go to the school at the
Sasembata mission station which teaches up to Standard 6. Inonda
children were first introduced to schooling after the eruption
when the Seva people joined them accompanied by a mission teacher.
[368] After this mission teacher retired, Inonda was dependent on a
school at Hohota. Only a few children went to this school because
it was six miles away, across a deep river, but today, after
the building of a new road and a bridge, and the latest shift of
Inonda village, this distance has been reduced to about three
miles and school attendance is regular.

The eruption changes the centre of gravity of the district.
368 The pre-eruption settlements of Higaturu and Sangara contained all
731 governmental and mission facilities, including the hospital and
the schooling past Standard 2. Sivepe's link with these facilities
was by a bush track running through Isivita. Today, Popondetta is
the centre, but the hospital is at Saiho, the senior college near
Agenahambo, the Local Government Council in the new Higaturu, near
[491] Agenahambo. Thus the main road to Popondetta, now greatly improved,
has become the main artery. Nonetheless, for those who have to
walk, the bush tracks from Sivepe to Saiho, Awala and Agenahambo
are still important thoroughfares used by many dozen people every
day.

Section 4: Resources

423 I have already referred to the main resource, owned by the
311 Orokaiva, which is their land. The Sivepe people own only about
480 acres, almost entirely gardening land, and very little of
their land is in virgin bush. This small area is useful for certain

423 "look after" the land was passed on to the daughters' sons, who
613 now hold it. This arrangement is something like a perpetual,
inheritable usehold, but should the lineage of the useholders die
428 out, the land would revert to the Tandai'undi, as Crocombe and
Hogbin point out. Furthermore, should the present occupants decide
to settle elsewhere, the land would again revert to Tandai'undi.
They have residuary rights and, as Crocombe and Hogbin again point
out, they are not alone to have them, for another neighboring
group (the Urio people) likewise have residuary rights. In these
circumstances it is understandable that, for instance, the people
of Inonda would be most concerned if they were forced to settle,
even temporarily, away from their own lands.

We find the same pattern in Sivepe. First of all, the blocks
of land over which individuals had perpetual useholds contained,
in almost every case, some blocks which had not been inherited
through the patriline. Secondly, even those blocks which had been
so inherited were often held in common with others belonging to
a different village and nowadays counting themselves as belonging
to a different clan, even though agnatic links could sometimes be
731 traced. On the day of the eruption, or within the four days
following it, both Sivepe and the closely allied villages were
361 evacuated, and they were together at Ilimo. When the camp was
423 disbanded, a large resettlement village was established in Kongohambo,
on land belonging, at least in part, to Sivepe villagers of the
Seho clan. Almost 1,000 people were settled there so that garden
land in the vicinity of Kongohambo became very highly prized.
Meanwhile, the government desired to resettle the Sivepe people in
Awala. It seems that the Sivepe people did stay in Awala for
three months, after which the Jegase and Timumu clan groups
received permission to return to their land in Sivepe. The third
Sivepe clan group, Seho, stayed on in Awala, but planted gardens
in the Sivepe area.

At this point, the Seho people evidently felt reasonably secure; a year later, however, they joined the other clans in Pamba and together built the new village of Sivepe. When I asked Seho informants why they had returned they told me it was because of fear of losing their land. Now this danger did not come from the other Sivepe clans, who were mostly affines of the Seho people and whose return to their home village evidently caused no great concern to the Seho people in 1951. The danger came from Kongohambo which adjoined the Seho lands. Some Kongohambo people had residual rights over some of this land; if the Seho people did not return, they would undoubtedly have had some trouble in getting it back.

The government, though aware of this possibility, had
[657] imagined that Sivepe people would not be too concerned, seeing
that they had been offered garden land at Awala. Government reasoning
can be traced from the discussions by Belshaw and Keesing and also
from a long memorandum by Plant (see bibliography), a public servant

731 with some knowledge of anthropology. All these authors, following
F. E. Williams, had the impression that Orokaiva clans are corporate
361 groups and that the local clan groups are segments of these. Thus,
Plant and the others imagined that the Jegase of Sui (near Awala)
423 would share their land without reservations with the Jegase of
Sivepe, that the Seho of Awala would share their land with the Seho
657 of Sivepe, and so on. The Orokaiva, however, knew that their
position in the resettlement villages would be weak indeed unless
they retained their own village holdings. This weakness will
become more apparent from my discussion of the resettlement village
of Mumuni in a later chapter.

628 The closely allied villages, therefore, are not only a source
of cooperation but also competition. Seho returned and had no
423 trouble reasserting their rights; they accepted with good grace
that their neighbors had built their village partly on Seho land
and that the mission station had partly been built on it, but they
jealously guarded the rest of their holdings. Let us now consider
the specific variables listed in the previous section.

628 Transactions between members of closely allied villages
occur in kinship and friendship roles; decisions affecting the
villages as corporate groups are taken at a meeting where all adult
men of the affected villages are present, and have a right to
speak. Visits between the villages by individuals occurred almost
every day; formal meetings involving Sivepe and one of the closely
allied villages occurred, for one reason or another, about once a
month. The occasion might be a death, a bride price, a minor
dispute, some government or council or church project. Contacts
were equally close between young and old, males and females.
Meetings occurred in the villages, or, more casually, outside
[578] them. There is much affection between people of closely allied
villages and one finds that disputes between them, though giving
rise to a great deal of heated oratory, are not rashly allowed to
get out of hand. The disputes I witnessed were all resolved amicably
and serious breaches carefully avoided. On the other hand, neighboring
[574] villages were always treated with much reserve. Before the eruption,
they never ate together except under the formal conditions of a
feast; even today, when a feast is held at the mission station for
all the villages in the parish, each village sits apart in a separate
group. When people from different villages eat together in a formal
feast, each village house has its own little group of guests, who
are either kinsmen or in a partnership relation. Transactions between
such persons nonetheless have a greater fiduciary element than
[754] transactions with other outsiders. Sorcery between closely allied
villages occurs, but only, so I was told, by the employment of a
professional sorcerer from a more distant village. No Garombi man
would act as sorcerer, so I understand, to kill a Sivepe man, but
men from Isoge or Kendata could be found for such a service.

628 Although these contacts were confined to relatively few villages, their part in village life was by no means insignificant. Some of these contacts arose out of affinal links and maternal links; others arose out of residual land rights held in these more distant villages. Unless an annual visit is made such rights are
[631] apt to be extinguished. Only in one specific case--the marking out of the boundaries of the lower Sasembata local government council ward--was the contact between these villages a direct result of modern administrative exigencies.

628 I have already mentioned that Sivepe shared some land
423 boundaries with Soroputa and Agenahambo; these boundaries lay North of the Sohu River and were fairly indefinite. The blocks North of the river were used by Sivepe people of Soroputa ancestry, men with Soroputa or Agenahambo wives resident in Sivepe, and so on. The blocks were far away from the new Soroputa land Agenahambo
[659] villages and therefore not cultivated except by Sivepe people. It was only in 1967 that the local government council decided that the boundaries of wards should be properly laid out and surveyed, as a first step to title improvement within the wards. The people of Sivepe, Agenahambo and Soroputa therefore had to meet together to agree upon the definition of boundaries which hitherto were allowed to shift as expediencies (such as marriages, migrations) arose.

It was rather interesting to compare how this boundaries problem was handled between different villages. The eastern boundary of the lower Sasembata ward was in fact the boundary between Sivepe and Kongohambo. These villages were in very close contact with each other, shared many kinship links, had mourned each other's dead and had feasted each other. When the boundaries had to be defined, the Sivepe men simply walked to Kongohambo with their bush knives, had a brief meeting with the Kongohambo men (half an hour, no more) and proceeded to cut the boundary. The principles by which they established their landmarks are irrelevant here. On the other hand, Soroputa was handled in a gingerly manner. A small delegation was sent, two men who "originally" came from Soroputa, who actually owned the land on the boundary, and who had kept in regular contact with Soroputa. It was felt that Soroputa might refuse if anyone else was sent. This choice of ambassadors was especially interesting as there had been an "election" for an organising committee to determine these boundaries. Though this committee consisted of one man each from Sivepe, G rombo, Binduta and Isoge, the delegation that sent to Soroputa and Agenahambo was sent by the Sivepe representative and did not include a single representative, elected for this task.

628 This incident provides a good example of the role of the mediator which is crucially important in all inter-village contacts except those where alliance is very close. The two men sent on this delicate mission had no special qualifications except their

628 village. Williams, in marking out his "Waseta tribe," with Waseta 619 at the centre, excluded the Soroputa people from this "tribe" (vide Map X)[A] but "intra-group morality" definitely prevailed [266] between Soroputa and neighboring Sivepe. There never were cannibalistic raids between these two villages, which included each other in their "intra-group morality" circle.

It so happens that the people who were brought together at Ilimo consisted preponderantly of members of what Williams called the "Waseta tribe." The only bonds existing between the members of this tribe were the individual kinship and friendship networks and the solidarity of "intra-group morality" circles. The camp was built as a set of separate villages, each under its own village constable, eating and living separately, though more [572] closely together than formerly. I obtained from a number of Sivepe men a list of "friends" and inquired into the occasion when the [582] friendship started; in no case did it start at Ilimo. On the other hand, the camps led to a number of marriages between people from different villages. This tendency was especially pronounced at Hohorita, which is understandable as so many refugees had lost their families during the eruption. In Sivepe I found one case of a man who married an Agenahambo woman whom he met at Ilimo.

731 If "tribal" solidarity was dubious before the Ilimo camp period, (the atmosphere of an evacuation camp was certainly not 628 a suitable one for developing it. Both Belshaw and Keesing 619 emphasize the anxiety of the inhabitants, their strong desire to return to their home villages, while I have also emphasized their distrust of "others" who might wish to occupy their land; these "others" would inevitably be other members of the Waseta "tribe," although perhaps the Europeans were likewise suspected of predatory aims. (For such suspicion, I do not, however, have evidence.)

A sense of district solidarity did tend to grow up after the eruption, but [illegible] can be traced to formal organisations in which Orokaiva occupied roles which brought them into contact with people from other villages. Sometimes these were élite roles, which will be considered below; sometimes they were roles open to anyone, such as that of worker in paid employment, patient in a hospital, pupil in a secondary or advanced primary school, participant in a large-scale public celebration, such as were held in Popondetta and Saiho.

657 The government is actively attempting to create among the Orokaiva larger solidary units than existed in the past. We may 571 thus explain the various attempts that are made to bring Orokaiva people together in the local government council, at numerous sports meetings and celebrations such as at Christmas and New Year, and by any other expedient means. Without the popular acceptance of the local government council the establishing of a land boundary between Sivepe and Soroputa or Agenahambo, to stay with my previous example, would have been hard to imagine. Yet it

[A] [See Cat. 116, p. End Map 9--Analyst]

657 was accomplished without any European power bearer making his
appearance and any sense of compulsion being created--the people
571 clearly considered the boundaries advocated by the government to be
in the popular interest. Yet the bonds of solidarity this being
formed do not strengthen the unity of the so-called Waseta tribe
but the unity of the Higaturu council area as a whole.

In this section I have said little about Inonda, because
628 I did not have time to clarify what "tribe" Inonda really belongs.
619 Williams' tribal map shows Inonda as Sausha; Crocombe and Hogbin
[114] describe Sausha, quite correctly, as a clan resident near the
settlement of Dobuduru (where the people speak a different dialect,
presumably that which Williams called Dirou). Clearly, the task
of establishing "tribal" units in this district would need to be
done again, if it is worth doing at all, which I doubt, for reasons
already given.

Section 5: Contacts With Other Orokaiva

628 Generally, contacts outside the "Waseta tribe" are sparse.
During the year, only one visit was made to Sivepe, in a kinship
[582] context, by persons from another district. This was a group from
Kokoda, where a Sivepe man married 40 or more years ago, and the
[574] visit was from that man's children. Several Sivepe persons quoted
as an ancestor a woman from Ajoro, a village close to Inonda. It
turned out that all these linkages were due to one single event,
namely the capture by the Isivita people of three Ajoro women
during a raid. Two of these found their way to Garombi where they
[424] married; the third woman's son came to live in Sivepe. Descendants
of the Sivepe men continue to exercise each year their hunting
rights at Ajoro. I could not find other references to ancestors
[572] beyond the "Waseta tribe" apart from these. Some people mentioned
a friend, but rarely more than one, who came from another "tribal"
district. Often these friends were found during employment, or at
the mission school, or they were persons with special roles in
mission or government, who had come to the Sasembata district in
the course of their jobs. When women had such friends, it was more
[526] often due to a kinship link. An interesting example of the extending
of such links under modern conditions occurred when a man from
Sasembata village, employed in Kokoda, invited a number of fellow
workers to Sasembata for a football game. These men were likewise
in Kokoda for employment and came from the Aiga district.

[657] When the members of the "Waseta tribe" were accomodated at
[731] Ilimo, they were not only the guests of the government which
[574] supplied food and other comforts, but also of the people of Ilimo
village who had agreed to the camp being established. From the
little I could find out about relationships between hosts and

628 guests, it appears that they were friendly but rather formal. As
574 will be shown later, all arrangements in connection with Ilimo
camp were made between the government and the Ilimo people; the
731 Orokaiva had no forms of organisation, in 1951, through which the
refugees could have negotiated directly with Ilimo. The hosts
[657] generously supplied food, grew extra food in special plots,
provided abundant building material from their land, and a site
for the camp and helped with the preparation of the camp while
the evacuees still lived at Wairope, in return for which the
government made various gifts which Ilimo evidently regarded as
adequate payment. At no point, during the existence of the camp,
did the refugees develop an organisation which dealt directly with
the Ilimo people. Thus, the only contact between hosts and guests
was on a social level.

The camp was built at some little distance from the village.
Refugees who had friends and relations in Ilimo used to go over to
the village and visit them. There was for instance, at the time
of the eruption, one Sivepe man resident at Ilimo; thus some Sivepe
people paid visits to the village. There was an Easter celebration
at the camp to which the village people came. When the camp broke
up, the government gave a feast to the Ilimo people, on behalf of
the evacuees, in the usual Orokaiva style.

If we wish to answer the question to what extent contact
121 between different "tribal" groups (or distant groups) of Orokaiva
has become more intensive since the eruption, we cannot confine
ourselves to contacts occurring in villages such as Sivepe or
Ilimo. Here the pattern suggested in the previous pages has hardly
[178] changed. The changes have occurred by the development of new
organisations (to which I shall refer later) through labour migration
and through urban development.

As I am at present discussing only unorganised contacts
464 between villagers, I can give only one clear instance of changing
166 attitudes and this is in Popondetta itself. Popondetta, the new
administrative centre of the Northern District, has about 4,000
633 inhabitants, almost all Orokaiva; among its inhabitants all parts
of the Northern District are represented, including Sivepe. The
[162] Sivepe people had many relatives there, mostly hailing from the
Sasembata district, and employed in some regular job in the town.
These jobs are partly in personal service to Europeans, but also
in light industry, the retail trade, public works and public service,
and go far beyond the little employment that was available in pre-eruption
Higaturu (with a population which, judging from aerial
photographs, can hardly have exceeded that of a large village).
484 Popondetta is preeminently the place where intelligent men from
various villages can gather informally to discuss political and other
521 public questions, and develop a wider interpretation of the situation
633 of the Orokaiva which is learnt by the men from the villages when
they pay occasional visits to Popondetta. The town generates a new

484 sophistication which is spreading to the villages. This was not
521 yet very evident in Sivepe, though I shall later quote a few
633 examples, but far more so in Hohorita.

All the Orokaiva, including the people of Sivepe, liked to make occasional visits to Popondetta, even though they had little business there. They saw relatives and exchanged news with people they met around town, especially outside the Steamship Co. shop. News filtered down about the mission, the administration, the coffee factory and various current ideologies were communicated. The Inonda men visited more frequently than the Sivepe men; the women visited less frequently than the men.

I had little chance to observe relationships between Orokaiva
609 and Papuans and New Guineans from outside the Northern District,
619 except when these served in some official or mission capacity. The
only exception was the workers on European-owned plantations. I observed one incident at Hohorita which seemed to me highly significant. The Sangara plantation, which is very close to Hohorita, employs many Chimbu; bad feeling between plantation workers and villagers had been built up over some time, without any specific major issue of conflict. This culminated in a fight on a major scale. The Hohorita councillor went over to the plantation to make peace; the discussion ended with an invitation to the Chimbu to come to a feast at Hohorita. This feast was a success and was followed by a return feast at the plantation. Thus the Chimbu were placed on the same footing as other groups, at one time hostile, with whom feasting relations had been established, e.g., Sivepe and Togahou. Hohorita people whom I interviewed explained to me that when they quarreled with the Chimbu, they did not really know them, but they were friends now.

Section 6: Contacts With Indigenous Office-Bearers

Among the victims of the eruption were 143 Papuan administration
731 servants as well as 27 Papuan constabulary, who died at Higaturu
along with the 46 European civil servants stationed there. The Mission was somewhat fortunate that Martyrs' School at Sangara was still closed for the holidays; the pupils and some of the staff had not yet returned. Even so only 11 Papuan mission teachers survived, including the present Bishop of the Northern District Diocese, George Ambo, the priest at Sasembata, Fr. Albert McLaren, and the now retired mission teacher at Seva, later at Inonda, Moses Kusmale.

657 At the time of the eruption, a certain number of new roles
177 had already become firmly established among Papuans: member of the
Royal Papuan Constabulary, Village Constable, Mission Teacher,
647 Medical Orderly, Clerk, Labourer. Post-war government policy aimed
at greatly increasing the number and scope of these roles, both by

177 instituting numerous training programmes for the development of
657 skills hitherto unknown to Papuans, and by setting up organisations
657 in which Papuans wield a limited amount of political and administrative
647 responsibility. It suffices, for my present purpose, to enumerate
modern roles, performed by Papuans, with which the people of Sivepe
came into contact during the year of my field study.

[779] In the church, Papuans now play not only the role of mission teacher, but also of priest (as Fr. Albert McLaren) and Bishop (as the Most Rev. George Ambo). Fr. Albert was the priest of the local parish, while the Bishop paid one visit to the district during the year, namely for the consecration of the church at Duve, a great formal occasion attended by at least 1,000 people, from the whole of the Sasembata district.

[625] Village constables exist no longer, but their place has been taken by the Local Government Council. Two of the councillors were regular visitors at Sivepe; the sanitary inspector appointed by the council, who lived at Garombi, came even more frequently, while many Sivepe people had occasion, during the year, to visit the Council chambers at Higaturu, where all officials are Papuan, with the exception of one European who acts as Advisory Officer to the Council and also as Magistrate for Native Court cases. Locally we had an officer named "Committee," which meant that he was a member of a committee appointed by the local councillor to enforce council regulations in the villages. Each village has one committee member whose tasks are not unlike those of the village constable, though the concept of the role is rather different, and will be discussed below.

[759] While the only medical role allotted to Papuans at the time of the eruption was that of orderly, nowadays there are Papuan physicians, two of them in the Northern District. One of them is medical officer for the district and the other, a woman, is attached to the hospital at Saiho. An increasing number of Papuans are being trained as Assistant Medical Officer, a five-year course. One of the graduates was attached to the mission hospital and aid post at Sasembata. Aid posts have been established by the government in many Orokaiva villages and manned by aid post orderlies who were trained in the Saiho Aid Post Training School. Inonda village is served by an orderly trained under this scheme (stationed at Hohota, three miles away), but the training scheme has been discontinued in favour of a more efficient scheme. The training of Papuan nurses started in 1958 while nursing aide training has started more recently. In addition to general training, these nurses are given an intensive course in maternal and child health.

[875] The same movement into senior statuses was characteristic of Papuan educational personnel. First, the training given to mission teachers before the eruption was in the main ecclesiastical, while in the Northern District in 1966, 39% had been through at least one year of formal teacher training; a smaller number had obtained a

177 higher certificate after a two-year course, while various teacher
training programmes were involving a number of them. Furthermore,
657 the inspector in charge of the school and, after January, 1967, also
647 the District Inspector of Schools was a Papuan. Thus, in the Church
as well as in the Health and Education Department, Papuans were in
[895] actual administrative control over Northern District operations,
with white personnel nominally their subordinates. The term
"nominally" must be applied to the relative rank of Papuan controllers
and expatriate subordinates, because the latter are still receiving
a very much higher salary. Nonetheless, the new situation definitely
sets up a hierarchy, with Papuans at senior levels, and the village
people are in official contact with them.

I shall give two further examples of contacts with Papuan
[631] public servants. The first was with a clerk sent out by the
Department of Lands, whose task it was to organise the establishment
of boundaries between the wards. This man was an Orokaiva, from
Jegarata, who explained the purpose of the boundaries in the Orokaiva
language, at a meeting held in Garombi and supposedly attended by
all the villages in the ward. A spirited discussion took place,
the people suggested village representatives, the clerk accepted
the representatives proposed for Sivepe and Garombi, but was non-
committal over the other two, as he saw Isoge and Binduta were
[276] insufficiently represented. He chewed betelnut with the people;
the whole procedure was matter-of-fact and businesslike, and no
covering-up was attempted for the two ill-represented villages.
[191] The absence of an interpreter, the use of Orokaiva instead of the
lingua franca (Motu), the free use of betelnut, the fact that we
all sat on mats together--all this established an easy bridge
between government and people.

During the same period, a good deal of agricultural extension
242 work was in progress in the nearby village of Sasembata. Here
177 again, the day-to-day instruction was given by two Northern District
Papuans, agricultural assistants, in a rather more junior position
to the Lands Department clerk. These two young men were definitely
supervised by an expatriate officer; they were staying in Sasembata
village for awhile and came over to Sivepe one night for a small
feast and a dance. Though they were both Aiga, they mixed easily
with their Orokaiva agemates, on a basis of equality and familiarity.
They were the guests of a third agricultural assistant, who belonged
to Sasembata village but were working for the Department at Saiho.
This young man gave me a description of the scope of agricultural
development (a rubber cooperative) proceeding in Sasembata. He had
a mature and responsible understanding of the project.

Finally, Papuan government drivers had highly significant
657 though informal contacts with villagers. These men, highly skilled
647 at negotiating the difficult roads of the Northern District, have
the task of driving government personnel where they wish to go and
177 often travel unaccompanied by officers to collect personnel or cargo.

657 647 177 employed rather widely over the last decade or so, they have a responsible job, for which the qualifications include a reasonably high standard of education. In Orokaiva eyes, these men enjoy high status, as they have permanent, relatively highly paid positions and above all, because they control one of the most coveted European resources, namely motor transport. [499] They very often have the power to offer transport to Orokaiva travellers; their favours are eagerly sought; they carefully choose the men for whom they will stop on the road: kinsmen, residents of closely related villages, other men of high status.

Orokaiva accord high status to all Papuan employees of the government and the missions; one of the main reasons why men become, for instance, mission teachers is the high status they thus acquire in the villages where they are posted. This is so in spite of their very low pay; only recently has this low pay begun to deter recruits--due to the greater availability of higher-paid non-manual jobs for [875] Papuans. Mission teachers at Sasembata still regard themselves as aristocrats, who will speak somewhat deprecatingly of "the village people" and address them with some slight condescension. The best of them are most valuable as educators, not only in the religious sphere, but also through their knowledge of the outside world which they spread through their friendships with congenial villagers in the parish. They will also spread knowledge of elements of the culture of their own district, e.g., dances and songs, which are easily introduced into local repertoires. Most of the Sasembata mission teachers come from the Motu-speaking coastal district. [797] One problem with the mission stations has been, especially on the larger stations, that they develop into a sort of village of their own, a tight community with a deep conviction of its own superiority, not only because it is a mission village, but also because it is a Motu village and the Motu regard the Orokaiva as barbarians.

All the functionaries discussed so far are directly under the control of Australian institutions--the government and the church. The second category to be considered are Papuans playing roles for which they are elected or appointed by other Papuans. Within this category fall the members and officers of the Higaturu Local Government Council, the directors and manager of the coffee producers' cooperative, the local Member of the House of Assembly. None of these roles existed at the time of the eruption; they were created as part of the Australian policy, inaugurated in the 1950's, of preparing Papuans for at least local self-government and limited management of their own affairs. Though the views expressed by these officials hardly differed from those of the Government and Mission men, the Orokaiva received them much more warmly in their villages. Especially the councillors had to ingratiate themselves, their office being elective, and they handed cigarettes around. They were trusted far more than the government officials because the villagers felt they had some power over them; they were given local information withheld from the others.

657 Though most of the contacts between village people and the
647 office-bearers arise out of official roles, the local priest, the
177 assistant medical officer in charge of the Sasembata mission
hospital, the mission teachers, the council's sanitary officer and
others who lived near Sivepe, or temporarily stayed near Sivepe,
tended to have at least one or two families with whom they were on
mutual visiting terms and who regarded them as personal friends.
At the same time, their relationship with many of the other Sivepe
families remained definitely formal.

Contacts occurred almost always either in Sivepe or in a
village nearby, on the initiative of the office-bearer (if the contact
was official). Formal visits by councillors, sanitary inspector,
[797] coffee factory officers occurred about once monthly. Contacts with
Church personnel occurred almost daily at the mission station,
though formal calls by the priest or a teacher to Sivepe were made
perhaps once a month, usually in connection with some quarrel that
[757] had arisen. The village was most active in its contacts with the
mission hospital, several patients presenting themselves daily with
minor ailments. Serious cases were often referred to Saiho hospital
[743] and most of the referred cases actually went to Saiho. There was a
[758] monthly visit from nurses dealing with infant health and expectant
mothers; most of the mothers took their babies to be checked and
weighed and no objections were made to preventive injections.

There were no cases, in Sivepe, of inter-marriage between
[582] local people and Papuans occupying these specialized roles, but in
Inonda one man married the mission teacher's daughter. Otherwise,
contacts of the type described in this section were sparser in
Inonda, as the mission and medical establishment was at Hohota,
[232] three miles away, and on a far smaller scale. Inonda did have some
direct contact with government over agricultural matters as one
man expressed interest in entering an experimental scheme for
growing beef cattle. He has adquate land and education, but the
scheme had not gone beyond initial discussions by the time I left.
[499] Finally, Inonda had an arrangement with a Papuan who was a distant
affine and who had a truck with which he took garden produce weekly
from Inonda to the Embi hospital. The village people paid this
man for his cartage. No comparable arrangement existed in Sivepe.
Finally, contact with the officers of the Local Government Council
seemed to me less frequent in Inonda than in Sivepe and to generate
much less interest. This was no doubt due to rivalries between the
village leader and the councillor, but also to a less keen interest
in council objectives on the part of the majority of families.

The contacts described in this section, unlike the ones
177 discussed earlier, do not characteristically occur in a kinship
context. Hence, the contacts do not necessarily occur equally with
all categories of members of the community, but when the problems
have to do with land or politics or the conduct of village affairs,
the married men are principally concerned; in educational matters

177 the people. He was the only white man in the district (omitting
the anthropologists) who actually did this. Finally, some people
[464] of Sasembata district were familiar with *taupa* as workers and in
personal service, as cookboys, housegirls, etc. outside the village.

The only *taupa* residents in the district were the head
[875] teacher and his wife; they had daily personal contact with village
people especially because they bought vegetable produce for the
[439] mission, while people also approached them with a multitude of
minor problems, e.g., pressure lamps that did not work, troubles at school, help needed with sports or the sewing programme of the women's club, etc. Most Sivepe men and nearly all the women were too shy to approach them. The head teacher used the Papuan priest as an intermediary when he had to approach Sivepe men when help was needed for school buildings, or when land was needed for the gardens of the mission teachers. The other *taupa* came to the district no more often than once or twice a year; the doctor attended patients only at Saiho; the magistrate sat at Higaturu; the nearest white planter was at Awala.

657 Characteristically, contact between the taupa and villagers
occurs either through the mediation of Papuan functionaries--and
177 it is thus that basic ideas are mostly communicated to Orokaiva
leaders and groups--or directly, when taupa finds it inexpedient to
[242] delegate decisions on problems affecting individuals. This tendency
to deal with individuals rather than leaders or corporate groups
is self-evident from the roles of many taupa (educational, medical, judicial) but I noticed it also in, for instance, agricultural extension work. Here the emphasis was on the educating of individual growers. The administration is not in favour of cooperative cash-cropping ventures, so that dealings are of necessity mostly with individuals. When it is desired to indoctrinate groups, the most useful channel at the present time is the Higaturu Council, so that the taupa's message reaches the people through an Orokaiva intermediary. The patrol officer, when visiting a village, for instance for census purposes, tends to deal with his audience in three types of ways: (a) he deals directly with the "committee" for the formal arrangements of calling the people together and to obtain what facilities he needs for his work; (b) he makes a speech expressing the desires of the government, to the assembled people; (c) he addresses individually those individuals against whom he has complaints, and he does this in front of the assembled people. These individuals, on the occasion I witnessed, received a reprimand, but they might also be arrested and jailed. This kind of meeting is held yearly in every village.

Undoubtedly, the patrol officer consults both with the councillor and the committee member in charge of the village. It was clear from his treatment of the complaints on his list that he had not only consulted, but also trusted these two local leaders. The cases with which he dealt were all connected with the policy of

657 177 closing up old isolated hamlets and moving the inhabitants to the larger, more modern-looking villages. The patrol officer's speech to the assembled people was intended to encourage increased cash-cropping activity. The patrol officer was young and not very well informed; some of the suggestions he made (e.g., that the people should busy themselves selling produce at the Saiho and Popondetta markets) were based on unrealistic assumptions about the lucrativeness and volume of trade at these markets, and provoked no more than an indulgent smile. As the patrol officers usually are young men of limited experience, the government is wise in depending, in its efforts to arouse enthusiasm for economic development, not on these officers but on the structure of the local government councils. Thus the most crucial European role, from the viewpoint of development, becomes the advisory officer to the council through whom development ideology must flow to the villages. In 1967, the government acknowledged the unusual significance of the work of these advisory officers by setting up a special training course for them with the School of Pacific Administration at Sydney. I did not have the opportunity to see the work of these trained officers, as none had graduated by the time I left.

In all matters the ultimate initiators of contacts were the Europeans who, after all, had set up the institutions for which their roles were required. Some of these institutions depended, however, for their survival on the voluntary support of the Orokaiva. This is true not only for the schools and churches, but also for the courts which depended on information laid by councillors and private aggrieved individuals. Similarly, the agricultural officer depended on people freely coming to him to ask for rubber trees, coffee trees, etc.

In some respects, the pattern of these contacts differs today from what it was in the early period of colonialisation. While a local government councillor reports infractions of council rules to a Native Court voluntarily, this voluntary principle did not exist before the local government and could be punished for not reporting infractions of the law. Rubber and coffee were planted, not voluntarily by individual but compulsorily, every village having the duty to plant a certain number of trees every year. It was only after the second world war that the government began systematically to seek from the Orokaiva not forced compliance but voluntary cooperation. Even today, it is not always easy to know whether contacts with Europeans are the result of choice or compulsion.

Let us take the case of two Sivepe men whose houses were not up to the standard of the rest of the village. In the end the "committee" forced them to build according to the rules. This man was motivated far more by pride in his village and desire to demonstrate his power than by fear of the government; nonetheless, he could secure compliance only by reporting the cases to the councillor and a threat to lay a complaint with the patrol officer. The ultimate sanction to which he appealed was thus a court conviction and jail sentence (no less!) impose by Australian authority. There was also the motivation that the patrol

657 officer, observing the offending houses, might charge the "committee"
with dereliction of duty. This could not be taken lightly as some
177 years earlier, in the days of the village constables, a negligent
constable might find himself deposed and even jailed. (How frequently
this actually happened I do not know, but the fear was still there.)
The situation seems essentially ambiguous: willing cooperation and
compulsion are both present.

177 As may be expected, contacts between Orokaiva and taupa are
perceived totally differently by both parties. The European has two
609 kinds of concept foreign to the Orokaiva, namely the concept of a
formal organisation by which long-term fiduciary relationships can be
established on an affectively neutral basis; and the concept of welfare
objectives pursued by these organisations on the basis of universalistic
values. The Orokaiva had no difficulty in trusting a European to
fulfill fiduciary obligations if he had a close personal relationship
with him, and likewise he would expect such a European to have an
interest in his welfare, but as I have shown, such closeness was
extremely rare in Sivepe. It was just unthinkable, to the Orokaiva,
that an official casually visiting the village was truly interested in
their welfare, because the Orokaiva could not see any reason why such
an official should have such an interest. Clearly, the official was
thought to come in the pursuit of his own, or his organisation's
advantage. The patrol officer came to punish people who did not obey
the law. I was told by informants that it did not greatly matter
what one said to him as long as it stopped him from punishing people.
The same was true, in one way or another, for most taupa, except some
of those one knew well.

177 All men and women of Sivepe were asked what Europeans they knew
or had known; the answers to this question were especially interesting
because of the omissions. None of the persons listed in this section
as being in contact with Sivepe people were ever mentioned--not even
the head teacher and his wife. Anthropologists who had been in the
village earlier were mentioned by many men and women, past employers
were mentioned if the job was in the employer's home or if both employer
and employee lived on the premises (e.g., in a hospital). The other
contacts were left unmentioned, not because informants were uncooperative,
but because these contacts did not fall within any of their categories
of social intercourse. If I had asked specifically: "Has any European
ever weighed your vegetables?", predictably some vegetable-weighers
would have been listed, assuming that their names were remembered.

The relationships at Ilimo camp form a striking contrast to this general picture. This was obvious at once in the interviews as the name of, for instance, Mr. Kaad, is remembered by everybody, as are also a few other names, though less widely. There was hardly an informant who had been to Ilimo and who did not report, in one context or another, the activities of Mr. Kaad. Never once was he referred to in the accounts as "the taupa" or "the officer." When I interviewed Mr. Kaad in Sydney, he likewise felt that the kind of relationships between

177 Orokaiva and whites developed at Ilimo were rather unusual. He quoted other Europeans making remarks to him such as that the experience "drew us all much closer together." A planter who was helping the organisation and staying in the camp commented that the people came to talk to him far more often than before.

177 There were altogether some 14 Europeans attached to Ilimo--two
medical assistants, two nurses, two government teachers, one agricultural
● 657 expert and the others administration workers, mission workers, etc.
Mr. Kaad, though himself a Roman Catholic, made it a rule for the whole European staff, including himself, to attend the daily religious services, "to show the people we were with them." Food distributions were made daily through the village constables, blankets and medical supplies were available as needed, adult education classes were almost daily organised for both men and women, the agricultural officer demonstrated techniques and supervised the gardening programme, the Isivita people from Oro Bay were brought over to reunite families, and Kaad himself began to speak in favour of economic development in the future. Even such a bald summary indicates a far more intensive contact with Europeans at Ilimo than the Orokaiva generally experienced either before or since.

[829] Kaad's own comments place this experience in its proper perspective. He remarked that Ilimo camp showed the government in a good light, and that people responded especially when they found that they could go back to their villages. This comment indicates that the generous gifts of the Australian government did not, by themselves, lead to a removal of the Orokaiva fears and suspicions of Orokaiva motives. One question in people's minds was whether the government, having given the food and other comforts, would now feel entitled to seize land near the volcano. It was only when this suspicion proved unfounded that relations became genuinely warm, for only then were people sure that they were not the victims of trickery.

From our own knowledge of Australian administration we can easily
see that Orokaiva fears of land alienation were wholly unfounded but, on
the basis of their knowledge, the Orokaiva reasoned perfectly logically.
[431] First of all, it is regular Orokaiva custom, when one makes gifts, to
have in mind a claim one wishes to make for a return gift. Thus,
having accepted Australian gifts, the Orokaiva were naturally anxious to
[423] find out what would be demanded in return. Furthermore, the fear that
the Australians might demand land which was unoccupied and uncultivated
was based on past experience and on provisions actually on the Statute
Book (Native Plantation Ordinance 1925-1934, repealed in 1960).
According to this ordinance, land could be alienated where there appears
to be no owner and also for the purpose of "technical education of
natives in agriculture." It is a matter of historical fact that the
Australians acquired some choice land in the Orokaiva district under
these provisions prior to the second world war. (Information: P.
Sebire.)

177 657 423 If we analyse the reasons why the Australian government would never have used these ordinances in the circumstances of 1951, we find that these reasons lie principally in Western notions of government responsibility for victims of disasters and other values of Western Civilisation, restraining cupidity, and held more strongly that the Orokaiva, on the basis of their information, could have taken for granted. I myself found, and Mr. Sebire confirmed, that the Orokaiva even today are extremely familiar with the provisions of this old ordinance, and that they still fear it, even though it has been repealed some years ago.

177 657 731 The episode at Ilimo therefore undoubtedly did much to increase confidence in Australian intentions. Mr. Kaad stated to me that the main ultimate purpose of the camp administration was to teach new skills and a new way of life. Under camp conditions, there was a good opportunity to teach these new skills and put forward new ideas, but the real opportunity, he said, came later in the resettlement villages. The people at Ilimo had their world shattered and were still recovering from the shock. For that reason they could not absorb as much of what they were taught as they could have done normally.

177 657 After Ilimo broke up, Mr. Kaad transferred to Saiho, where the new hospital was then being built and where an administrative centre was also established. (Only the Agriculture Department still operates from there today.) He attempted to develop further the new ideology he had been putting forward by contacts with the resettlement villages of Agenahambo, Koipa, Awala, Waseta, Kongohambo and Mumuni. He continued his educational, agricultural and medical programmes for some months in these villages, but he was not able to stay long. From the viewpoint of today, these programmes cannot be seen as marking a permanent change in the pattern of Orokaiva-European contacts. It would be more correct to say that the European soon became as remote as before but that the ideas promoted at Ilimo and by Mr. Kaad were later taken up by the people in the framework of organisations where direct contact with Europeans retained only a minor role.

Section 9: Contact with Americans and Returned Ancestors

829 How did Orokaiva themselves classify white people? As we have seen, they do not classify them according to the organisational role they fulfill. I also found that ethnic origin of white people is usually not a basis upon which Orokaiva will classify them. There is, however, a more esoteric basis of classification which I encountered on a number of occasions.

829 769 It is well known that in many parts of Melanesia, there is a belief in the return of ancestors, whose skins are white, and who bring wealth and a happier dispensation to their Melanesian descendants. The Orokaiva do not appear to look upon every white man they see as a

CHAPTER VI: Government Welfare Efforts

Section 1: Relocation Plans and Their Implementation

657 After the second world war, the Australian government became strongly oriented towards economic development of the indigenous population in its Territories. While before the war, the policy emphasis was perhaps more on the maintenance of law and order and the development of expatriate industry, it is after 1946 that we begin to find the active encouragement on a wide scale of co-operative societies, agricultural extension projects, marketing projects, rural progress societies, and later Native Local Government Councils, as well as other political and economic programmes. Even after 1946, progress was slow and in a recent survey, R. S. Parker suggested that "relative inattention to economic development up to 1960 have left a great leeway to be caught up under insistent pressures of time and external change." (1966: 189)

In 1951, shortly after the first eruption of Mount Lamington, the Hon. Paul Hasluck became Minister for Territories in the Australian Cabinet, and Sir Donald Cleland became Administrator of the Territories. One of the chief concerns of the new administration was to increase the scale, the level of technical competence and the concentration of effort in the departments concerned with indigenous development. (Parker. ibid. 195) The relocation policy in the Northern District is more easily understood if it is remembered that in 1951 a new central administration was eager to make rapid strides in economic and social development while the staff establishment and the "basic craftsmanship of the service" (Hasluck quoted in Parker, 1966) was not yet adjusted to these new objectives.

In considering Australian relocation policy, we must therefore keep in mind that there was a disparity between the more sanguine development objectives and the available resources. Furthermore, there was no real consensus in the administration on the scope that [124] should be given to the development objectives. When I interviewed persons concerned with the events of 1951, everyone told me that the establishment of the camps and the resettlement villages was principally a rescue operation, and that wider development objectives were only [731] incidental. On the other hand, it was possible, from published statements by Belshaw, 1951; Keesing, 1953; Plant n.d.; and interviews with Bishop Hand, Mr. F. Kaad and others, to piece together a quite different attitude to the disaster that must have been current in 1951 among high-level development-minded officials. According to this approach, the disaster offered a unique opportunity to try out some

657 731 ideas concerning socio-economic development. It looked in early 1951 as though the evacuees would not be able to go back to their homes for a long time. The vulcanologist had recommended a large restricted area (see Map II)[A] and was doubtful when (if ever) it would be safe again for human habitation. It looked as though thousands would have to be resettled in altogether new surroundings. Such resettlement could only occur under strict government supervision; in these villages, it looked as though the government might have the opportunity to introduce a new way of life: model village layouts, cash cropping, improved land tenure, better education, health services, everything in fact that developers still aim at today, except that no plans existed for the setting up of new political institutions.

[177] To what extent were the evacuees involved in plans of this kind? Mr. Kaad often spoke to the evacuees of Ilimo about his ideas concerning development. Belshaw's evidence shows that a number of Orokaiva to whom he talked were eager to embrace a new way of life and, especially, that they were anxious to get better educational facilities. He also detects a strong motive for the Orokaiva to agree to any propositions Mr. Kaad put to them: they hoped that thus they would be allowed to leave the evacuation camp earlier than if they argued back (1951: 246). Mr. Kaad himself expressed to me the view that the evacuation camps were too stressful an environment to be propitious for the teaching of development ideas.

During the time when large-scale development was envisaged, at least three persons of authority and scholarly qualifications were asked the Territory administration for their opinions. Belshaw (1951) advocated a general broadly-based socio-economic development programme, in line with modern theory of applied anthropology, but far beyond the resources and administrative skills of the Territory at that time. Keesing (1953) recognised that the resettlement had been "remarkably effective" as a means of reducing "cultural trauma" caused by the eruption. He further commented: "Any attempt by Government and Mission to use the emergency to manipulate such a people and culture arbitrarily in drastically new economic and socio-political directions would seem foredoomed to failure, and would generate unwanted tensions." Plant, an anthropologically trained administration officer, studied some of the practical consequences a wholesale resettlement policy would have. He worked out an elaborate scheme whereby groups would be resettled in villages where there were local groups with the same clan name--a procedure which the thought would be in line with traditional social organisation--but he also showed that resettlement outside the restricted area, as defined in early 1951, would probably lead to land shortages.

Shortly after these three studies were made, an unexpected event changed the situation. The vulcanologist found that the active, paroxysmal stage of volcanic activity of Mount Lamington had ceased after less than two months and hence, a large part of the restricted area could be resettled long before he had earlier been led to expect.

A [See Cat. 116, pp. End Map 2(A)-End Map 2(B)--Analyst]

657 731 In March, 1953, he was able to reduce the restricted area still further, to a circle of two miles' radius around the crater. Thus, all areas that had ever been used for the growing of taro and for village sites, became available to the Orokaiva once more. In these circumstances, it was inevitable that the fertile slopes of Mount Lamington were again occupied in much the same way as before the eruption.

As the first chapter of this report deals adequately with the planning and establishment of the evacuation camps themselves, I shall confine myself in this section to resettlement after the period in the camps. The number of places in which groups were settled between the day of the eruption and the present varies somewhat. The Sivepe people all went to Wairopi for a few weeks, then to Ilimo until end May, 1951, then to Awala, where some stayed briefly, others for a year. Since then the present families all stayed at Sivepe. On the other hand, the present population of Hohorita went to Cape Killerton (one week), Oro Bay (about ten weeks), Popondetta (a short period), Irihambo (almost five years), until they were able to reach their present site. The resettlement history of other villages close to the mountain, such as Kiorota and Bagevaturu was about equally long.

We may generally distinguish two phases of resettlement, following the evacuation camp period. The first phase, occurring around May, 1951, was the transfer of groups from the camps to a number of chosen "resettlement" villages, mostly along the main road from Waseta to Popondetta, but also on sideroads, e.g., Sairope and Kongohambo. This is the phase when an attempt was made to set up model villages of largish size under close government supervision, following discussions at Ilimo when the people concerned had agreed to live together, and to make the innovations. It was no doubt the intention of Mr. Keed to continue in these villages the educational effort started at Ilimo camp, and this will be discussed in subsequent sections.

The basic problem, however, was to ensure satisfactory garden lands for the resettled groups. The weakness of the locations chosen by the government was that they were mostly placed along one main road and thus within walking distance of only part of the available garden land. As Plant and Keesing foresaw, it was inevitable that the settlements would split up so as to bring people closer to their garden land. It is mainly for this reason that the Sivepe people did not stay at Awala. Furthermore, the resettlement was based on an analysis by Plant according to which a local clan group could be resettled in any village where there was a group with the same clan name. I shall give only one example of this sort of analysis, to show its effect. There are Jegase clan groups in Sivepe, Binduta, Sui (near Awala) and Isivita. Plant therefore suggested that in the resettlement of Isivita, the Jegase clan group could be shifted to Kongohambo and be given the use of land at Sivepe, Binduta or Sui. Some Isivita evacuees therefore [423] went to Kongohambo while others went to Koipa. The Jegase of Isivita were thus made to join groups which were themselves already fairly short of land and, in the case of the Jegase of Sivepe, dependent on

657 maternal relatives. Moreover, the fact that these groups have a clan
731 name in common implies very much less than that they have rights in
each other's land. They have rights to be protected and succoured as
423 brothers in times of war, starvation or other emergencies, but rights
in land cannot be established on that basis.

The government sometimes went to considerable trouble to give supposedly secure land tenure to those who agreed to stay in the resettlement villages. I have already stressed that in such cases one cannot speak of "clan land" being made available to the immigrants, because all Orokaiva land is owned by individual extended families.
[426] In such cases, individuals lend pieces of land to immigrants who are allowed to cultivate them on a year-to-year basis. Their usehold lapses when they leave the community. It goes without saying that where this land is used by the techniques of shifting agriculture, a man cannot depend on the land resources of his new village unless he gets enough land to make about eight gardens in eight successive years. Plant estimated immigrants' needs at five acres per person and this is a good deal of land. I know of several cases where land was lent to people who needed some. The pieces transferred usually measured at the most one or two acres--enough, to be sure, for subsistence over a short term but no more. The effect of this is not to make life in the new village impossible but to hold the immigrant in a position of dependence on landholders. Understandable, the immigrants make every effort, after resettlement, to cultivate their own land, even if it is situated some distance away. Once they begin to do this, the temptation to build a village near their home gardens is very strong. According to Orokaiva ideas, the immigrants lose all rights over land which has been lent to them by their hosts as soon as they stop residing in the village where the land is. Thus, as soon as people decide to leave a resettlement village, they lose any rights in it that their hosts may have given them, if Orokaiva legal principles are followed.

I shall illustrate these principles in one concrete instance, the resettlement village of Mumuni, situated between Sasembata and Waseta, and I shall show how the government attempted to improve the land tenure position of resettled groups. After the eruption, the people of Dapari were persuaded to settle in Mumuni, which was intended
[425] as one of the new style resettlement villages. They were given some
land to cultivate and stayed for several years. When the government
[245] began to encourage the planting of coffee trees, the Dapari immigrants
planted coffee gardens at Mumuni. Under Orokaiva law, it is permissible
[426] to plant trees on borrowed land provided the owner consents and the
produce from that tree will then always belong to the planter, even
[422] when the land as such reverts to the owner. One frequently sees a
betelnut palm or a breadfruit tree which is owned by a person who at
one time borrowed the land and which is harvested by the planter and
left undisturbed by the owner of the land.

657 It is a ticklish question whether this rule similarly applies
to coffee trees which differ from the traditional kind of trees in
731 two ways: first, in that they occupy the whole of a piece of land and
423 not just a few square feet of it and secondly, in that they are a
source of cash income. The government was aware, from the beginning
245 of the coffee scheme, that traditional Orokaiva law might be inadequate to protect coffee growers but balked before the huge task of giving all Orokaiva a legally registered title to their land. If this were to be done according to the principles of Australian law, it would involve expensive surveys, endless litigation and cost many times the value of the land, even if qualified personnel could be found to do the work. The Northern District administration therefore hit upon an ingenious dodge, by which the Higaturu Local Government Council, after summary investigation, issued declarations allotting land to persons who wished to plant cash crops. These declarations, made and witnessed by the clan elders, allotted the land to the grower in perpetuity. (For details see Crocombe and Hogbin, 1963: 89 f.) The practise of issuing these declarations was soon stopped by the authorities in Port Moresby who ruled that they have no legal validity, but Mumuni is one place where they were issued.

657 After planting their coffee at Mumuni, the Dapari people began
to depend for their subsistence gardens on land they owned in their
731 own natal district, which was an hour or so from Mumuni. All the
423 Dapari people, except for the Jegase clan group of Dapari, went back
to their natal district to build a new village; the Jegase clan group
578 was the only one to stay behind at Mumuni. Their position was more
628 favourable, as they owned land near Mumuni; hence they had no reason
to go back to Dapari. I met these Jegase people when they visited Sivepa to receive brideprice. They told me then that one Mumuni man had made a large gift of land on which all the Dapari people grew their coffee. The Jegase group was growing coffee there without being disturbed by anyone, nor were they ever asked for payment. On the other hand, the owner wanted his land back from those Dapari people who had left to build their own village. But this group insisted on holding on to their coffee plantation; they stayed at Dapari and had subsistence gardens there, but they returned to Mumuni from time to time to look after their coffee. They claimed they were entitled to do this because they had been registered as owners in the Higaturu Council declarations. Thus a conflict developed, in which Mumuni relied on traditional custom whereas Dapari relied on a (legally invalid) kind of certificate of title. In this quarrel, the government could do little except hope it would blow over.

A New Zealand geographer, Mr. Peter Aitkins, who made a study of this area (unpublished), told me that the Mumuni people had begun harvesting coffee from the Dapari-planted plots. My own investigation showed that nothing was ever stolen from the Jegase clan group (who had not left Mumuni) and that Dapari had offered to sell the coffee stands to the Mumuni owner of the land, and that the owner was prepared

657 to buy, but there was no agreement on the price. Thus the thefts
731 seem to be a stratagem to get Dapari to agree to a lower price.
The first lesson we may draw from this example is that evidently,
423 resettlement villages are liable to be unstable unless the resettled
group has solid land rights close to the village. Thus, the resettle-
[578] ment of a group of Garombi people in Sivepe in 1966 may well be stable
because these people own land within a one-mile radius from Sivepe.
[628] But the resettlement of Dapari people in Mumuni was unstable because
the Dapari land was more than one mile away. In fact, the distance
between Mumuni and the Dapari lands could not have been much above two
miles, but this is still too far for subsistence gardeners. It is
therefore clear why Sivepe people did not agree to stay at Awala after
1951: their land was between two and four miles away from Awala, and
this was regarded as an excessive distance. In the light of the events
at Mumuni, we would be wrong to regard this attitude as "traditional"
and "opposed to modernisation;" it was a shrewd assessment of the
drawbacks of resettlement villages.

657 In the first phase of resettlement, the government took a
predominant part. Before evacuees could leave Ilimo, they had to
731 agree to resettlement in one of a number of villages which were to be
developed according to modern principles. The government took pains,
however, to work out the details of resettlement in consultation with
local Orokaiva leaders. Nonetheless, arrangements such as the sending
of the Jegase of Isivita to Kongohambo, in the hope that they would be
helped by local Jegase clan groups, were not based on a realistic
assessment of the possibilities. This agreement was easy to get as
it was seen to be a necessary condition for leaving Ilimo camp.
Resettlement plans were thus imperfectly adapted to the traditional
relationships between the groups concerned.

621 In the second phase of resettlement, many of the groups allocated
to the scheduled list of resettlement villages branched off to villages
731 of their own. This process started almost at once and continued for
657 more than five years. I have already stated that in Sivepe this phase--
the withdrawal from Awala--took place in the years 1951-1952, while
at Hohorita, Bagevaturu, Kiorota, Seva, Dapari it happened a good
deal later. In this second phase, the participation of the government
was much less active. In Sivepe, a patrol officer made a decision as
to the site of the village and the groups to be contained in it but
this was only after half the people had already lived in Pamba for
some time and a quarrel with neighbouring Kongohambo had broken out,
and when the Sebo people were returning to the area.

The history of the settlement of Kiorota and Bagevaturu may be traced from a file of the Department of District Administration, Popondetta (12-3-2A). As already mentioned, the Isivita evacuees, numbering 1,869, were "re-established" in the resettlement villages of Kongohambo and Koipa. Soon disputes began to arise owing to the insufficiency of land--villages such as Sivepe could give only limited help in the way of lending gardening lands and marauding pigs were

621 another source of annoyance. Some village groups requested permission
to move from Koipa and this was granted. A report on the file refers
657 to the clearing of new gardens South of Koipa (end 1956), but in
731 May, 1959, we read that these persons who left Koipa had "over the last 18 months split into two groups one of which settled at Bagevaturu and the other at Kiorota." The villages had been laid out (according to "modern" principles, as I myself observed), gardens and garden houses established, coffee planted. Government supervision over these movements was much less strict than it had been in 1951, though strictly the village sites ought to have been approved before the villages were built.

657 This second phase of resettlement became possible because the first phase was not accompanied by any renunciation of land rights,
731 or foreclosure of the possibility of return. At no time did the
423 resettled groups give to anyone else a permission to occupy vacated lands nor accept payment for any of their land or its products. After
245 this second resettlement, however, one substantial land tenure problem remained. The nature of this problem is the second lesson to be drawn from the example of Dapari tenure described above. The traditional Orokaiva land tenure system is not well-adapted to cash cropping. The Dapari people are likely to lose their coffee plantations as a result of tenure difficulties. Likewise, Crocombe and Hogbin believe that the failure of several Inonda families to plant coffee is due to tenure difficulties. The Inonda families who did plant coffee were careful not to do so on the extensive land holdings which they inherited from maternal relatives because they feared claims that might otherwise
[428] be made by maternal kin. The fact is that a large proportion of Orokaiva land is held on a legal basis much more complex than patrilineal inheritance. When an Orokaiva holds land he has inherited from his father, both he and his father having continuously resided on the land, that man is indisputably the owner and he can grow coffee or rubber on that land without fear of interference. We have already seen that no Inonda land is held in this way. In Sivepe, most men have some land of which they are indisputably the owners, but at the same time most of them also have useholds over many pieces owned by maternal kin or affines or absent agnates. They are "looking after" this land, and the true owners never trouble them as they either have their own usehold lands in the villages where they live or are working in towns or on plantations.

These circumstances change as soon as cash-producing trees begin to be grown. It is then that claims begin to be asserted and Orokaiva customary law has no way of dealing with such claims. The owner is certainly entitled to a share of the proceeds, and the size of that share is dangerously indefinite.

Inquiry in Sivepe showed that the people were well aware of the danger. All but two coffee growers had planted on land inherited from their fathers, preferring to use their other lands for subsistence crops. One of these two exceptions was the Seho clan chief who had

657 planted coffee on his mother's brother's land. He explained to me
that this mother's brother was dead and nobody except himself had
731 any claims on the land. The second man, who had planted on his wife's
423 land, was not so fortunate. His wife's relatives live in Sivepe and
lost no time asking for the return of "their" land as soon as the
245 coffee was harvestable. He settled for a compromise: he planted
coffee on some of his other land and promised his affines they could
have their land back as soon as his new trees began to bear. As far
as I could discover, this was agreed to.

423 It has been argued by several students, especially Crocombe and Hogbin, that title improvement is a necessary requirement for the success of cash cropping in the Northern District. My own findings suggest that the importance of title improvement varies a good deal between villages. Where, as in Sivepe, a fair amount of land is held under an undisputed title, no great gain in productivity can be expected from the formal registration of these good titles. In other places, such as Inonda, it is of course essential.

Crocombe and Hogbin (1963: 89-93) have described some early attempts to register Orokaiva titles under some scheme administered by the Higaturu Local Government Council; after describing several rules passed by the council for this purpose, each of which was in operation for a short period and then rejected by Port Moresby officials, the authors conclude: "Registration is of doubtful validity, but to the extent that the Orokaiva accept it as binding (and they appear to do so unreservedly at present) it functions in practice." The example I have given of the dispute at Mumuni shows clearly the disadvantage of all such informal registration procedures. If the Dapari people were to lay an information with the police that Mumuni is stealing their coffee, could any judicial officer convict any person from Mumuni of theft and send him to prison? I cannot imagine that Crocombe and Hogbin would applaud such action.

657 423 The government made a fresh approach to the problems of indigenous land tenure with the passing of the Land Titles Commission Ordinance 1962, the Land (Tenure Conversion) Ordinance 1964, and their amendments. Under these provisions a Land Titles Commissioner has been appointed at Popondetta whose task it is to determine the land titles in specifically designated "adjudication areas." The Commission prepares an adjudication record showing what land in the adjudication area is native land and the ownership of each piece of that land. A native may then apply for registration in his name of any native land included in the record by agreement, but no titles can be reigstered in a piece of land which is less in either area of frontage than the standard prescribed for the purpose for which the land is likely to be used. In practice, this has meant that every individual holding registered by the Commission should have a minimum area of 20 acres.

The operation of this system, and its difficulties, may be instanced from my observation of an attempt to apply it in Hohorita in 1966. Hohorita is a resettlement village harbouring some 12 clans;

657 it has a substantial area of land but holdings are very fragmented. As this village is very interested in growing coffee, its leader 423 suggested in 1962 that all Hohorita land should be consolidated and partitioned among the owners and titles registered. (Crocombe and Hogbin, 1963: 93) When I visited the community in 1966, an officer of the Land Titles Commission was busy measuring the ring boundaries. He found that the Hohorita people owned a total of 2,240 acres of land, enough for 112 unit holdings. I was impressed with the ease with which the people could be induced to accept the scheme in spite of its far-readhing repercussions. If the scheme was accepted, all boundaries would be redefined by the commission; people would often need to exchange their ancestral blocks with others in accordance with the map prepared by the commission. Moreover, the usual pattern of shifting cultivation would need to be carried on within the boundaries of the single 20-acre block which, in addition, would need to accommodate cash crops. The fluidity of traditional land transactions, the opportunity to revive old claims and residual and reversionary rights would be past, as the registration abolished them all, including the rights to planted trees. All this was explained but did not deter the people.

The scheme was killed in spite of its popular support, because it was soon bruited abroad that Hohorita was to be cut up. I witnessed myself that letters were written to men who had been living away from Hohorita for years and were never likely to return. These letters, written by relatives, warned the men to come to Hohorita to assert their rights. It had initially seemed that 112 holdings was quite adequate, in fact ample, for Hohorita's population, but as all the absentees came swarming to the Commission, a total of 126 men had been able to assert their rights successfully. In none of the Ordinances was residence specified as a necessary qualification for participation in a consolidation scheme; hence the Hohorita scheme had to be dropped and hopes dimmed that major schemes could ever be completed on a significant scale.

In 1967, a remedy to this problem was devised. According to this scheme, each ward of the Higaturu Local Government Council district was formed into an "adjudication area." The people were asked to determine the boundaries of their wards; as I have already described, the lower Sasembata ward did so with alacrity. The effect of this operation was that no person resident outside the ward would henceforth have rights to land inside it. Residence could easily be determined from the village census lists. These lists did not wholly represent actual residence, but a non-resident would be obliged to be present at every village census until he transferred himself to another village list. The main point was that every person can be on only one census list and thus have land rights in only one ward. The establishment of the boundaries would probably daunt any surveyor as numerous men have rights in the land of other wards, but I found that the work was swiftly done by the Orokaiva by the expedient of effecting some exchanges along the boundary line so that, for instance, Soroputa and Kongohambo

657 retained as much land as they had before, after the boundary was cut.
423 They had received some Sivepe land and they had lost an approximately equal amount of their own.

Thus, the lower Sasembata ward is now declared an adjudication area of which the owners are about 600 people listed in the census records. Between them, these 600 people are now the undisputed owners of perhaps 2,400 acres of gardening land. The government would now like to see this area subdivided into some 120 economic holdings registered in the name of a single owner, but this is recognised as being extremely difficult. In one respect, however, this latest government approach is vastly superior to the previous ones. In treating residence as the basis of Orokaiva land rights, the new policy comes much closer to Orokaiva conceptions than earlier schemes which treated the patrilineal clan as the basic unit. The choice of the ward (rather than the village) as the adjudication area was fortunate in that it was much less disruptive of residual rights held by agnatic and at times affinal kin residing in nearby villages. On the other hand, the assumption that the ward territory can be profitably subdivided into 20-acre family holdings may not conform with Orokaiva expectations and conceptions. The administration is in danger, in this respect, [591] of being misled by its own ideological bias. The enthusiasm people felt about the establishment of ward boundaries was based on the hope that thus the people of the constituent villages could form a big "company," as cooperating group which would function as a cooperative. I have already mentioned the paradox that the Orokaiva is an individualist but at the same time has a deep belief in the power that can be gained from corporate action. Ward producers' cooperatives, if they can be organised, may provide an excellent incentive to productivity while at the same time enabling some mechanisation to be introduced, both in transport and cultivation. The model I have in mind here is that of the incorporations established among the New Zealand Maori in the Native Land Act 1909, and developed since until their annual income today is in the range of several million dollars, earned largely by sizeable units often with an ownership running into several hundreds. (See Hunn, 1961; Schwimmer, 1968: 26-28.)

The problem of adapting Orokaiva land tenure to conditions of [731] a cash economy, though not yet solved, has some promise of being successfully tackled. If all Orokaiva land were held under secure tenure, many new areas would undoubtedly be planted in coffee and other crops. The resettlement programme following the eruption of Mount Lamington has not, as I have shown, contributed anything to the establishment of persons on secure land holdings but the present policy of consolidation, perhaps followed by partitioning into economic family lots, is more likely to achieve this objective.

Section 2: Economic Assistance

177 Subsistence: Undoubtedly, European contact had a profound influence
on the subsistence economy, both through the introduction of steel
433 tools and of the pax Australiana. The government did not, however,
intervene directly in the operation of the Orokaiva subsistence
economy; it was a very simple economy, but it provided, in general,
adequate nutrition and housing. The first time the Orokaiva subsistence
731 economy broke down seriously in the post-contact period was immediately
657 after the eruption of Mount Lamington. The government therefore decided
to offer some limited assistance towards the re-establishment of the
subsistence economy in the resettlement villages built when the
refugees left the evacuation camps. One requirement of the new villages
was a food supply until new gardens had been made and harvested. This
[241] requirement was met by the planting of a quick-growing variety of sweet
potato in villages in the vicinity of Ilimo camp. The government also
bought up any root crops the Orokaiva could supply and distributed
these in the resettlement villages throughout 1951, as needed.

The opportunity offered by the evacuation camps was also taken
731 to introduce a few innovations which, it was thought, would improve
242 subsistence gardening in the resettlement villages. People were taught
the cultivation of the variety of sweet potatoes mentioned above, as
well as of corn, tomatoes and beans. Seeds and plants were supplied.
An agricultural officer demonstrated on a large scale the growing of
[412] sweet potatoes and peanuts. In order to facilitate the rapid establishment of gardens--which the government hoped would be bigger and better
than the pre-eruption ones--small spades were distributed to villages.
These small spades were not a familiar implement to the Orokaiva, but
the agricultural officers thought they would be more efficient than
the wooden implements and large shovels hitherto used in villages.
These small spades cannot have taken on very well; I saw none in Sivepe
or Inonda. I myself had brought a spade for the garden I established
in Sivepe, but my neighbour, upon seeing it, at once supplied me with a
grubber (ex-American army stock). A very brief acquaintance with the
root structure of the garden weeds convinced me that a spade was indeed
[227] of limited utility. Finally, in order to add to the supply of protein
in the resettlement villages, the camp superintendent distributed some
snorkels for catching fish.

Keesing reports there were fears in the camp that the eruption
731 would have destroyed taro seed stock, but this fear proved unfounded.
134 The taro plants remained perfectly healthy and the volcanic ash made
the soil amazingly fertile for awhile, so that food shortages were
quickly relieved.

Issue of Food: In the camps, rice, tinned meat, tobacco were distributed
731 according to a ration scheme based on the census figures. Each village
657 constable was issued with rations for the number of people resident in
the villages under his control. These distributions were continued in

731 the resettlement villages as needed, but soon replaced by issues of
657 the sweet potatoes and later, village-grown crops. Distributions
tapered off after May, 1951, and ceased at the end of that year.
Commercial Enterprises: Agricultural activities are the only kind of
enterprise which are encouraged or assisted by government. These
activities are mostly conducted by individual entrepreneurs. No
rewards are ever given for land clearing, nor are any labour costs ever
paid. The government assists by providing coffee, rubber and cocoa
seeds to growers. Initially these were free; nowadays, growers are
charged the cost of seed.

Although there is provision in the Territory for credit assistance
452 for economic development, small growers of cash crops such as are
657 found in Sivepe and Inonda are not eligible for this credit. A short
time before I left, one man from Inonda (again the government driver)
was encouraged to apply for a loan under a new experimental scheme
for beef cattle farming, but the arrangements were not complete when
I left.

The government provides marketing assistance to New Guinea
245 growers of coffee (mainly indigenous) by a remission of duty on raw
652 coffee imported into Australia from sources other than Papua and New
Guinea to each importer who obtains a certain percentage of his total
requirements from the Territory. The government does not itself
245 purchasecoffee but when the Higaturu Local Government Council was
474 formed one of its initial functions was to operate a cooperative for
the purchase, processing and exporting of locally grown coffee. Later
[654] (in 1962), the Council withdrew from this activity and an independent
Orokaiva Coffee Growers Society was formed. The reason for the Council's
withdrawal was advice from the government which felt uneasy about local
bodies engaging in commerical activities. The effect of the setting
up of the cooperative has been that service is now no longer given to
all growers but to all who have bought shares as an entrance fee and
become members of the cooperative. This fee was initially $4 but is
constantly rising until in 1966 it reached $20. Some non-members sold
[439] their coffee to the Chinese for a lower price; others sold through
kinsmen who were members, and did not always receive the full proceeds.
The government keeps an eye on the operations of the cooperative; in
any case, it seemed well enough conducted. Until end 1966, the cooperati
depended on the government for transport: the buyer who visited villag
each month to collect and pay for the coffee travelled on a government
truck. It is now buying trucks of its own. The nearest pick-up
point for Sivepe coffee was Garombi, one mile away; the nearest pick-up
point for Inonda coffee was likewise one mile away, at Ajoro.

The government also assists agriculture through its research
654 activities conducted in various experimental stations in the Territory
242 which specialise in rubber, coffee and other relevant crops. A
resources survey has been made of large parts of the Northern District,
including the Oro-Bay--Kumusi River region with which we are concerned
here. A programme for the improvement of Robusta coffee is on the way,

654 and local field trials are being carried out on the volcanic soils
of the Northern District.
242 Agricultural extension work was being carried on by Australian
officers stationed in Popondetta, with the help of Papuan agricultural
242 assistants some of whom were stationed in a sub-office in Saiho. It
is this staff which has been responsible for the gradual increase in
coffee plantings and the spreading of basic knowledge about coffee
cultivation. We should not, however, minimise the extent of knowledge
and stimulus that spread not through the activities of officials but
was passed on from experienced Orokaiva growers to beginners. Furthermore,
many persons trained as agricultural assistants have returned to their
villages and became a fund of knowledge to those around them. The
assistants are trained in a course of between nine and twelve
[874] months' duration, given at Popondetta. Papuans may also receive a full
agricultural diploma course at a school near Keravat, New Britain, or
a two-year sub-diploma course at a school near Keravat, New Britain,
or a two-year sub-diploma certificate course given at Popondetta.
Graduates from these schools were not yet working in the Northern
District at the time of my visit.

No stabilisation fund for coffee exists in the Territory. The
435 violent fluctuations in price for this product do have a somewhat
unsettling effect on growers, though I could not observe very much of
245 this as 1966-67 was a good year. I heard that in bad years in the near
past people had been very disappointed. The problem of price fluctua-
tions affects other tropical crops as well, and New Guinea has few
sources of income which are significantly stabler than coffee. Therefore,
no easy solution to this problem is possible. The Orokaiva Coffee
Growers Society has been following a wise policy of withholding a
substantial part of the proceeds in good years for capital improvement,
thus providing a kind of cushion against fluctuations. Thus, in
1966-67, a substantial proportion of proceeds was withheld for improve-
ments to the factory and trucks. Growers are paid an initial sum
per pound substantially lower than the expected total proceeds, and
the balance is in part distributed to shareholders at the end of the
season, in part withheld. By this procedure, a substantial drop in
export prices can be suffered without corresponding lowering of the
initial cash payment. In 1966, the cash payment was $26 for a 150-
pound sack.

A good deal of development work has been left for the Higaturu
657 Council to deal with. I have already mentioned that government officers
423 attempted to have the council deal with matters of land tenure improve-
ment (though Port Moresby authorities overruled this) and that the
coffee factory was planned as a council operation though again plans
were changed later. In 1966, the main activities of the council were
653 in the building of roads, the improvement of water supplies, the building
of medical aid posts, the maintaining of the produce markets at
Popondetta and Saiho and some minor social services. (For details,
see Table 12.)[A] Thus, a sizeable area of local development had become

A [See Cat. 116, p. 217--Analyst]

Section 3: Social Services: Health Assistance

657 Social services were provided partly by the government, partly by the council and partly by the mission. The services provided by the different organisations were so tightly interlinked and so systematically complemented one another that it will be convenient to present, in the present chapter, the overall system that was operating. This system was a product of government planning, while council and mission made specific contributions in their special areas of competence. In the next chapter, I shall look at these services again, from the viewpoint of general mission objectives.

657 743 In this interlocking of services, it was the government which met the bulk of the expenditure, as Table 13 clearly shows.[A] On the other hand, over Papua as a whole 60% of the hospitals were conducted by the missions and over one quarter of the aid posts. In the year 1964-1965, in the Northern District, the three administration hospitals had 3,671 admissions and 13,176 out-patients while the corresponding number for mission institutions was 3,286 admissions, 255,460 out-patients. It is therefore clear that the mission contribution to health services in the Territory is, in terms of patients treated, far greater than its budgetary contribution (2% of total expenditure on public health) would suggest. This disproportion is only slightly lessened if we consider the value of grants-in-aid and drugs supplied by the government to mission hospitals. Clearly, it costs a great deal less to treat a patient in a mission than in a government hospital.

743 [344] The Saiho Hospital, which served all Orokaiva territory, was a sprawling settlement of a great many buildings, almost all made of native materials. Only one building, as far as I remember, was in Australian style, with weatherboard walls; this contained the doctor's office, some other administrative offices, and was used for the few non-Papuan out-patients who occasionally called. The wards were all built of bush materials. Although the statistics show 2,500 admissions and 5,000 out-patients per year, there was only one physician at the hospital who at the same time functioned as superintendent and had a heavy administrative burden. He had a small expatriate administrative staff, and a few expatriate nurses. In the beginning of 1967, a second physician, a Papuan woman, joined the staff. The superintendent was also in charge of the training of aid post orderlies. Increasingly, Papuan nurses, trained in a three-year course at Port Moresby, are being used. A substantial number of hospital orderlies are employed.

758 743 It is not the policy of the hospital to offer ambulance services, so that the village people are expected to make stretchers out of bush materials and carry in their sick. In practise, hospital and administration vehicles will frequently carry sick people to hospital and I have never actually seen the stretchers made. People would certainly know how to do it. Upon arrival, the sick person is interviewed by a hospital orderly; usually he is accompanied by a number of

[A] [See Cat. 116, p. 218--Analyst]

Section 5: Attitudes Towards Government

Orokaiva attitudes towards the government have three aspects
829 that must be carefully distinguished: attitudes to individual government
servants, to the power structure and to the values represented by the
563 government. As for attitudes to individual public servants, I have
no evidence for any change in attitudes. In a subtle way every white
man with whom Orokaiva come into contact is tested according to various
criteria: fairness, courtesy, willingness to reciprocate gifts and
services, willingness to eat with the people (a rare phenomenon,
this) and above all, his behaviour in the constant battle of wits
and inner strength in which Orokaiva delight. A man such as Mr. Kaad
who was a good man by all these tests, was remembered with much affection;
others, though excellent by the criteria of the Australian public
service, would be resented or soon forgotten.

The Orokaiva attitude to the power structure is determined by
657 a rather harsh history of earlier contacts, beginning with the murderous
177 régime of Monckton and culminating in the 1940's in the Japanese
conquest, the Allied re-conquest and the public execution of a small
band of Orokaiva who had sided with the Japanese. The welfare
orientation of the Australian government was perhaps never massively
demonstrated before the eruption of Mount Lamington. At the present
time this welfare orientation is well understood but the Orokaiva fear
the Australian power to compel their compliance. They use what
resources they have to keep this power within limits. They have found
that it is usually fruitless to disobey Australian commands openly,
but power can often be made ineffective if orders are misunderstood
or forgotten or evaded. Furthermore, it is a general rule among
Orokaiva to withhold information systematically from the *taupa*. It
took me some months to learn that even the simplest information I
had about the Orokaiva was often unknown to Europeans, not because
they were not interested but because nobody would tell them. On a
few occasions when an official asked me a question I would say that
any of his "driver-boys" (that was how they referred to their drivers)
could answer it and the official would answer: "Nobody will tell me.
They all say they don't know." This is indeed a potent weapon against
colonial administrators.

It would be wrong to assume that this attitude is directed
657 against Europeans *in general*, because there was great variation in
177 the treatment of individuals, and also, it is not directed against
the values Australians are trying to introduce. The avoidance of
communication is largely, I think, a device in the power struggle
between the colonial government and its subjects. The Orokaiva do
what they can to avoid being dominated. In this context, the setting
[623] up of local government councils was a great step forwards. The councillors
do not meet with the same communication bar because the people know
that they can control them through the electoral machinery. Hence it

657 is the councillors who are most effective at communicating whatever
they understand of European values and the Australians have been happy
623 to reduce direct contact with the people to formal dealings in which
177 intermediaries can definitely not be used. The Orokaiva say that it
is only since the council was set up that their thinking began to change.
While this is not to be believed, it would be correct to say that an
ideology of change developed only through the mediation of the councillors.
The humanitarian work done immediately after the eruption did not lead
to ideological change because it did not set up effective mediating
institutions.

575 [593] [626] [657] wife, effectively shaming the husband. Today's organisations are sponsored by the government as well as the mission. The government employs a female "welfare officer," attached to the Department of District Administration at Popondetta, who is charged with the organising and supervising of what are called women's clubs. These clubs, set up in villages, are expected to follow a set programme, designed by the welfare officer, aimed at improving village hygiene, housekeeping and craft work. The women are also encouraged to play basketball at club meetings. They learn to sew, bake scones, etc., make bark cloth for sale, are given talks on infant welfare and generally learn Australian ideas about home care. Clubs are encouraged to buy sewing machines, instructed in their use and care, shown how to cut patterns, how to launder, and so forth. Courses lasting two weeks are given periodically at the Higaturu Council building, to which a number of selected officers of local women's clubs are invited. Usually these are presidents and secretaries of clubs. They are taught the various skills to be inculcated and expected to pass on their knowledge in the village. The women are expected to persuade the men to build a meeting hall for the club. Money for the club is raised by regular dues, by the sale of bark cloth, and by the sale of cakes, scones and the like on club days. (The buying of ovens is also encouraged.) Inonda had such a club, built a club house in 1967 and had the use of a sewing machine. Kiorota had a club house, used not only by the women but also by the men when there were important visitors.

794 575 In the Sasembata district, the women's clubs became fused with their mission counterpart, the mother's union. The latter had existed from the early 1950's, and were accustomed to have prayer meetings, clean the church and the cemetery, sew for the hospital and carry out other church work usually allotted to women. The president of the mother's union was the pastor's wife, a woman of some ambition. For the convenience of the members of the mother's union, many of whom lived too far away to attend regularly at the mission station, several branches were formed, in places such as Kendata and Furi, while the villages within easy reach (Sasembata, Sivepe, Garombi, Binduta, Kongohambo, Torogota) mostly attended the central branch. When the government founded the women's clubs, the territorial units covered by the clubs soon became identical with the areas covered by the branches of the mother's union. Furthermore, the club which included Sivepe and the mission station chose as its president the pastor's wife, as well as the same secretary, a young Sivepe woman. The two organisations thus became identical in territorial boundaries, largely identical in personnel and rather similar in some of their activities. To mention but one instance, it was natural for the club to use the mother's union sewing machine for the club sewing programme.

The membership of the mother's union, in Sivepe at least, was somewhat larger than the membership of the women's club. The younger women were all active in both. Once a month they went to mother's union, did the necessary church work, cooked a common meal, prayed

Section 4: Social Services

797 The mission contribution to health and education has been set
out in the previous chapter. It is of course the mission rather than the government which has pioneered the social services in the Territory. The first contact the Orokaiva had with Western medicine and education was through the mission sisters and the teachers trained, however inadequately, by the mission. The scholarly inadequacies of the mission teachers, though regretted, had not marred the primary aim of the church which was to inculcate Christian values and introduce some acquaintance with the arts of civilisation. If before the second world war, education was not viewed by the mission as a weapon in the struggle for economic development, it must be remembered that economic development of the Papuans was not deliberately pursued as an objective by the government or any other influential group in the Territory.

At the present time, mission education poses a dilemma. The
797 government school inspectors express their concern over the generally
871 low academic standard of the smaller mission schools. It has now
been established as a rough rule that schools, in order to receive
875 government approval (and therefore financial assistance and examination
facilities), should have a ratio of trained teachers of at least one in three. The term *trained* is defined, for the benefit of the mission schools, as meaning the possession of an A certificate. Over the whole of the Northern District, one in three is approximately the average.

797 There has been no case where the government has actually caused
a school to close down. Such action would certainly greatly anger the
871 Anglican authorities, who argue with some force that the government
has no practical means to replace the educational service of the missions. It lacks trained personnel, just as much as the mission does. Moreover, it is far more expensive to conduct a government school than a mission school and the government cannot afford this extra expense. Finally the mission argues that for the Papuan, as an essentially religious person, education ought not to be divorced from religion.

875 Meanwhile, the government is rapidly upgrading its own standards
of training. It restricts to the utmost the intake of teachers with
●657 A certificates and encourages, by means of salary and other incentives,
the obtaining of B and C certificates. It is gradually widening the scale of its operations. At the same time, the government is performing a most valuable service by giving refresher courses to practising mission teachers, thus improving their knowledge and giving them a more professional attitude to their teaching tasks. I watched Sasembata teachers who went to these courses which certainly provided much stimulus. In Hohorita, the mission conducted special classes for adults who lacked a standard 6 education. These were mostly attended by mission teachers who thus became qualified to do further study toward a teacher's certificate. The mission conducted some teachers

875 training school which prepared students for examinations for these
certificates.

657 Though many men with teacher's certificates and advanced
medical training take up positions with the government, where salaries
875 are far higher, there is still a considerable inflow of qualified
Papuans into the mission ranks. One reason for this may perhaps be
797 found in the sketch I gave earlier in this chapter of a typical mission
station settlement. The educated man who takes up a job with the
mission receives his reward, not only in the satisfaction of religious
service and the approbation of the mission towards which he is usually
obliged for his education, but also an assured social status in a
community in which he can feel thoroughly at home and can set up the
type of social relationships to which he is accustomed. A government
position on the other hand tends to isolate and detribablise teachers
and hospital workers and thus be less satisfying socially.

Finally, it should be stressed that the mission is responsible
872 for the education of Papua's educational élite. Martyrs School, once
873 built at Sangara where it was destroyed by the eruption, and now
established just outside Agenahambo, prides itself on a higher academic
standard than any of the other secondary schools of the Northern
District. It is able to choose the most proficient of the products
of the primary school system, not only in the Northern District, but
in the whole of Papua. One man in Sivepe and one in Inonda had been
to this school but neither had continued to the secondary Forms. But
the church-educated élite will dominate the Northern District for
some years to come, until the graudates from the new University of
Papua New Guinea will take over this status.

CHAPTER VIII: Selection of Emigrants

At the time of the eruption, the whole of the population fled
731 from the volcano; those who wished to stay behind were persuaded to
leave by village constables when the area surrounding the mountain was
declared "restricted" by regulation. The whole of this population, of
the affected villages was placed in evacuation camps and, in general,
it was again the total population of the pre-eruption villages that
was transferred to the resettlement villages established in and after
May, 1951.

Recruitment to these villages was therefore non-selective and
621 by government order. The amount of land available at the new location
and the clan affiliation of the groups relocated were the main criterion
657 in allocating particular groups to specific resettlement villages. The
allocation was done by a government officer who took into account the
preferences expressed by community leaders as between the alternative
resettlement villages available. It is hard to say at this stage just
how much self-selection occurred, but the evidence suggests that in
1951 there was a very limited amount of self-selection. The situation
in the camps was a very disturbed one. Undoubtedly, when two groups
joined together and told Mr. Kaad that they wished to form a village
together, Mr. Kaad would agree to this, but a heavy burden of decision
fell on the government. After 1951, a good number of relocated groups
founded new resettlement villages, mostly with prior government permission.
In these later settlements, self-selection played an important part.

When self-selection of resettlement sites occurred, the following
361 were among the reasons for choice, as is demonstrated from evidence at
[628] Sivepe and Hohorita: proximity to land to which the group has good
title; greatest possible distance from hostile groups from which
aggression and sorcery may be feared; closeness to groups with which
a historical connection exists. The Hohorita people, though from a
wide range of clans, all have their origin in a fairly compact cluster
of Sangara villages. This has kept them together as a reasonably
solidary village. In Sivepe, we witnessed the exodus from Awala,
because of land problems; the exodus from Pamba, because of troubles
with neighbouring Kongohambo, to a place one mile removed; and more
recently, the exodus of small groups from Binduta and Garombi, in
both cases on the basis of historical affiliation. In the case of the
Binduta families, this was an agnatic or clan linkage; in the case of
Garombi, the links are far more complex and will be discussed under
the heading of "Internal Influences."

The village group was the organisational unit of settlement.
621 No larger cohesive group exists among the Orokaiva, though some
resettlement village groups were much larger than pre-eruption ones.

621 657 Groups smaller than a village were rarely resettled because the government placed almost total reliance on village constables for leadership roles. Piecemeal removal would have left some people without the leadership of a village constable. While the people would probably have managed quite well without him, the government could not have controlled such a group. In any case, the close cohesion of Orokaiva village groups was almost the one element of stability that was left immediately after the eruption and evacuation. The simplest administrative policy was the one actually followed, namely to leave the village groups undivided.

The factual data on emigrant allocation have been given in previous chapters.

. . .

177 It is always the individuals who have travelled who are responsible for innovations either by setting a personal example or by persuading the community.

I have not yet referred to the deepest acculturative influence
657 that was absorbed before the time of the eruption, namely the abolition
177 of inter-village warfare. Pacification had effects in all aspects of
culture: the kinship system, economic, religion, politics. It would
take a full monograph to trace these manifold effects satisfactorily.
The other major change of the early colonisation period, the introduction
of steel tools, was the subject of a recent book by Salisbury. I
have already pointed out that Waddell does not accept for the Orokaiva
Salisbury's thesis that the introduction of steel tools liberated a
vast amount of leisure time thus bringing many luxuries within reach
of the people. Waddell points out that the time now spent on cash
cropping is about equal to the time gained by the use of steel tools.

It is useful, however, to consider more broadly what have been
the effects of, not only the technological changes, but also the
political and ideological ones. By 1951, the Orokaiva had learned
and--in the ward of the 40's--rediscovered the magnitude of white power
and the need to respect it. They had also learned how vast were the
resources of white power and to what extent some of these resources
could suddenly become available to the Orokaiva, as happened during
the American army operations. They had seen that congenial relations
with white people were possible in certain circumstances, as during the
[556] war. The acquisition of wealth and power comparable to that of the
white people had become a generally recognised objective. Only the
[484] means by which this end could be achieved were still obscure. The
Orokaiva therefore began to value highly any opportunity to travel,
to observe the white man and his ways and those who had travelled
were accepted in the village as persons knowledgeable as to the means
of pursuing wealth and power.

[731] Developments since 1951 provided increasing opportunities for gathering this knowledge. The evacuation camps and resettlement villages provided precisely the kind of experience for which the Orokaiva had been searching. If the eruption had occurred two decades earlier, the response to European relief measure would not have been so prompt and cooperative. Somehow the experiences of the 1940's, with the rapid influx of foreign goods, the opening up of employment opportunities after the war, the establishment of numerous village schools had made the Australian rulers appear less threatening and stimulated a desire for further contact which was apparent in Orokaiva reactions to Australian post-eruption policies.

167 a village as small as Sivepe, statistical samples will sometimes show
freakish features of which the sociological significance should not
166 be overestimated.

Nine of the 12 labour migrants came from two of the families,
[469] namely the family of the village constable and that of the man who was
councillor for Sivepe over the years following 1956. The other migrants
came from three further Jegase families. The reason for all these
movements was, of course, the absence of employment opportunities
[873] close to Sivepe. One absentee from Sivepe was a boy of the Seho clan
who was at a secondary boarding school (Martyr's school, at Agenahambo).

Dissension was the reason for both the major migratory movements
into Sivepe. The two Jegase families who came to Sivepe around 1956
were originally residents of a hamlet near Binduta called Korinasusu.
All the other families of Korinasusu belonged to a different clan
(Usohu). Conflicts between the groups arose; one Jegase man felt
sure that deaths in his family were caused by Usohu sorcery and left.
Another Jegase man was then accused of sorcery against Usohu and
[621] decided it would be wiser if he left too. At one time, such families
might have set up a separate hamlet, but the government pressure
[657] towards consolidated villages led to their settlement at Sivepe, where
there were a number of other Jegase families.

I was not able to reconstruct precisely what led to the Sorovi
migration. Two of the men who settled in Sivepe were brothers of the
Garombi feast leader and the other men were linked with these two
by affinity or close friendship, as well as common clan membership.
[593] It is a general principle of Orokaiva family structure that the oldest
brother in any family has absolute control over the family land and
other family assets; he takes the place of the father. There is no
sort of appeal against his decisions. He has the duty to "look after"
his younger brothers and see that they prosper. If he fails in this
task, the younger brothers have only one recourse; namely, to leave.
In practise, the oldest brother is often compelled to divide up the
patri-money when such a split-up occurs. Certainly this is what
happened in the present case. The younger brothers renounced their
elder's protection and started out on their own. Again, due to government
pressure, they joined an existing village rather than starting a new
one, as they might once have preferred.

Sivepe was chosen for several reasons. One of them undoubtedly was the link that existed through the three women from Ajoro who had been captured and taken to wives by men from Garombi and Sivepe. The descendants of these men regarded themselves as bound by common ancestry, because the three Ajoro women were regarded as being closely related (nobody could say how, but the fact that they came from the same village was said to be sufficient). This was a link between Sorovi and one lineage of Jegase; there were also specific links with a Seho lineage. Furthermore, as was often emphsised to me, there were links of hereditary friendship. Also, the families had land very close to Sivepe.

657 Garombi was a somewhat delapidated settlement. The government
and the council were said to favour its dissolution and incorporation
621 into Sivepe and Binduta. This project was favoured by Sivepe which
was keen to enlarge its size. Sivepe could see that under the modern
166 dispensation, the greatest favours always went to the largest villages.
167 The large villages had shops, water supplies, a club house; the coffee
truck stopped there, and so on. There was also a prize for the most
improved village; here, too, size was thought an asset. In council
elections and many other contemporary situations, size meant power.
Sivepe was therefore eager to absorb these families, hoping that more
would follow. During the year of my visit, there were several meetings
about this with Garombi people; rumours of further migration were
hopefully spread around.

161 In contrast, Inonda slightly dropped in population in the period
under consideration. There was the same rise in the number of children;
[464] there was little loss through labour migration (only one man in 1962;
as Crocombe and Hogbin report; and still only one today). The decline
[166] in the number of households was due to dissensions; the households
shifted to neighbouring Ureo and Hohota. Perhaps this decline may be
[621] explained by the strong leadership exercised by one family--socially,
economically and ritually--so that anyone who fell out with that family
more or less had to leave. In contrast, Sivepe has several strong
personalities who had to make compromises with one another. Sivepe's
post-eruption development was shaped not by one dominant figure but
by several, each making a specific kind of contribution. Certainly,
there was factionism, but there was also balance between the rivals.
In the next two chapters, I shall deal with these two kinds of
internal pressure: the character of the key personalities and of their
rivalry.

CHAPTER VII: The Role of Mediators in Development

Section 1: Expatriates

I have referred, right through this report, to certain individuals
121 who seemed to play a key role in development. The study of these key
[028 individuals can be adequately carried out only if there is some team
work, preferably in the field, with the cooperation of a psychologist.
My own approach in this chapter is wholly impressionistic and probably
of little scientific utility. Nonetheless, the phenomenon of the
mediator, who often appears in a crucial role in situations where
values of a newly dominant culture are being transmitted to the newly
dominated, is an important object of study in a sociologically oriented
177 analysis of culture change. In an earlier work (Schwimmer, 1956)
I developed the thesis that between the two interacting cultures
there stand a number of people whose position is best described as
one of double opposition: they find themselves in opposition to their
culture of origin and also, inevitably, to the strange culture they
are seeking to influence and adapt, or to borrow from.

This thesis presented an oversimplified picture. An Australian expatriate, when in contact with Papuans, certainly, almost inevitably, sets up as a champion of his culture of origin and, consciously or unconsciously, pressures the Papuan to adopt it. On the other hand, my definition of the mediator also implied that this expatriate, in contact with his own people, sets up as a champion of Papuan culture. On the surface, this is very far off the mark. I have attended a number of expatriates' social gatherings and found that there was an almost compulsive tendency at these gatherings to devote the time to bemoaning the supposedly grave and irreparable faults in the Orokaiva character. If we are to cast these expatriates in the role of champions of Papuan culture, we are forced to go beyond the conscious level and thus trespass dangerously on the preserve of the psychologists.

177 One of the most fruitful sources for such an exercise (in this
report I shall confine myself to the barest outline) is found in the
●657 writings of C.A.W. Monckton, resident magistrate of the Northern
District in the first decade of the present century. Though Australian
administrators of today regard Monckton's methods with some horror,
I would still regard him as, in a deeper sense, a prototype of the
Territories administrator; he is more ruthless than those I met, but
also more candid and more deeply involved in Papuan culture. He was
extraordinarily influential: the Orokaiva fear of the white man, their
unremitting vigilance when a white man comes close, the cat-like caution
with which the white man is often evaded, can all be traced back to a

177 large extent to the bloodbath of these early days. It was he to whom,
● 657 above all others, the compulsive show of obédience Orokaiva make to white men can be attributed. It is therefore interesting to inquire what was the influence of Papuan culture on Monckton.

In order to show the atmosphere in which Monckton operated I shall quote a minor example (bypassing some cruder and more obvious passages of his books in which he describes shootings, floggings, tortures, etc.) where a sorcerer is brought before Monckton's court, accused of such crimes as causing a virgin of a distant tribe to produce still-born twins and causing the moon to alter its course and colour. Monckton advised the accused, so we are told, to plead "not guilty." "But I am guilty. I should not be much of a sorcerer if I could not do a little thing like that." In such cases, says Monckton (1922: 98). "The sorcerer would get a fine or a few months' imprisonment," Monckton explains that the New Guinea administration made witchcraft a crime punishable by law as a means of establishing respect for white man's law in the eyes of the Papuans.

[431] Monckton was very well aware that he was thus lending himself to a reciprocal transaction in which each side proffered the other a certain measure of prestige. The white man was most graciously given by the sorcerer a demonstration of his respect for the white man's law; in return Monckton (quite consciously, by his own admission) helped the sorcerer to "establish his reputation as a man capable of marvelous things, a man to be feared and conciliated with gifts" (ibid.: 99). On what basis, then, was the white man's law respected? It was on the principle of exchange which dominates and has always dominated Orokaiva social relations. (On this topic, see my doctoral dissertation.)

Monckton always bought his loyalties in this precise fashion. On one occasion (1934: Chapter 1) he invoked Papuan help to kill off a few troublesome marauders on the tacit understanding that the captors would be allowed to eat them. He appointed as his constabulary persons of high rank from various districts so that the Papuans would be afraid to kill the constables: their death might induce their own people to start a tribal war against the killers. In return the constables knew that their own villages would be quite safe from Monckton's bloodthirsty attentions. Furthermore, Monckton tells us that he was in the habit of making presents to his constables, paid for out of his own pocket, over and above whatever was supplied by the government. With these presents, he bought a kind of personal loyalty which was over and above that owed by the constables to their employing government. On one occasion his constabulary marched into Government House to protect Monckton while he was the guest of the governor.

Monckton admits that he made himself rather unpopular with the officials of Port Moresby. Neither the crudity of his methods nor the means by which he procured the special attachment of his praetorian guard were regarded as proper in a British officer. Some of his exploits, 657 177 such as his threat to chain some recalcitants to corpses they had refused to bury, never entered his official despatches; other exploits led to a series of inquiries and finally to his being edged out of the service.

While Monckton's methods were never practised again by senior officers in the Northern District, the tendency for the field men to become involved with Orokaiva ways of thought and thus incur the displeasure of Port Moresby has persisted. The Higaturu Council's land registration scheme, dreamed up by Popondetta public servants, is a case of that tendency. In this case land title deeds were issued which had no validity in law but which the district commissioner would protect with his strong right arm, such as Monckton would have done most efficiently. The arrangement was repudiated by higher authority in Port Moresby. Very often relationships between white employers and Orokaiva exist on two levels: an official level where wages are paid for work done and an unofficial level where the Orokaiva receives some small extra gifts and rewards his employer with some special loyalty. These "buckshees" are a regular pattern for which some allowance is made when calculating labour costs.

657 731 [466] A second and completely different type of expatriate was Mr. Kaad, who was in charge of the Ilimo evacuation camp. He neither relied on threats of dire punishment nor on the Orokaiva system of exchange bargaining. He came to the Territory in 1942 with the Army and stayed to become a patrol officer. He was soon seconded with the Department of Labour. It became his task to educate expatriate employers whose methods of treating their labour conflicted with the government's plan of improving relations between Australia and the Papuans. In particular his task was to advocate better methods of labour control than corporal punishment which had been extremely prevalent. Orokaiva informants told me that in fact corporal punishment on plantations ceased after the second world war. Mr. Kaad later became an Assistant District Officer. At the time of the eruption he had just come back from leave to move to a new post, when he was chosen for the delicate job of looking after the evacuation camp.

His task at Ilimo, as he saw it, was to help the recovery of people who "had their world shattered." He was greatly in sympathy with the new policy of promoting Papuan economic development and tried hard to make the resettlement villages he set up into foci for development. At the same time he was always flexible and ready to place the interests of recovery from shock above the interests of reorganisation. Shortly after, he was crippled in an accident. In 1967, he was teaching at the School for Pacific Administration in Sydney, training future generations of patrol officers in techniques of social and economic development which he practised before he knew them theoretically.

657 177 Most of the other expatriates who had dealings with Sivepe and Inonda moved quickly into anonymity. The roles played by a succession of government and mission servants were undoubtedly key roles, but their contact with the particular villages was too casual for their

177 individual names to become part of village history. The anthropologists
who had been in the two villages, under the auspices of A.N.U., were
[657] all very well remembered by name. When we included in a questionnaire
a request for the names of Europeans our informants knew well, we were
[125] given a list including all the anthropologists, by their first names,
and nobody else. This was almost a standard reaction. I am not at all sure that this close acquaintance made the anthropologists into key figures in development or that they were more influential in socio-economic development than the mission and government servants who, though anonymous, may have achieved more in this direction. A.N.U. personnel have made presents of coffee hullers, both in Sivepe and Inonda; one anthropologist taught his key informant in Inonda to drive a car, as a result of which this man found a permanent job with the administration. These certainly were tangible moves in the direction of economic progress.

177 I found that among the Orokaiva, unlike the New Zealand Maori,
I was never asked my opinion when some community decision was to be
123 made nor was any greater interest displayed in the views of my predecessors. I was usually told when something had been decided (and decisions almost always seemed to be reached in my absence) and naturally I always expressed pleasure at receiving the information. The pattern was different only when I myself was directly involved. On the other hand my participation in community activities was sought and much appreciated. Our behaviour was closely observed and some minor innovations in housekeeping (the making of washing lines, airing of blankets, etc.) may be due to my wife. Everybody seemed concerned that our presence should not disturb the precarious balance of power--and that we should be given no power. This suited my own purpose.

If the anthropologists may nonetheless perhaps be classed as key personalities, it is because Orokaiva attach special importance on the kind of relationships that are thus established with whites. I have already mentioned some hints we received that we might be returned ancestors; even if imagination does not go so far, the daily relationship established with the anthropologists comes close to what Orokaiva would regard as tolerable and human. It is in the texture of life that grows up between the population and the anthropologist rather than specific innovations that the importance of his visit lies; perhaps without realising it, he nurtures an ideology.

875 One of the significant mediators during my time in Sivepe was
the head teacher of Sasembata school. His case will provide an example
657 of the dangers of generalising about expatriates who are in fact an extremely complex group very imperfectly known. This man, aged about 28, had led a somewhat bohemian life in Australia, as a photographer, broadcaster and advertising agent. His decision to join the New Guinea mission was in part a conversion, in part a search for identity, in part a search for an assured place in the world. He married a mission teacher met in New Guinea. He found, in fact, that none of the fixed expatriate categories quite fitted him: he had absorbed, while in

875 Australia, enough of contemporary thought in literature, art and allied
subjects and enough general sophistication to fit only with difficulty
657 in the society of missionaries, planters and officials. At the same
time he was drawn to these groups because of his feeling that by coming
to New Guinea he had joined the "have's" and left the "have-nots"
behind. Though his bohemian background made him critical towards the
colonial attitude to Papuans, he faced a difficult problem in working
out his own. Both his own ambition and his wife's background (closer
to the mission norm) predisposed him to avoid identification with the
Papuans. On the other hand, when I met him, he still felt a little
uneasy at playing the pukka sahib role which was certainly a betrayal
of earlier principles. He was beginning to run into some difficulties
with Papuans on the mission station and in the villages. During the
year of our presence in Sivepe, he found what seemed an excellent
solution by being elected a member of the Higaturu Local Government
Council.

647 Though membership is open to persons of any ethnic group, it
seemed at first as though Orokaiva would not vote for an Australian
666 candidate. After all, they are well aware of the dangers of having
their local affairs controlled by foreigners. But as the election
[123] approached, attitudes changed. Quite early, they had asked me to stand,
but I excused myself as I would not be staying long enough. A little
later, the mission teacher heard that if he offered himself, he would
get some support. He went to the villages of his ward on an electioneering
tour and defeated the sitting member with a comfortable majority.
[829] The motive of the electors, as I was told, was that this energetic
young white man would be a good champion for Sasembata causes in a
council which, in pragmatic terms, was still largely dominated by an
Australian advisor. Furthermore, Orokaiva were well aware that their
own power over the mission teacher had increased considerably since
he depended on them for elective office. He and his wife could no
longer treat any callers in an offhand fashion, for were they not
also voters?

Section 2: Papuans from Other Districts

177 In our discussion of expatriates, we have shown that some kind of identification with Papuan values occurred in many of the most influential; this identification could either be positive, when the expatriate identified himself with the interests of the Orokaiva, or negative, when the expatriate used procedures not acceptable in his country of origin but effective in furthering his own interests in opposition to Orokaiva. For the Papuans, employed as pastors or in similar roles, and therefore resident among a strange tribe, the position was more complicated. Such a Papuan was not principally a mediator between his own indigenous culture and that of his new

796 The same pattern is found in the dancing which occurs nightly
177 before a major feast is held or before certain initiatory rites (like
the kere) are concluded. These are now referred to as "practises,"
[536] even though they are undoubtedly ritual acts in their own right. It
is also significant that the Orokaiva seasonal rites have been fitted
in as part of the Christmas and Easter observances, apparently as an
exotic appanedage, but in fact as a means of preserving traditional
religious obligations, even though in a changed form.

657 The same service of two masters is sometimes seen in the secular
sphere. People built lavatories, on official instructions, long before
[514] they dared to use them (for fear of sorcery). At Kendata, an hour's
[754] walk from Sivepe, I saw a village with new houses, built on the government's
instructions, but I was told nobody lived there except when
[361] there was a visit from the patrol officer. There are many such villages
in the Managalasi district. Here, government instructions are being
complied with but customary patterns have persisted. In Sivepe, not
very much show needed to be put on for the patrol officer. The place
was cleaned before he arrived, of course, but not significantly more
so than happened every week.

123 It is true that certain things were concealed from me in Sivepe,
but these fell largely into some simple and reasonable categories:
secrets known only to initiated men, secrets known only to members
of a family or of the Seho clan. It was not a practise of the people
to pretend to adhere to a custom they had abandoned or to pretend to
881 have abandoned what they were still practising. In the early days of
our stay, this did happen; it took some months before we discovered
that girls were secluded upon their first menstruation and then ceremonially
exhibited. We were told this custom no longer existed. But then,
we had referred to the custom with reference to what Williams said
about it; and in that form, perhaps, it was not or no longer practised
[841] in Sivepe. Later, I was told that if the ceremony was not performed
girls could not control their menses; there would be no way of stemming
[783] the flow of blood and everything would be polluted. Thus, the ritual
has persisted. Whether full-grown girls, completely naked, are carried
through villages at the present time I very much doubt (viz Williams,
1930: 207). I was told that these customs lasted until the second
534 world war and then were abandoned. But I found the word "abandoned"
always a dangerous one; the calling down of spirits with bullroarers
782 in preparation for a feast (viz. Williams) was also, according to
Sivepe informants, an "abandoned" custom; yet it happened in both
178 Inonda and Urarituru (a mile from Sasembata mission station) in 1967.
It was true that it had not been done in Sivepe for some time--not
since the middle fifties--and that there was no immediate intention
of doing it again. On the other hand, Sivepe knew the use of bullroarers
as a means of calling down spirits which would then be
present at a feast and give this feast magical potency. For the time
being, Sivepe people evidently feel that this procedure is unnecessary
for the achievement of their immediate ends but it is still part of the
store of available possibilities should a need appear to arise.

621 Naturally he was angry that his wife had been molested; his younger
brother who was rather fiery and quick to fight, was angrier still.
684 They both found themselves isolated as the kinsmen of the assaulter
took the opportunity of expressing their heart-felt views about the
two brothers, especially the pugnacious one who had successfully raped
a young Seho woman earlier that year. Both brothers said they would
go back to Binduta and the younger man actually did so. This shows that
their position in Sivepe was still somewhat unstable.

One of the objectives Sivepe had during the year 1966-7 was
657 to win a prize for the most improved village. This prize was awarded
621 by a committee of councillors and paid out of government funds. The
eagerness to align all the houses in two rows was partly due to this
361 desire to win the prize, though this was not the only motive. In
these circumstances, it was certainly evidence of esprit de corps to
fit in with the village plan and the objective of winning the prize;
it was also evidence of a lack of esprit de corps to ignore the village
plan altogether and build houses of inferior design in places where
they were extremely conspicuous. Yet this is what the immigrants from
Garombi and Binduta did. Lawrence, and the others who were keen about
village improvement, accepted this situation with much tolerance,
though Lawrence did go up to the Garombi houses one morning to talk it
over. No doubt he received assurances that something would be done;
the discussion was amicable enough. Yet this instance shows that the
amalgamating of villages poses organisational problems which place a
burden upon everybody: upon the old residents who must be tactful
and upon the new arrivals who will long continue to feel insecure.

CHAPTER XI: Epilogue--The Case of Hohorita

Section 1: Comparison Between Resettlement of Sivepe and Hohorita

731 My subject of study obliged me, both in Sivepe and Inonda, to
inquire repeatedly into the state of affairs in 1951. My informants
123 showed only limited interest in this line of inquiry. Robert, in
Sivepe, even began to tease me by composing a song about what he
considered to be an oddity of mine; every second line in this song
(which he improvised as we walked along the road) began with the words
"iji tiri pajetai" (the time when the volcano blew up)--I knew that
from that time onwards I could never use this phrase without looking
a little ridiculous. Such levity would have been unthinkable in
Hohorita. For most Hohorita people, the time of the eruption marked
the death of some, or many, of their closest relatives.

731 In the files of the Department of District Administration I
saw the official estimate of indigenous casualties in the eruption
[165] (Table 1).[A] The toll of the dead from the Sangara tribe was evidently
established by taking the total resident population of the Sangara
group of villages (1964) and subtracting from that total, 170 known
Sangara survivors. To these figures, 800 "Andemba dead" must be added
as these were also Sangara. According to these figures, 94% of all
Sangara died in the eruption. I have already pointed out that most of
the survivors either came from villages lying at the boundary of the
devastation area or happened to be away from home when the disaster
occurred. They escaped to Cape Killerton, were placed in an evacuation
camp at Oro Bay, shifted to Popondetta and in May, 1951, were able to
settle at the Northern edge of Sangara territory, in a village called
Irihambo where they found themselves under the close personal care of
Bishop Hand who encouraged them to build a fine new church. The
Bishop's purpose, as he explained to me, was to give this minute remnant
of the powerful Sangara tribe a sense of community, some hope in life.
[621] It was the people who chose the site for the village; the Bishop hoped
that later on, it could become a centre for cocoa production as climate
[361] and soil suits this crop very well. At that time, neither the people
nor the government seemed aware that the land occupied by the Sangara
[425] was no longer in law their property.

The whole block North of Irihambo as well as East of it had
been bought by the Crown around 1910, with the intention of encouraging
425 sugar plantations there, but this plan was stopped by sugar interests
in Australia. In the middle 1950's, a new plan arose to use this
657 extremely fertile area for cocoa plantations. Most of it was settled
in 1959 by Australian ex-servicemen, financed by a Credit Board
(Howlett, 1965). As this plan was in its initial stages, it was
discovered that the Sangara people were on the land and, in law, were

A [See Cat. 116, p. 205--Analyst]

425 trespassing there. Bishop David recalled, in my interview with him,
how amazed the people were that the land was no longer theirs: "What
●657 is this business of our land being *sold*? Our *fathers* sold it; *we*
should be able to get it back." In spite of the Bishop's protests,
the people had to leave their new village. They then moved about two
[361] miles closer to the mountain and to the centre of their traditional
land holdings and chose the site of Hohorita. (The Irihambo village
used not only Crown land but also the land of a planter, Mr. C. E.
Searle, who tells me he never objected to the presence of the village.
The situation is illustrated on Map XIII.)[A]

The shift from Irihambo was a gradual process, during which
361 several groups set up new villages independently. Today, the population
657 of Irihambo is dispersed over six locations: first, two large villages,
one behind the other, which have now virtually fused into one and
together are known as Hohorita; immediately to the side of this, a
mission station, with a church built of bush materials, similar to the
one at Sasembata, but not of the superior standard achieved at Irihambo;
finally three smaller breakaway villages, called Sombou, Kakita and--again--Irihambo. Though Hohorita people today are not ready to admit
it, they must have been very angry when they were told their Irihambo
land was to be occupied by white ex-servicemen. They pulled down the
beautiful church at Irihambo, much to the Bishop's chagrin.

Under the impact of the Higaturu Local Government Council,
Hohorita nonetheless gradually assumed the character of the other
modern resettlement villages; by June, 1967, the biggest of the breakaway
groups had joined the main village, which no longer looked like two
separate units but had been spatially integrated; the houses were
being aligned and modernised; in other more fundamental respects the
[177] Sangara people had become rather rapidly acculturated. By the criteria
used in the present study, acculturation had progressed rather more
rapidly than at Sivepe, though also more unevenly. In many respects,
[731] Hohorita had more difficult problems to surmount than Sivepe: the
death toll had left the tribe virtually leaderless; the resettlement
village was made up of the survivors of a dozen villages or more, which
made it rather heterogeneous; land titles were far more confused than
before the eruption; the establishment of an *esprit de corps* required
the forgetting of deep traditional intervillage antagonisms; a deep
sense of insecurity had been caused, first by the disaster and the
deaths and later, probably, to some extent by the failure of settlement
at Irihambo.

It was the general hypothesis of this comparative study of ten
731 displaced communities in the Pacific that displacement would lead to
accelerated culture change in some directions. This hypothesis was
177 tested by using, in each case, a control community, similar to the
relocated community but lacking the experience of relocation. In the
[121] case analysed in the present report, the experience of displacement at
Sivepe was comparatively mild in that the people soon returned to their
traditional land holdings and formed a village identical in personnel

A[See Cat. 116, p. End Map 12--Analyst]

Section 3: Social Environment

619 In discussing the Waseta "tribe" I suggested that its boundaries
would be hard to establish and that it gave little evidence of any
sense of unity. The case of Sangara is somewhat different; first of
[199] all, Sangara speaks a dialect of its own that is easily distinguishable
from that of other areas. Secondly, a Sangara man is able, if he is
knowledgeable enough, to list some 27 villages which formed a loose
military alliance, and between which raids and organised ward did not
[582] occur. These 27 villages formed at the same time an area within which
intermarriage would regularly occur. The present population of Hohorita
and the adjunct villages is drawn entirely from this alliance. (The
number 27 is probably an underestimate.)

621 Since the government made Sangara the centre of the Northern
District immediately after the war, patrols were active in the Sangara
[651] district to amalgamate villages. A number of the people now living in
Hohorita report that they came from such consolidated villages, such
as Tunana, which absorbed three neighbouring villages just before the
eruption. Informants say that the clusters of villages joined together
in this way had always been closely related. The population of Hohorita
is more diverse. I was at first told that it was composed of households
of four clans (Horeopa, Oripa, Besupa and Sehopa), the first two clans
being in the front village and the last two in the back village. A
house-to-house census revealed representatives of a further eight
clans, sometimes survivors of clans that had otherwise died out,
sometimes a clan more fully represented in Kakita or Sombou while two
clan names came from the Sasembata district, under circumstances to be
discussed later. Furthermore, when a number of families came from the
same clan, they were not always from the same village. While Sombou
was inhabited by the remnants of one cluster of four villages, and
Kakita by the remnants of one village, Hohorita offered a more general
hospitality to all Sangara.

621 Because of their history, the four Sangara villages built since
the eruption form a rather tight cluster, quite different from the
628 intersecting circle pattern I described for the Sasembata district.
When a person in Sombou died, the whole of Hohorita rushes to join the
wake. All four villages in the cluster do this for each other, but
[731] not for any other village. Because of the sharp drop in population,
and the way the survivors were thrown together after the disaster,
people who were previously bound together only by a very loose alliance
now behave in the same way as a small neighbourhood cluster of closely
related villages.

Meanwhile, the Sangara people are rapidly developing friendships and affinal links outside the tribe. In 1966, the front half of Hohorita gave a feast for Koipa (a large Isivita resettlement village), the back half gave a feast for Asigi, Irihambo gave a feast for Hohorita while Sombou, with the assistance of Kakita, entertained the Uhuru'undi

TABLE 12

REVISED ESTIMATES OF HIGATURU LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL FOR JULY 1966--JUNE 1967 (ABRIDGED)

Revenues	
Tax: 2000 males	$16,000
1000 females	1,000
Truck hire	13,000
Aid Post Orderlies Subsidy	1,250
Water Supply Subsidy	3,320
Aid Post Subsidy	240
Adult Education Subsidy	780
Miscellaneous	2,900
TOTAL	$38,490

Expenditure	
A. Personal Emolument	
Council President	$ 156
Council Vice-President	108
Councillors	1,560
Exec., Fin. Ctee	108
Council Clerk	1,170
Messenger	390
Landrover Driver	500
Truck Drivers	1,450
Agric. Fieldworker	234
Market Manager	260
Aid Post Orderlies	2,500
Health Worker	256
TOTAL	$ 8,692
B. Revenue Expenditure	
Council Administration	$ 1,000
Transport	5,000
Drugs	720
Adult Education	780
Other Items	1,686
TOTAL	$ 9,186
C. Capital Expenditure	
Drivers' houses (2)	$ 2,200
Council Staff House	800
Council House Furniture	500
Market Building	1,500
Staff, House, Health Personnel	800
Water Supplies (16 villages)	6,565
Clinics (3 Villages)	900
Roading (3 Projects)	6,070
Other Items	2,099
TOTAL	$21,434
GRAND TOTAL	$39,212

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The Papuan Orokaiva Vs Mt. Lamington: Cultural Shock and Its Aftermath

Felix M. Keesing

731 What happens when people are subjected to unexpected catastrophic shock, dislocating their whole round of life and making a sudden break in cultural continuity? This occurred to some 9,000 Orokaiva in northern Papua when Mt. Lamington erupted on January 21, 1951. Some 4,000 Orokaiva and all of the approximately 50 whites at the Government and Mission stations in the main blast zone were killed. The survivors were forced to flee from ash-choked homes and gardens.

114 121 At the request of the Administrator of Papua and New Guinea, the writer and his wife visited this area some weeks after the main eruption and shortly after a second major blast. The purpose of the visit was to make a brief survey of the relief and rehabilitation operations set in motion by the Australian authorities and to give any advice possible. This area was one of the great battlegrounds of the Pacific war—the Kokoda-Buna-Oro Bay area—and since there are still a number of usable airstrips and jeeproads, it was possible to cover the emergency camps and other Government and Mission operations by plane, and then by jeep, canoe, and on foot, and to get some sense of the consequences of this catastrophe and of the problems involved.[1]

121 This paper does not purport to be based on profound knowledge of the situation for it will take a long while before its total dimensions can be properly assessed. Rather it is designed primarily to raise questions: some of theoretical significance, particularly regarding the responses of such people to cultural trauma of the first magnitude, and others from the "applied anthropology" aspect, relating to choices possible in official and mission policies in the wake of such a destructive experience.

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[657] [1] The actual field survey, covering approximately five days, was made in the company of Colonel Elliott Smith, District Commissioner in charge of relief operations, and included discussions with virtually all of the Government technical personnel, with representatives of the one Mission body operating in the area (the Anglican Mission), and through interpreters with some of the Orokaiva leaders. Discussions were held, too, with the Administrator, Colonel J. K. Murray, and other administrative personnel at the capital, Port Moresby, all of whom had been in an out of the devastated area from the beginning, and relevant official records were made available by them.

[p. 16-A]

133 731 eruptions has subsequently continued, and reports as of December, 1951, show a persistence of these conditions and a recurrence of bad earth tremors. In other words the Orokaiva, Government and Mission are having to learn to live with the volcano for an indefinite period.

731 241 An observer passing through or flying over destroyed areas was struck by the fact that plants with large fleshy foliage such as taro (the staple food of the Orokaiva) and bananas tended to green over quickly. Root crops indeed sometimes showed accelerated growth, presumably through combined ash-rain fertilization, though considerable rotting set in later. Squads of men were organized to go into the more accessible areas within the blast perimeter to gather such surviving crops, though they were not permitted to stay overnight. These foodstuffs supplemented the official rations which consisted of rice, canned meat, some wheatmeal, peas, salt, sugar, and tea in generous quantity.

731 Within two months the whole situation was becoming reasonably "structured." The Government vulcanologist had defined a danger zone from eight to 12 miles around the active crater; no individual could go inside this area except with an official pass, and then only by day and for good reason. Those groups whose living sites were outside this closed area, or who could get land from relatives or others, were being allowed to resettle under conditions closely prescribed by supervising Government officers (this will be enlarged upon later in this paper). On this basis, some 2,500 persons had already left the refugee camps, though they were still being rationed to some degree. The "Sangara" people had been transported back inland from the Eroro camp to the Popendetta camp and adjacent zones within a few miles of their homes. The "Isivita" people at Oro Bay, numbering some 600, were being transported in batches of some 35 persons every other day by launch from the Oro Bay camp to Killerton, by truck to the Popendetta camp, then by small Dragon Moth plane to the Kokoda airstrip. From here they walked the approximately 20 miles to the Ilimo camp on the western side of the mountain where they had lived formerly. The Oro Bay camp was in this way closed down by May. At Ilimo, some 2,000 persons were living either in the first temporary huts such as the Orokaiva build for emergency or short-term housing, or in large newly-constructed houses of a more permanent type. (Somewhat later this camp population was reduced to about 1,500, comprised essentially of the surviving people from the west side of the mountain whose homes were in the closed-off area and who had not been able to find resettlement places outside). The Ilimo camp had a staff of some 14 white officials, aided by Papuan police and other assistants. In addition to the various welfare activities, there were schools for children and adults, sports, a community hall, and a large block of garden land broken in with tractors and other modern tools. Government was using it as an experiment in "community development" as well as a relief center.

731 657 177 [361] By that time, too, a whole series of policy problems had arisen which both the field staffs and the Australian authorities at Canberra and Port Moresby were trying to resolve. Most serious was the question of how far the crucial break with the past should be used as an opportunity to encourage

[P. 17-B]

731 or even force Orokaiva settlement patterns from the traditional
657 scattered hamlet system to village or even town living.
Another tough question was how far Government should step
177 in to supervise matters of economic and social welfare, including
[361] elementary schooling which hitherto policy had left almost
[797] wholly to the Anglican Mission. The majority of the mountain Orokaiva are now adherents of this Mission, the only body operating in the area. Questions relating to land tenure, social group realignment, leadership, law and order, and other matters involving local custom had also to be faced, especially in the course of the first experiments in resettlement.[4]

731 Officials and Mission workers reported that the explanations
784 of the "cause" of the disaster given to them by Orokaiva, were, in general, of a supernatural nature: "God" was punishing them for "sins" such as "not supporting Mission and Government plans for development," "not building new churches as requested by the Bishop," or "not helping the Allies enough during the war." However much these may
731 have pleased the hearers, the fact seems to be that there were
152 resulting strong feelings of insecurity and even of guilt in their retrospective look at the pre-eruption way of life.[5] Officials who know the Orokaiva considered that these feelings undoubtedly helped to foster the extraordinary degree of cooperation and orderliness in situations where large numbers of people were necessarily herded together and shifted around without benefit of the traditional niceties and proprieties.

This raises the whole problem of interpreting the overt
121 events here summarized in terms of their cultural and individual
731 contexts. In discussing theory relating to the dynamics of change and resistance to change, the writer, along with
178 others, has referred elsewhere to the general tendency for
182 peoples to be pre-conditioned by the characteristic sets of their culture and personality norms, to be differentially "adaptable" or responsive to change in the face of new experiences.[6] The impression gained in this case is that subject to inevitable factors of shock and disorganization, the Orokaiva were culturally predisposed to respond to the traumatic experience here described with something approaching maximum adaptability.

262 The mountain Orokaiva are shifting cultivators, and supplement their staple food, taro, with sweet potato, yam, banana and sugar cane. Flesh from domestic pigs, chickens, dogs, and wild game is what Williams calls "a dainty rather
241 than a diet." "Fresh ground," says this ethnographer, "is continually cleared for new plantings" in the typical pattern

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[113] [4] These matters are discussed particularly by C. S. Belshaw, an anthropologist working in Papua under the auspices of the Australian National University Research School of Pacific Studies, as a result of a visit to the area in April, 1951; see his "Social Consequences of the Mount Lamington Eruption," *Oceania*, 21, 4, pp. 241-252 (1951). This article was not seen until after the first draft of this paper was completed, and as the approach is considerably different the two papers are complementary rather than unduly overlapping.

[5] Belshaw, *op. cit.*, p. 202, stresses this "guilt" factor.

[113] [6] F. J. Keesing, "Some Notes on Acculturation Study," Sixth Pacific Science Congress, *Proceedings*, IV, pp. 59-63 (Berkeley, 1940); "Cultural Dynamics and Administration," Seventh Pacific Science Congress, *Proceedings*, 14 pp., mimeographed (New Zealand, 1949).

361 mingled more freely as a result of travel on the government 571 roads and trails (which they have to keep in order), trading, Mission and official gatherings, and other new opportunities for interpersonal relations. One special feature of Orokaiva 224 life in modern times is the annual burning-off of grasslands by hunting parties in order to get wild game. This has (628) probably involved the assembly of larger groups and is one of the few activities which could induce intersettlement cooperation. The writer sensed the parallel of the crude local 311 fires set for garden clearing and the general burning-off of grasslands to the major burning and blackening in the wake of the volcano—doubtless a mighty job of clearing to the Orokaiva eye.

157 Within the limits that brief characterizations of personality norms can be valid, observers seem to agree that the Orokaiva as individuals have traits congruent with the social structure that favor individuality and mobility. Even the casual visitor gets a sense of independence, alertness, self-reliance, "strong talking," dignity, restraint, imperturbability at meeting the unexpected event, and high-tension interpersonal behavior in general. This is in particularly striking contrast to such an elaborately structured society as that of Samoa, where the writer had been working shortly before. In informal groups seen around the camps and waiting at airfields for transport, women and children, far from being in the background, kept up a busy verbal exchange with the men. The Administration has considered the Orokaiva [657] territory as perhaps the best recruiting ground for its Royal [625] Papuan Constabulary on the basis of these personality characteristics, including ability to meet crisis conditions such as patrols may encounter.

771 The Orokaiva religious history is also particularly interesting here. Their traditional faith, Williams says, though in many respects vague and locally variable, concerned itself "primarily with the spirits of the dead" and their influence on the welfare of the living. Death was appraised with [761] particular realism, although it was considered ultimately as the result of supernatural causes. Magic had a consistent [789] place. Orokaiva country, however, has been swept in modern 794 times by a series of new cults indicative of religious adaptability in the face of fresh experience. First to come into prominence was the *Baigona,* or "snake cult" of 1911-12, succeeded from 1914 on by the so-called "Taro cult" which in turn had undergone a series of local reformulations by the time Williams reported on it in 1924.[7] Central features of the Taro cult were association of successful taro cultivation with the ancestral spirits, approached by way of a "shaking-fit" technique of revelation, together with somewhat new types of public ritual and symbols, including fragmentary elements from Christianity. Later Belshaw and others reported that "Christian Co-operative Evangelist" societies, which were developed by the Anglican Mission among some Orokaiva converts for the cooperative growing of rice and other crops, tended to assume a somewhat parallel 474 and absorbing mystical agriculture context. Rumors spread 668 of "an order from the King (of England) that co-operatives

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771 [113] [7] *Orokaiva Magic,* Part I; see also Chinnery, E. W. P. and Haddon, A. C., "Five New Religious Cults in British New Guinea," *Hibbert Journal,* 15, 3 pp. 448-463 (1917). Materials are also found in the official reports of the time.

[P19-A]

474 668 791 should be formed . . . (and that) as a result of their activities the white people would leave Papua and the villagers would be in charge of their own affairs." This type of cooperative movement was stimulated after the war, and included putting crosses in the gardens, offering prayers before gardening activity, building special houses in which cooperators could meet and eat, and collecting money for vague purposes. Even in the face of Mission reluctance and some Orokaiva opposition, Government finally stepped in to try to give it better direction; a Cooperative officer was trying to bring the situation under control when the volcano exploded.[8]

648 As final pieces in this background mosaic, the effects of World War II may be noted. When the Japanese moved in they formed labor gangs with the small number of captured whites, including Mission workers, later removing them when Allied attack was imminent. As battles ranged through the area, Orokaiva were drawn in as helpers, willingly or otherwise, on both sides of the lines. After the Japanese surrender, American forces built up large military establishments including airfields in the Buna-Oro Bay zone. Great numbers of Orokaiva were gathered together in work camps which were not unlike the present refugee camps as regards living [929] conditions, food, and social structuring. In the wake of the war, War Damage Compensation representing considerable money wealth by Orokaiva standards came into the [929] area. Some of the younger men who were "veterans" were given technical training at Higatura and elsewhere.

361 These Orokaiva were generally resistant to a war-stimulated movement to consolidate into larger settlements although it has had considerable vague along the coast and in the Kokoda region. Typically, the new villages have been built in an open area, with houses drawn up like a military encampment on three sides of a square or rectangle. The inner [526] square is used for soccer football, which is tremendously popular, and for other community purposes. 731 361 Subsequent to the eruption, the Orokaiva who resettled along the jeep-roads outside the danger zone were encouraged by Government officers to build this type of village, and the houses were laid out under the official eye. First, the men left the relief camps to erect buildings, and were followed later by the women and children. These new settlements contain anywhere from 100 to 400 persons, with the kin and hamlet alignments usually kept through contiguous housing. Such units are within sight of one another, and from the air resemble a chain of fairly continuous settlements. Some family and hamlet groups, however, have inconspicuously avoided settling in these new villages although this has been difficult because Government has tried to keep a very tight supervision in case its judgment as to the danger perimeter has been wrong. A government post was established in each of the two main resettlement zones to facilitate this supervision.

Belshaw has observed this resettlement in a somewhat ● [657] more advanced stage than was seen by the writer. He comments that in general the prime concern of the people was

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[8] Belshaw, *op. cit.*, pp. 249-252, gives a fuller account of this cooperative movement and its significance. Publications of the Anglican Mission also contain references, seen by the writer some years ago, but not available at the time of writing this paper.

731 to get out from under the direct control of Government and
361 that everything was "subordinated to this end." Those who had title to land outside the closed area and wished to get
[657] to it, readily agreed to official plans for resettlement, including the village building program. Those whose land was inaccessible—too far off the road or in the danger area—attempted to obtain permission to occupy land of kinsmen or others who might be willing. The most immediate objective was to break in gardens and to reduce or eliminate the need for rations, emergency wild foods, or daily treks into the closed area for salvage produce. Here difficult problems are foreshadowed. This pattern of settlement will be possible only on a short term basis. For longer occupation the people will either have to scatter out in widening areas to make their further seasonal shifting gardens, or else make the radical change to sedentary gardening which has no appeal to most of them.

731 The situation is made more serious by the fact that the safe land tracts are, in general, less fertile than the devastated
361 higher slopes; these and comparable areas elsewhere do not carry such relatively dense settlement.[9] Mr. H. T. Plant,
311 an officer with anthropological training, made a quick survey of land tenure and social structure in the resettlement zone on the Wairopi side. On this basis he estimated that
[161] with only about five acres at hand per person, or approximately 100 people to the square mile, the available land is inadequate by New Guinea standards to support the population. In April, Belshaw found that great uncertainty surrounded land use problems. There were frequent moves, uncertain titles, disputes over tenure, and conflicting authority among the hamlet and clan leaders. He predicted that it might take months to sort out the economic and social threads involved. It will take far longer to build up seed stock, domestic animal herds, and other bases for normal living, as well as the large quantities of food required for the proper ceremonies for the dead which will eventually be held. In due course other settlement areas than those immediately occupied will need to be found for people still in the camps.

731 Government and Mission personnel were ready to offer judgements on Orokaiva behavior in the crisis situation, and
152 camp records had some objective data to the extent that people broke the law, entered hospital with wounds, or otherwise came under official purview. In addition to the "sense of guilt" already mentioned, there was said to be considerable
[578] "anxiety," "irritability," "excitability," and "quarreling." The legal record shows several sharp clashes where injuries were inflicted, wife-beatings, and other kinds of quick tempered violence. Under extreme provocation, it was said that they might "throw hysterical fits." An obvious source of early tension came from not knowing the fate of missing clansmen. Officials denied knowledge of any significant mental derangements beyond the scattering of instances known previously.

The Oro Bay camp inhabitants appeared to be under by far the most stress and strain. Here, out of sight of the

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[9] Williams, after referring to the rich Lamington slopes, says: "A somewhat discouraging contrast is found in the forests of the plain proper, which are sometimes gloomy and waterlogged . . . and of wholly inferior quality" (*Orokaiva Society*, p. 12).

[P.20-A]

731 152 [823] mountain, wholly on official rations, and with nothing to do, the people were a prey to all kinds of rumors as to what was going on elsewhere. Furthermore, these mountain people apparently could not conquer a fear of the sea, and this was reinforced by a rumor that a supernatural "tidal wave" was to occur along the coast. The camp director told how every night the more timid scattered on to the higher ground rather than sleep in the camp on the foreshore. Prior to the liquidation of this camp the authorities sent one of the leading men back to the big Ilimo camp and the home area so that he could return with a factual account of conditions and allay the other inmates' fears as far as possible. A strong current of tension running through this whole situation was: "What does Government intend to do?" All these behavioral conditions appear psychologically congruent with the long term personality norms.

731 361 177 The new group alignments of the camps and resettlement areas presented interesting tests as to how far larger aggregations could be structured effectively enough to show promise of permanence. This matter is particularly crucial to policy, and constitutes the major challenge from the viewpoint of "applied anthropology." Reference has been made in the foregoing to a controversy which arose as to whether this would be an appropriate occasion to resettle the survivors in centralized communities, or to allow them to scatter as before in a dispersed pattern of settlement consistent with safety. Some officials resented the idea that the catastrophe should be used to "put over" anything other than those rehabilitation operations that are in line with the habits and sentiments of the people. On the other side was an opposing official viewpoint, and a powerful Mission sentiment, that it would be in the long term interest to take the opportunity to concentrate the surviving Orokaiva into a small number of population centers, with proper welfare and other services. The first village building program represented something of the latter viewpoint, though some even visualized bringing the people into a handful of large townlike communities, much like the Ilimo camp-settlement, with cooperative agriculture and other modernization. The Orokaiva, so far as their views had been, or could be obtained, appeared to have no crystallized opinion. Because of the factors playing upon them, they were for the time being particularly susceptible to the suggestions of those official and Mission workers who brought the enthusiasm of reformers to the cause of concentration.

731 The writer was asked to give an opinion on this matter. The following points seemed clear, even from a quick view:

657 361 177 1. The loosely organized Orokaiva society has no significant pre-existing socio-political institutions and loyalties beyond the immediate kinship and hamlet alignments. A camp concentration, therefore, remained a congeries of traditional groups, each dealing with Government authority through its senior leader. Officials said that a few particularly strong men of super-local reputation were tending to take leadership in speaking when the "headmen" were brought together for informal camp "councils." But essentially, for purposes of issuing ration and other activities, each small group had to be dealt with as a unit, and otherwise kept its integrity. Here and in the newly formed villages, Government de-

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731 657 361 177 liberately endeavored to keep everyone busy, and the men spent much of the time in work gangs (e.g. Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday were usually devoted to house-building; Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday to gardens; Friday to roads and hygiene). But leadership and organization were creatures of Government, and to some extent of Mission. There were no significant signs of a self-motivated superstructure taking form other than the strengthening of scattered clan ties. Consequently, should larger communities be established with the purpose of preventing the people from scattering out again, they would have to be bureaucratically or theocratically controlled with all the dubious consequences such a situation can entail.

731 657 578 [625] 2. Reasonable law and order was being maintained in the new settlements, under the eye of a considerable force of the Papuan Constabulary sent in for the emergency. Opponents of a concentration policy claimed, however, that the elder patterns of intergroup hostility and violence are not far enough below the surface to justify the risks involved in larger long-term aggregation. As indicated, problems of land tenure are a major potential source of conflict. Another is "woman trouble," judging from experience in the camps where husbands and wives find themselves in informal association with members of the opposite sex, in contrast to the normal tightly structured small units.

731 754 514 3. Not least among the uncertain factors is that of sorcery. According to those who manage the settlements, fear of coming under the influence of strangers who practice sorcery shows itself as a vague but persistent factor. Most overtly it has emerged in connection with the disposal of waste products in the large camps. In typical Papuan fashion the Orokaiva is extremely secretive in his disposal of faeces and other leavings of his body because of the possibility of their use against him in harmful magic. A crucial question, therefore, has been whether group toilets could provide enough anonymity to forestall opportunities for the practice of sorcery. The problem was dealt with where possible by putting men's and women's latrines over running water. This social-supernatural sanitation problem could be serious where long term settlement of large groups is being planned.

731 361 241 4. On the economic side, no sound basis seems in sight for establishing large permanent communities in the comprehensive manner proposed. As indicated, the familiar pattern of shifting gardens will normally involve seasonal movement outward from the immediate environs of the new settlements where most present cultivations are now being made. As yet, no widespread disposition exists to adopt more [242] intensive sedentary cultivation, although undoubtedly some will be prepared to try to continue cooperative experiments with rice and other crops and, hence, will be amenable to Government and Mission encouragement and aid here. As 731 657 [241] [177] 731 231 in socio-political affairs, the responsible organization and leadership would in general have to be provided from outside, with the dependence relationship that this implies. Government might have to continue helping any large community for an indefinite period, as with the mechanized agricultural production it is introducing at the Ilimo camp. In large settlements the technique of handling domestic pigs and chickens, vital sources of protein, is always a difficult

731 [231] problem—and one which the Orokaiva will not be equipped to solve when stocks of these animals are eventually restored. It seems fair to prophesy that as the people become habituated to living in the shadow of the volcano, many of them will quietly "hive off" from the present concentrations and go their familiar economic way. Alternatively, official opposition to this trend could produce growing tensions, including anti-Government hostility.

[57] [799] 5. Other factors can be noted congruent with the above points. Some individuals are said to fear that in larger communities they will face more extensive demands for village maintenance and other Government and Mission needs than under the old patterns of settlement. [799] Belshaw points to a complication of the labor situation in the resettlement areas due to a request by the Mission that its adherents devote some time to building new Mission stations in the area. [178] As indices of the increasing normality of life, there is some revival of dancing and music, as well as keen sports interest.

731 361 On the basis of such factors, the writer ventured to present to the Administrator and a group of his top officials a view opposed to a compulsive concentration policy. He suggested, instead, that three or four main "centers of attraction" be developed outside the danger zone and on the main road, corresponding to the principal ethnic concentrations (Sangara, Isivita, Wasida). Here would be located subdistrict offices, Government boarding schools, medical aid posts, community center houses, experimental garden plots, and other facilities. Housing space could be made available to those desiring to settle around such a center voluntarily and try out more concentrated and sedentary living. The Mission could also use such centers for their stations if it wished. The writer also recommended cutting a series of crossroads more or less at right angles to the main road, and locating each "center of attraction" at a main crossroad point. These secondary roads would serve to draw settlement away from the overcrowded chain of villages that have developed along the one main road. This plan would enable those people who do not wish to be concentrated to scatter out in a wider pattern of dispersal for garden development; it would offer quick routes of escape on foot or in vehicles in case of the threat of further eruptions, ready access for government welfare services, and for transporting commercial crops to market. The writer has subsequently been informed that these proposals in general correspond with the policy which was officially adopted—crossroads have been cut and government centers and facilities have been built up at three key points.

731 799 The second problem referred to earlier, namely the delicate one of Government versus Mission responsibilities, will be discussed only briefly. The Mission teachers claim that the great majority of the mountain Orokaiva are adherents: those remaining outside the church do so by conscious choice. In the wake of the eruption the Anglican authorities sent in a very active, young Bishop who was familiar with the people, to take charge in place of the resident white staff killed at Sangara. Mission medical workers took over some of the important health responsibilities, including a [895] [872] Mission hospital at Oro Bay. "Native" Papuan Mission teachers started elementary vernacular schooling in the camps.

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This was in accordance with the official policy of the Territory that mission bodies shall normally handle at least the first four years of "village" level schooling. In such a major center as Ilimo, however, the question arose as to whether Government should step in to provide more adequate schooling facilities as part of its "community development" program. This was complicated by the fact that children of non-adherents had to come under the Mission teachers if they were to get schooling. The writer was told that in [875] the morning these teachers went through the camp with switches to get children to school. Another potential conflict was foreshadowed at the time of the writer's visit by [241] [657] the Mission's decision to send in agricultural workers in the face of the active program of rehabilitation by Government technical officers.

657 The writer gave it as his opinion that the Government should not abrogate its responsibilities in essential matters of rehabilitation, that it should insist on coordination rather than rivalry. It is understood that this view has been made policy, even in the face of the great sensitivity of Government in such delicate relationships that could reflect back in the form of criticism by religious groups in the metropolitan country. Government schools have been opened and the people are free to choose between them and the Mission institutions. Official medical services have become well organized. It will undoubtedly take time to unravel the question of the Mission role in agriculture, particularly as it is bound up with the religiously-oriented cooperative movement. There could be further new cults centered upon gardening and, as with various other post-war movements in the New Guinea area, these could be either pro- or anti-Government or Mission or both.[10]

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The possibility of transforming Orokaiva agriculture from the shifting to a sedentary basis deserves a special final word. A recent report of the Director of Agriculture stresses this problem as of prime importance to the development of

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[113] [10] Though extensive materials exist in unpublished official reports on post-war New Guinea cults (e.g., the Paliau movement in Manus, the Yali cult in Madang, the Tomu Kaba cult in the Purari delta) very little has been published. Available references are Belshaw, C.S., "The Significance of Modern Cults in Melanesian Development," *The Australian Outlook*, 4, 2, pp. 116-125 (1950); de Bruyn, J.V., "The Mansren Cult of Biak," *South Pacific* (Journal of the Australian School of Pacific Administration, Sydney), 5, 1, pp. 1-10 (1950); Guiart, J., "Cargo Cults and Political Evolution in Melanesia," *South Pacific*, 5, 7, pp. 128-129 (1951); United Nations Mission, *Report of Visiting Mission, 1950* section on Paliau movement, reproduced in *South Pacific*, 4, pp. 207-208 (1950). A brief analysis of modern cults is given in Keesing, "Research Opportunities in New Guinea," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, 8, 2 (Summer, 1952).

[p.22-A]

241 177 the Territory to the point of self-sufficiency and dietary adequacy and one on which almost no progress has been made. Theoretically the problem does not look difficult, in view of the characteristic adaptability of the Orokaiva, the loose group organization which involves no elaborately structured hierarchy of vested interests in the *status quo,* and the freedom of families to experiment as they wish as more or less independent production units. But here, as in the case of shifting gardeners in many comparable situations, the problem is one of motivation, of incentives. Among the Orokaiva, for all the enthusiasm they have engendered, past religious and cooperative movements have not struck seriously at the rotational basis of cropping, or introduced fertilization [654] and other soil-maintenance techniques. The territorial Department of Agriculture is desperately short of manpower and it is not likely that it can afford to station a permanent cadre of technical personnel to guide and supervise this [799] still quite remote district. It is also very doubtful that the Anglican mission could do so. Nevertheless, at the centers referred to above, the present dynamic situation justifies giving encouragement and aid on a voluntary basis to any families and individuals who may wish to try out sedentary cultivation, market saleable products, and on a cooperative basis of organization where desired. Such a non-compulsive widening of the range of cultural alternatives seems in line with a current strong stirring of ambition among some of the younger, schooled Papuans to adapt to the modern world and have a greater voice in the affairs of the Territory.

731 177 178 121 To the extent that this paper presents a correct interpretation, its implication is that this catastrophic shock has produced something approximating a minimum degree of cultural trauma, considering the demographic dimensions and the destruction and death involved. Predispositions in Orokaiva culture and personality favored relatively easy "adaptive" behavior in the face of crisis. [657] The remarkably effective relief measures taken by the Australian authorities helped materially to cushion the situation. Any attempt by Government and Mission to use the emergency to manipulate such a people and culture arbitrarily in drastically new economic and socio-political directions would seem foredoomed to failure, and would generate unwanted tensions. Yet opportunities are clearly present for economic and other stimulation and education of a voluntary and permissive type. 121 Considered as a case study in cultural dynamics it is illustrative both of internal readjustment in a culture where a sharp shock and break in continuity occurs, and of the implications of attempted control and direction in culture process by a dominant outside authority.

[p.22-B]

781 gara lived close to a large mission station which offered educational facilities until it was wiped out by the disaster. Afterward, the mission took a special interest in their welfare.

781 What distinguished the relocated villages from the others was not greater contact with European-dominated institutions. On the
184 contrary, it would seem that contact with such institutions was
[177] probably most frequent among the male residents of Inonda, who were much engaged in wage labor; such contact was least frequent in Sivepe, with Hohorita holding an intermediate position.
[434] Nor could it be said that economic prosperity, in the sense of money income, was correlated with relocation. On the contrary, the average income was higher in Inonda than in Sivepe or Hohorita.

781 In summary, the major outcomes of the eruption and relocation have been the following: first, the administrative center Higaturu,
657 situated on the mountain, was destroyed and replaced by Popondetta, which lies on the alluvial plain to the north, thus shifting the center of Australian influence away from the relocated villages. This detracted from rather than contributed to development of the relocation areas and placed the administrative center at some distance from the areas of greatest population density. However, the relocated villages were provided with subsidiary centers of Australian influence such as the hospital in Saiho and the mission
781 stations at Sasembata, Isivita, Agenahambo, and Hohorita. In addition, a number of large villages (with populations of 250 to 500)
361 came into being along the main road between Popondetta and Kokoda at a distance of 6 miles or more from the crater; these villages were made up of groups previously domiciled in small bush villages.

[177] The government prefers these large villages because they make it possible to introduce such Western social institutions as schooling, water supplies, road construction, and health clinics more conveniently. The eruption offered the government a good opportunity to establish large villages. The population of the bush settlement had abandoned the area, and by the time the population was allowed to return, the villages were no longer habitable because of
781 eruption damage and subsequent neglect. In this sense the eruption offered an opportunity for speeding up development pro-
178 grams. One might also argue that social development among the Sangara survivors was accelerated when the entire older genera-

829 627 weapon, since the person who cuts down his own tree to injure himself shows anger about a hostile act perpetrated by some unnamed person. He thus makes a claim for community sympathy and possible restitution (Williams 1940). Self-accusation is a form of self-injury and therefore at once places an obligation on the *sufferer* of the supposed original injury. In this sense an acknowledgment of guilt by Orokaiva would place some obligation on Sumbiripa or God to forgive them. Thus we can never ignore the transactional element in what is manifestly a sincere state of contrition.

731 784 797 It is far more complicated to explain the anger of the Christian God, and people's belief in it, than to explain the anger of Sumbiripa. At the time of the eruption, few Orokaiva had been baptized, whereas it was precisely in Sangara territory that the mission was well established and had many adherents. Most of the persons who thought they had been punished by God were actually still pagan, which strictly should have put them out of reach of his wrath. We need to reconstruct as best we can what kind of exchange relationship was deemed to exist in 1951.

We can appraise this only if we consider briefly the total system of relationships of the Orokaiva within the colonial macrosystem, namely the social unit comprising Orokaiva, mission, government, and traders. Theories about the punishment of God referred not only to Orokaiva neglect of the mission but also neglect of instructions and advice given by the government. The traders were never mentioned.

● [657] [797] One common characteristic of government and mission is that both institutions believe they are the Papuans' benefactors and say so on many occasions. In particular, it is on these supposed benefits that they base any moral claims they make on the Orokaiva. When the eruption occurred it was therefore reasonable, from the Orokaiva viewpoint, to conclude that their slowness in satisfying the claims of government and mission had aroused in them great anger and that God, who manifestly was looking after the white authorities, acted as agent of the punishment.

829 431 177 In exchange relations it is a fixed policy to satisfy the claims of important partners first and be much slower about the others. The fact that the whites, in spite of their immense wealth, had a fairly low partnership ranking is not difficult to explain. If we glance at the kind of interaction typical of the years 1900 to 1950, we find

829 that the European exchange partner did not have a great deal to offer the Orokaiva, because not even money was essential. Con-
431 versely, the fear of the trouble the white man might cause was not
177 so great as one might suppose. Certainly, there were horrifying stories about what the white man might do if angered, but the Orokaiva had since learned some simple rules telling them how such anger could be most conveniently evaded.

657 Until World War II, the relationship between the Orokaiva and the government followed this general pattern almost entirely. The
177 government made the regulations and the Orokaiva did the unavoidable minimum. World War II began to change the pattern of
177 this partnership. Australian and American soldiers moved into the Northern District to drive out the Japanese. They camped in the bush, they shared their food with the Orokaiva, they accepted Orokaiva hospitality, they generously distributed what supplies they had to spare. The white soldier, unlike the civilian, lived in a style much closer to what the Orokaiva consider human. He laughed and joked in the presence of the Orokaiva; he put on no colonial pretense.

657 After the war, the Australian government changed its policy in the territory, suppressing corporal punishment of employees, em-
177 phasizing economic development in the villages, improving schooling, introducing local self-government on a limited scale (and later political representation in the House of Assembly), offering Papuans jobs of some responsibility, and discontinuing the type of village policing that made all reforms dependent on the enforcement of regulations. The village constables, whose job was in practice confined to reporting infractions of the regulations, were replaced by elected officials (local government councillors) who are indoctrinators rather than policemen. They harangue the people with a diffuse message covering a wide area of social and economic development. They seek to secure acceptance for new ideas, so that people will genuinely believe in the usefulness of changes they are making.

657 When I visited the Orokaiva in 1966–1967, I found a great deal of ideological discussion, the key concept being *iji eha* ('the new
179 day, the new age')—a new way of life based on the economics of coffee growing and wage earning, the social amenities of improved villages, school education, Christianity, avoidance of violence, and, generally, cooperation with the mission and administration. I

657 was amazed to see how closely the councillors' harangues and
other speechmaking in the villages corresponded to official poli-
179 cies. Many of the advocated ideas were not being put into prac-
tice, but generally the transition seemed rather smooth. There
were conflicts between the Orokaiva and their mentors, in some
instances irreconcilable ones, but it seemed that consideration of
these conflicts was being deferred because there was evidence of
steady improvement, as long as coffee prices would only keep
rising.

829 Informants, when asked when the 'new age' had started, all replied that it was after the Japanese were driven out. The eruption was never mentioned as the beginning of the 'new age'. It was after the war that the money economy became important and men began to take jobs outside the village for protracted periods. It was then that money became a necessary part of bridewealth so that, as an initiatory ritual, every young man had to have earned some. It was after the war that village improvement started seriously, as the history of individual Orokaiva villages shows.

781 The eruption of Mount Lamington in 1951 came a few years
after these beginnings, at a time when the impact of money was
179 not yet great, though the government and mission had had time to
communicate the new order they sought to establish and to press
for changes the Orokaiva were not too ready to accept. The erup-
tion strengthened the message. On the transactional level, there
was the large-scale help offered by the Europeans after the erup-
tion. This was done in the most dramatic way possible, by planes
dropping their riches in great abundance shortly after the disaster.
177 Certainly such a massive display of concern in a moment of need
did much to enhance the image of Europeans as desirable ex-
change partners. This display was followed by the organization of
the camps and by the widespread introduction, especially at Ilimo
Camp, of activities that were symbolic of the 'new age'.

Daily church services were conducted, all children were given regular schooling, adults were educated in a number of new agricultural and technical skills, good medical services were provided, and regular food and clothing distributions continued. New ideas on housing, village layouts, and women's handicrafts, lectures on how trade goods are manufactured in Australia, the presence of a strong development-oriented and numerous European staff—all these elements must have amazed the Orokaiva villager of 1951, 121 construct a higher-level system which accounts for all the explanations taken together.

Let us first survey the relationships between the explanatory
731 systems on the social level. They do not logically contradict one
829 another: they can be and are held simultaneously by the same people.
184 There is no need to believe that the eruption was caused *either* by God *or* by Sumbiripa nor that the intended victims were *either*
[776] Orokaiva *or* Europeans. My informants did not seem to view God and Sumbiripa as wholly distinct. Whether one ascribed the eruption to one or the other depended on the context of the discourse. Most Orokaiva do connect the death of European public servants and army personnel at Higaturu with the hangings that occurred after the war. They believe that these Europeans acted wrongly and that God punished them. But at the same time they believe that the eruption was a sign of God's anger toward the Orokaiva who had not followed the laws of the Church of England.

One cannot, therefore, gauge the relative strength of the three ideologies by counting what proportion of a sample of Orokaiva informants subscribes to one or another of the three explanations. One can, however, evaluate the general effect of each of the three ideologies. The belief that Sumbiripa caused the eruption had only the mildest historical consequences—merely the reinforcement of a hunting taboo. The belief that the mountain erupted to punish Europeans might have become historically important if the mystical Yega cooperative movement had grown to a major millennial
[794] cult, but this did not happen. In fact, the Yega cooperatives went into a decline after 1951, owing to crop failure, the departure of its advisors, and governmental opposition in the form of economic and legal obstacles.

None of these reasons would have sufficed to kill the movement
731 had there been, in the 1950s, a strong opposition to the adminis-
657 tration of the Northern District. There is, however, no evidence of
797 this. On the contrary there was, between 1951 and 1967, steadily increasing support for the ideologies advocated by government and mission. In this context the theory blaming the eruption on previous noncooperation by Orokaiva obtains some historical significance. It would be absurd to suggest that the increased support can actually be explained by the existence of the Orokaiva theory about the eruption. On the other hand, this support is now undoubtedly more powerfully motivated than if the eruption had

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 330]

731 never occurred. The vast increase in the number of baptisms in-
dicates a significant development in the pattern of transactions in
● 657 the exchange relations with the new god.

777 The effect should not, however, be overestimated, as the en-
vironment and the socioeconomic situation did not change signifi-
731 cantly immediately after the eruption. No socioeconomic trans-
formation occurred because of the eruption or the belief that the
178 eruption itself was divine retribution for noncooperation with the government. On the other hand, significant social, political, and economic changes did happen within ten years or so of the eruption; and when these changes occurred, they were interpreted in a manner consistent with the Christian explanation of the eruption.

Let us now consider the relationship between the various ex-
731 planations on the religiophilosophical level. Perhaps the best
184 starting point for our analysis is our apperception that the three
778 religious explanations have to do with political strategies—that is,
with the maximization of power. It may be enlightening to look at these strategies in terms of the Orokaiva's own general ideas about power. The Orokaiva word for 'power' is *ivo*, a mana-like concept envisaging 'power' as derived from spirits and bringing success in difficult ventures by overcoming misfortune, obstacles, and enemies. Misfortunes are explained by 'power' coming from a hostile source—for instance, from one's human or spirit exchange partner during a cycle of negative reciprocity.

The first of these three explanations postulates the existence of a negative exchange cycle with Sumbiripa, so that the people's 'power' depends on placating Sumbiripa and avoiding his anger in the future. The second explanation postulates that, in fact, the disaster was a restoration of the 'power' of the Papuans, as it punished Europeans who hanged Orokaiva ambushers. The third explanation, however, raises some difficulties. The restoration of 'power' here seems to depend on obedience which must be shown to the mission and the government.

This question of obedience is perhaps more one of degree than of essence. Students of religion (such as van der Leeuw 1938) distinguish between relations of "manipulation" and "obedience" which may exist between man and the gods. In this sense the relations with Orokaiva deities, including Sumbiripa, would tend to be manipulative. On the other hand, the relationship with the Christian deity involves far greater and far more diffuse demands, 829 the enemy, but rather in the Papuan sense, where one contends with exchange partners in an inconclusive tug-of-war and the strength of the opponents is approximately equal. Victory, in other words, is the establishment of an equal rather than an unequal relationship.

Given this view of the European-Orokaiva relationship, it is difficult to distinguish between millenarian and gradualist ideologies among the Orokaiva. They are all, in a sense, millenarian, even though they advocate full collaboration with both mission and government. From the more objective view I have taken here, 731 the three Orokaiva ideologies present at the time of the eruption 184 all convey the same message. They are all concerned with the res- 829 toration of what the Orokaiva call 'power', which always implies some form of power balance between themselves and their colonial masters.

IDEOLOGY, POWER, AND LAND

128 As we have seen, all Orokaiva discourse about the eruption can be reduced to one basic theme: competition for power between Papuans and Europeans. I have not surveyed administration discourse about the eruption in the same detail, but it is safe to say that, apart from the mechanics of relief, the administration was likewise concerned with one central ideological theme, namely socioeconomic development. Our structural analysis would hardly be adequate unless we considered the relation between these two ideologies, not only in abstract terms but also in the framework of concrete events.

731 During the period immediately after the disaster, the administration planned to make the evacuation camps the beginning 657 of permanent relocation under conditions where socioeconomic development throughout the region could be accelerated (Belshaw 1951; Keesing 1952; Plant 1951). While this relocation was being planned, the evacuees were adamant that they wished to go home as soon as possible (Belshaw 1951; Kaad, personal communication). That the administration gave in to the evacuees should not be regarded as a Papuan demonstration of their own power but rather as a necessary response to practical problems facing Orokaiva as swidden agriculturists lacking a secure system of individual, unencumbered landholding. The circumstances of the closing

731 of the evacuation camp provide an interesting case study in the
relation between administration and Papuan ideologies.

● 657 Several frightening explosions and floods occurred in February
and early March 1951. These vindicated the administration's re-
731 stricted area policy, which kept the mountain slopes out of
bounds. But after the period of acute volcanic phenomena was
166 over, Orokaiva pressure on Mr. Kaad, administrator of the Ilimo
Camp, grew steadily. The opening up of restricted areas began as
early as April 1951, so that the population of Ilimo began to
decline sharply in that month—from 2,000 to about 1,000. It
declined to 500 before the camp was closed in May. Although the
speed of resettlement did not actually conflict with administration
policy, Kaad freely admits that the pace was forced by Orokaiva
pressure.

This speedy return to the land was prompted largely by fears
which rapidly began to overshadow the Sasembata villagers' fear
[769] of the mountain. In part, these fears were religious. Separation
from the land meant separation from ancestral spirits who were
left altogether untended when the whole community lost access to
the land. Proper birth rites and ritual care for infants became im-
possible, as was ritual care for the dead, for both must be per-
formed on the taro field associated with certain deceased consan-
[422] guines. On the sociojural level, the migration of an entire agnatic
group was dangerous since it could activate residual rights over
land which were held by other agnatic groups.

121 It is likely that the same anguish about separation from the land
would have been felt by most swidden agriculturists in the same
circumstances. Such anguish cannot be fully explained by the reli-
gious and jural system prevailing in one culture alone. My purpose
in this chapter, however, is more limited. It is to relate Orokaiva
ideas about the eruption to Orokaiva ideas about land and spatial
movement.

423 These ideas are part of the structural patterns to which I re-
ferred above: the weakness of corporate groups and the emphasis
425 on the exchange system (see also Rimoldi 1966; Schwimmer
1970a, n.d.). At least half the land in Sivepe and nearly all the
land in Inonda is occupied by persons other than the agnatic cor-
poration acknowledged to be the "original" owners. Occupation
of such land arises mainly out of use rights granted by these own-
ers to nonagnates. In practice such use rights often become heredi-

182 423 614 dependence on the exchange system for the creation of larger solidarity networks. In a culture where warfare was endemic, these larger networks were indispensable in order for the traditional land tenure system, with its emphasis on multiple rights, to be socially adaptive under precontact conditions.

178 423 The 'new age' ideology, as expounded in 1966–1967, does not ignore these basic conflicts but incorporates them in the notion that multiple ownership belongs to the 'past age' whereas sole tenure is the modern ideal. There is strong support today for administration moves to establish a system of sole titles and to abolish the institution of multiple rights. Cash cropping has emphasized the need for such a change. In practice most Orokaiva today plant cash crops on patrimony land rather than on land on which there are invocable claims of residual rights.[18]

The movement toward individual landholding did not start in the Northern District until the mid-1950s, when there was a government-inspired attempt to have landholding titles issued by the Higaturu Local Government Council (see Crocombe and Hogbin 1963). I am not aware of any organized attempt to reform the system of Orokaiva land titles at or before the time of the eruption of Mount Lamington. If such reform is being introduced into the 'new age' ideology today, this must be credited to indoctrination mediated through members of the local government council.

731 657 423 We have seen that, at Ilimo, the traditional land tenure system was the basic cause of a conflict which strongly affected the course of the administration's resettlement policy. The officer in charge of the camp perceived two main purposes: to keep the people safe from the volcano and to rehabilitate them afterward in villages which would have a more modern life-style. As we have seen, the Orokaiva accepted both these objectives as desirable and benevolent. On the other hand, there was a difference in the importance that Orokaiva and administration attached to an early return to the home villages. The administration might have preferred a longer period of evacuation for the sake of safety from the volcano and also for the sake of its program of community education. They met, however, with a restlessness which made them hasten the disbanding of the camp. The same restlessness induced the Orokaiva to agree quickly to some programs of resettlement, not because these programs appealed to them very much but because agreement would hasten their return to the land. European

731 administrators, accustomed to secure forms of land tenure in their
own culture, could not fully share the Orokaiva anxiety about los-
657 ing their land.

423 This conflict between people and administration was settled amicably. It did, however, emphasize the fundamental difference between Orokaiva and European perceptions of the crisis. For the Orokaiva, it was the relatives—the holders of residual rights to land—who were viewed as the greatest danger, whereas the volcano was soon considered less dangerous. For the European, the relatives were not perceived as dangerous, as it was imagined they could somehow be controlled by the legal weapons available to centralized government. On the other hand, the danger of the volcano was viewed far more gravely, for the Europeans knew of no way to control future eruptions.

Both sides had a strong case in this disagreement. The Orokaiva had a strong case because the Europeans had no institutions that could have protected them against encroachments on their land. There was (and is) no adequate registry. The administration's case rested on its logical consistency with the development ideology it was trying to inculcate. The traditional Orokaiva land tenure system is incompatible with development because it impedes spatial movement and the traditional extended exchange network lacks the flexibility of a market system. Modernization depends on the creation of large corporate groups with well-defined systems of rights and obligations, instead of the subtle but essentially unstable web of warfare, diplomacy, affinity, and friendship. The 'new age' ideology of 1951, though fortified by the experience of the eruption, did not envisage modernization in this basic sense, while in 1966–1967 the implications of the 'new age' for land tenure and the kinship system were just being discovered.

179 This analysis of the 'new age' ideology indicates that it is
829 related only loosely to social and economic development. It arises
directly out of political competition between the Orokaiva, the
mission, and the government. Whenever new techniques appear to
the Orokaiva to serve this power struggle, their adoption is ad-
[731] vocated. We have seen that a traumatic event such as the eruption
of Mount Lamington, when it became the subject of Orokaiva
philosophizing, was at once put at the service of this competitive
struggle. Even when obedience to ecclesiastical and administrative rules is advocated by the ideology—and when the dire conse-